Far be it for me to decide whom Dr. Fahnbulleh has the right to insult, but if he had his own Web site, as a dispensary of his insults, I would merely link to the relevant articles, if it were still necessary to prove what a fool Dr. Fahnbulleh has made of himself. But as it is, it does not appear that any of the participating Fahnbullehs has a Web site. And if any does, none seems to be in such a rush to host Dr. Fahnbulleh’s essays.

With the potent title of "On Misunderstanding and Contradictions" Dr. Fahnbulleh’s essay sounds like Rousseau’s "Social Contract." But Fahnbulleh’s thesis is just that, "Misunderstanding and Contradictions." See for yourself. – Tarty Teh

On Misunderstanding and Contradictions
By Dr. H. Boima Fahnbulleh, Jr.

One gets the impression that the reason why some people are confused over concepts and categories is because they do not have a rudimentary understanding of these sociological constructs. A good example is the attempt to substitute elite for ruling class in the context of Liberia's history. In simple terms, the former has to do with differentiation which could be based on social status, inclinations, values, preferences and knowledge acquired.

Thus, there are political elites, educational elites, social elites, bureaucratic elites, etc. etc. The latter, ruling class, connotes a category which can only be defined within the context of the relations of production. An elite can become a ruling class, but this has to be with an alteration in the relations of production and the appropriation of the national surplus which then codifies the power relation in the nation-state. This was not the case in Liberia . . .

It is easy to read history but very difficult to interpret it. Historical interpretations deal with an understanding of the complexities of phenomena and how their relationship to other variables alter or impede the movement of the social forces. To read history is to observe facts which at times can be superficial. To interpret history is to grasp the inner dynamics of the process of transformation and thus position oneself to control or influence the emerging forces.

There are some people among us who have been reading Liberian history and have stopped at that level. They posit a category called "tribal people" and go on to bandy about a concept called "elitism" which is juxtaposed to "tribal people" and thus presents for them the primary antagonism in the struggle for liberation. This sophism has its genesis in the extrapolation from abstract ideas which bear no relationship to the reality of the Liberian struggle. Authentic knowledge can only come from participation (praxis) in the struggle, simply because it is tested and refined in the heat of battle.

The fantasy that there is a category called "tribal people" who are to be liberated from tyranny by "tribal sons" ignores the configuration of social forces in today's Liberia. It was this same fantasy that led many "tribal sons" to the firing squad behind rebel lines and there are many today who want to delude themselves that the vague category "tribal sons" is enough for the formation of that alliance which is needed to confront the tyranny and what it represents.

First, we must explore this concept of "elitism" and show how the reading--not the interpretation-- of history has led to some very inane conclusions. The slave trade on the Grain Coast was carried out in social formations which were in the process of primitive accumulation. For there to be primitive accumulation, there had to be a category of social surplus which was needed only in formations that had produced social gradations. Early societies, engaged in subsistence agriculture, produced no surplus which could be appropriated by a social group. Men and women farmed and took care of their needs. What was produced was for sustenance. The emergence in early society of chiefs, witch doctors, etc., people who were not directly engaged in production, signaled the existence of social surplus which could feed those who did not work on the land.

With this emerged a social group which by its role in society appropriated to itself the surplus which the peasants produced over and above their needs. This social group which appropriated the social surplus became the elite of those societies. The chiefs, witch doctors, goldsmiths in some social formations; mask makers in others, became special bodies of men and women by virtue of the roles they played in the appropriation of the social surplus. In the case of social formations which also appropriated surplus within the context of the tributary mode of production, like the Condo Confederation in Liberia, there was the necessity for the development of the rudimentary instruments of state building.

These social formations which were in the process of state building were advanced simply because they had developed elite gradations and written languages as forms of official communications. In these formations, there was a hierarchy of elites: from the chiefs and their households, to the gatherers of the social surplus, and then to the guardians of the social formations.

The introduction of the trans-Atlantic slave trade provided the opportunities the elites in the social formations in Liberia needed for primitive accumulation. For those who argue that they are "tribal sons" and therefore not elites, the question arises: who led the raids for slaves in the social formations? Could it have been peasants against peasants? This is very unlikely, for, as Amilcar Cabral argues: "There are no disputes between the people of Africa, only between elites." So it is and so it was! The elites of various social formations, in their bid for primitive accumulation, burrowed into other social formations and carried away the sons and daughters of the people to be sold into slavery. Those who engaged in the slave trade from Europe profited from this sordid scheme by playing on the greed and venality of the various elites in the social formations.

In Liberia, the four social formations in which the elites had advanced rapidly in the process of primitive accumulation were those which opted for the prolongation of the slave trade even after abolition in Europe. These were the Vais, the Bassas, the Grebos and the Krus, all coastal people. They had developed advanced institutions for governance and control. However, they were all separate and distinct entities and their elites were in constant confrontation, competing ruthlessly to appropriate surplus in the various modes of production. Thus, when the settlers arrived, these were the four social formations which confronted them individually.

All the wars in Liberia between the settlers and the elites of the four social formations--the Fish War of 1838 with the Krus; the Grebo War of 1875, sparked off by disagreement over the port of entry law; the 1893 war; the Vai, Gola and Dei war (the famous M. Newport fable); the war of 1915, etc. etc. were all inter-elite conflicts centred around appropriation of surplus. Interestingly, these conflicts were all separate and distinct. In the absence of any united front, the elites from the social formations could not advance beyond parochial interests. This was to be the pattern from 1822 to the 1940Ss.

The fallacy that there are "tribal people" on one side and elites on the other side is responsible for that shallowness of outlook which has bedevilled the attempt to organise the Liberian masses for the battle against exploitation. In contemporary times, the elites in Liberia have always stood together against the broad masses, be they (elites) in the True Whig Party (TWP), the National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) or the National Patriotic Party (NPP). As far back as 1912, during the administration of Arthur Barclay, the indigenous elites were bound together in a Council of Chiefs with the Secretary of Interior as the presiding officer.

Even in the case of the hut tax, the indigenous elites (the Chiefs) kept ten per cent of the amount collected from the people. This exploitation of the peasantry was done by all the elites and not only those who sat in Monrovia. No social formation in which there was surplus has existed anywhere in recorded history without elites. To argue on the contrary is to demonstrate a profound misunderstanding of the configuration of social forces in the country and undermine the struggle for the emancipation of the people.

Maybe, this fantasy about "tribal people" and "elites" is a pitiful form of opportunism which intends to ride the broken backs of peasants to power and wealth. We, on the other hand, intend to break the backs of all social parasites, be they "tribal sons" or "tribal daughters," and put power, wealth and arms into the hands of the masses, be they Kissi, Bassa, Kru, Grebo, Americo-Liberian, etc. etc. Thus for us, "history is a weapon in the ideological battle between those who want to change society--a society in a given sense--and those who want to maintain its basic features." (Samir Amin).

The confusion which reigns around elite demonstrates a pathetic vacuity which some try to camouflage with barren platitudes. We can accept these outbursts because they are rantings from men and women who have never taken part in mass mobilisation, not to mention serious political and ideological struggles. The inability to forge meaningful alliances is a consequence of the incomprehension of the contradictions which permeate the society. The argument today about "tribal people" as a collective construct misses the dynamics of our transformation.

This was the same problem which confronted the indigenous elites in the 1930s and 1940s. In the inter-elite struggle, Henry Too Wesley (former vice president), Dr. F.W.M. Morais (member of the National Legislature), and Counsellor Nete Sie Brownell (Attoney General in the Barclay Administration) saw themselves as Grebo nationalists first and foremost. It was easy to isolate and destroy them. Also, Justice F.E. Besylow and Momolu Massaquoi (former Postmaster General) saw themselves as Vai nationalists and they too suffered the fate of parochial nationalists.

Then there was Didwo Twe, the most advanced of the indigenous elites in his political understanding. He asked the British for arms to enable his Kru tribesmen to liberate themselves from oppression. Here again, his interest was confined to the liberation of Krumen and thus his isolation and destruction. Here was a man, brilliant, articulate and a serious revolutionary, who had attended St. Johnsbury Academy in Vermont and Rhode Island State College of Kingston, Rhode Island, refusing to go beyond the confines of a particular social formation and embrace the totality of the elites who wanted an alternative. His failure is the most tragic in our history because he was the most enlightened and resolute.

Throughout the history of Liberia, the inability of certain forces to exploit the contradictions within the ruling class (this is different from the elites) has hampered the attempt to build a vanguard around which the people can unite. Men like E.W Blyden, Reverend Alexander Crummel, Stephen Allen Benson, E.J. Roye, Edwin J. Barclay, etc. understood the need for that unity which could unleash a powerful force to propel the people in the struggle for justice and equality. Those who undermined their efforts were yesterday's social parasites; today's "tribal sons" and westernised caricatures, wallowing in a quadrille of irredentism.

The forces which propelled the Taylor clique to power did so because they perceived their interests to be identical with those of the clique. The Gios and Manos--victims of senseless victimization--needed a provider of weapons to ensure their survival. These Gios and Manos were "tribal sons" but many of them were from the sub-elite of Nimba (high school students from St. Mary's, Sanniquellie High and Gboveh High). As the fighting intensified in the countryside and Monrovia witnessed a reign of terror, the Gio/Mano elite from the University of Liberia sought refuge with the sub-elite. This unity between the emerging elite and sub-elite of Nimba provided opportunities for upward mobility by virtue of the gun culture.

It was in this new framework that the old elite of Nimba--the Jackson Does, Moses Duopus, Steve Daniels, etc.--emerged when they escaped from Monrovia or came in from La Cote d' Ivoire. They were regarded as competitors in the new scheme of things. Not understanding the dynamics of the situation, they felt a sense of security among their Gio/Mano tribesmen. This misunderstanding provided the axis on which the lives of the old elite were sacrificed. It was said that when Moses Duopu saw his killers (Gio/Mano tribesmen), he spoke Gio, then Mano to them, but they told him to shut up and to move back six feet. He thought they were joking until the bullets pierced his heart and lungs. Thus, our understanding of this should alert us to the reality that in the midst of upheaval and societal breakdown, the tribe cannot be the guarantor of our survival.

Those who are harping on the theme of a Krahn revival are either masochistic or downright naive. In the struggle confronting us, one needs to wean the Gio/Mano elements from Taylor's clutches by sharpening the contradictions between them. The dire financial straits and the blocking of all avenues for upward mobility because of the limited opportunities in a society chronically paralysed are sufficient and necessary reasons for the sharpening of antagonistic contradictions.

It is obvious that with the configuration of forces since the incipience of the civil war, only the Gio/Mano elements can provide the nucleus of the alliance which is needed to remove the Taylor clique. A Krahn force will only rally the Gio/Mano elements in a defensive posture around Taylor as they are bound to perceive a Krahn victory as not only signalling the demise of Taylor and his cronies, but the total destruction of the Gio/Mano people. This is the legacy of the civil war and it is the height of folly to allow the people of Nimba to regard their survival as inextricably linked to the survival of the Taylor clique.

This is exactly what is being perceived by those from Nimba who want nothing to do with the Taylor clique but are very apprehensive about a victory led by Krahn forces. To move from the ridiculous to the absurd, some people are even fantasising about a Krahn/Mandingo alliance to unseat the Taylor clique. This sort of alliance, if it is ever realised, will undoubtedly strengthen the clique as not only the Gios/Manos will fight for survival, but the Lomas will join the fray on the side of the clique as they have always regarded the Mandingoes as hostile elements.

In order to make progress in any political struggle, one has to assess the strength and weaknesses of any alliance. The weakest alliance at the moment is a Krahn/Mandingo alliance. Not only is this a throwback to the early days of the civil war; it is also the only alliance which by its mere existence solidifies the diverse forces around the clique. Isn't it interesting that the Gio/Mano elites based in the United States and Liberia (the professors, the lawyers, the engineers, the doctors, teachers, etc.) are mute on the tragedy facing their people in Nimba? The question for them is: what is the alternative?

One cannot compel them to choose between a Krahn revival with its leitmotif of revenge and the brutality of the Taylor clique which now touches them only accidentally! A constructive and veritable alliance--one geared to the removal of the clique--must have as its nucleus those from Nimba who are conscientious enough to see their survival as depending on the security and freedom of all the entities within Liberia. Their presence within the nucleus will go a long way in convincing those elements from Nimba who see their fate as intertwined with that of the clique.

The narrow nationalism which speaks ad nauseam about the revival and victory of a tribe is wrong. But then again, some people have been in America so long that they cannot even remember the road to the village of which they boast so much! Thus, it does not matter to them how we move ahead. What matters to these confused irredentists is that they have to appear relevant in order to inflate an ego. Is it any wonder that they are addicted to the childish stupidity of always having the last word? And some of them swallow unquestioningly everything they read in books as if their brains were vacuum-cleaners?

This brings me to the rhetorical repetition of "The Absent General." One would have thought that individuals who are overly presumptuous about issues in Liberia would understand simple analysis and historical sequences. The General died in November 1985. The piece "Liberia and Democracy" was written in 1986 to deal with the living social forces and the attempt at the obstruction of the democratic participation of the popular forces. The martyred General was not a factor in the democratic struggle in 1986--a struggle which had all the ingredients of caste, class and elite obfuscation in which compromises were sought, not for the advancement of the people's interests, but for the reactionary restoration of the ancient regime.

In the piece, the lack of criticism of certain forces was intentional. It was meant to build a tactical alliance in order to re-enforce the strength of the popular forces. Now, in this period of intense struggle on the home front, when the necessary alliance is needed to forge ahead, the cynical mockery of the martyred General not only irritates his people who are hovering around the seat of power, but re-enforces their determination to destroy those who were responsible for his untimely and brutal death. Common-sense should tell one that the people of the martyred General fought against state power and won decisively on the battlefield and now with state power (no matter how limited), they can still wreak havoc on those they perceive as their enemies.

When we do write about the martyred General tomorrow, it will not be in a few pages. It will be in the tradition of Graham Greene's "Getting to know the General," that beautiful narrative about the legendary General Omar Torrijos Herrera who won back the Panama Canal for his people, but was assassinated by Manuel Noriega on instructions from his masters in a certain foreign Capital.

After "getting to know" the martyred General Thomas Quiwonkpa, I am convinced that Liberian history would have been progressively different had he taken power in 1980. He was the only true revolutionary among the lot. No wonder it was he who led the uprising! He was a humble and decent man who had no love for power and wealth. His friendship was genuine and it cut across classes, tribes, elites and social groups. I remember him vividly as we embraced--that final embrace--on the banks of the Mano River at 2 a.m. on November 12, 1985. His last words were: "You cannot go in. You are not a soldier. Your role should be to help with the process of rebuilding. In case we do not succeed, you must carry on as you always say--until final victory!"

With this we parted in the blackness of the night with the Mano River flowing silently as if paying obeisance to the courage of a man who was going into battle against terrible odds. For me, every time I think of the martyred General, I repeat the words of John McCrae "In Flanders Fields:" "Take up our quarrel with the foe: To you from failing hands we throw The torch; be yours to hold it high. If ye break faith with us who die We shall not sleep, though poppies grow In Flanders fields." So, you will get to know the artyred General through us and our struggles; and when the people finally move into history, the statue of the martyred General will be at the centre of Liberation Square--at the beginning of the Avenue of the Heroic Martyrs!

We must briefly deal with the elections of 2003. Who in his/her right mind would contemplate participating in a process amidst this culture of violence? It is not for nothing that many of those talking about elections in 2003 are either sympathisers of the Taylor clique or agents provocateurs. What they are simply saying is that those who are naive or stupid should walk into the slaughter-house unaided. The reality of the Liberian situation is that there are no democratic institutions to deal with the process of democratic selection. The clique has instituted terror and banditry. In 1997, the presence of ECOMOG as a countervailing force did not stop the brutality, harassment and murder of people during the "Abacha orchestrated elections."

Imagine what it would be like in 2003 with the instruments of terror pervasive and wielded by young thugs addicted to drugs! We do not believe in playing the cynical game of those who mock at the tragedy of our people. If Taylor could not wait for an election to remove Doe because of the oppression and terror, why should any reasonable man/woman wait for an election to try and remove Taylor, now that the repression, terror and brutality have increased tenfold? There are those who do not want to learn; and this has nothing to do with a Ph.D. It is rightly said that the only true university is a library of books! Study, read, interpret and analyze and you will move away from these worthless purveyance of other people's ideas which impress only the uninitiated!

The fixation on elections is an attempt to ignore the real problem in Liberia. The nation has become "a criminal state" as citizen Tom Kamara argues. With this culture of mindless violence, we have the pitiful posture of citizen Sam Jackson (Joe Appiah Wleh) promoting himself for president. Now, from the drug cartel to the junkie would not be a degeneration for the nation and its people, but a curse of Biblical proportion! But then again, Sam Jackson is working with the clique, travelling through Europe with Shaw, Barnes and Dunbar to attract business. Imagine! European business people are not fools to invest in a country where drug dealers and international criminals hold sway. Poor Liberia! It is only in a country like ours that a Sam Jackson--an undisciplined hustler from the gutters of New York City who allowed his body and brains to be corroded by crack--can harbour the notion that he is presidential material. But then you will say "Taylor is, so why not Jackson?" And my reply will be: "That is why the epitaph for Liberia is being drafted." There is no nation at the moment. Liberia has become a sick and cruel joke!

We cannot stop people from dreaming about an election in 2003. It is their prerogative. Taylor will have to fall as Doe fell. Before we can address the question of elections, we have to deal with the issue of the gun culture. First and foremost, we have to demystify the gun. How is this done? By teaching the people to use arms. General security will be created by making it mandatory that everybody over 16 should be able to use a gun as is the case in Israel, Cuba and Libya. But first must come a revolutionary government dedicated to popular participation from the village level to the town council. The people must control popular power by constituting the armed militia in their various loci. Men and women with arms will not readily accept exploitation and repression.

There is no need to fear an armed people if you do not intend to cheat them! Now more than ever before, Liberia is in ferment and only a revolutionary regime can give the people a sense of direction. This is what happened in Uganda after Idi Amin and the bunch of political flunkies who followed him. Comrade Museveni has shown us an example of how this transformation can alter the balance of class forces and put the people at the head of the new order.

The revolutionary overthrow of the Taylor clique will be followed by a transitional period in which all genuine nationalists will be called upon to work with the people in the process of reconstruction and rehabilitation. All natural resources will be nationalized (timber, rubber, gold, diamond, etc.) for the period of the transition. The capital accumulated will be used for rebuilding homes, infrastructures, schools, hospitals, agricultural settlements, etc. All government construction projects will be undertaken by engineers and builders employed by government. Doctors in the health service will be the highest paid state employees with housing benefits and cars. Those sent upcountry will be paid twice as much as their counterparts in the city.

The Bar Association will be responsible for the selection of the Chief Justice, Associate Justices and Court Judges. Three names for each judicial position will be submitted to the Revolutionary Committee for National Salvation (RCNS) for the selection of one. The army will be abolished for the period of transition. Only the police and the security forces will remain to work with the armed militias throughout the country. A National Assembly will be formed from candidates from the various village, town and city councils. These members will be subject to recall by the various councils at anytime. Thus power will reside with the local representatives of the people. Finally, the students (high school and university), being the most conscious and revolutionary will make up the various committees for the defence of the revolution throughout the country.