Mr. Howard Kelley, a 32nd Infantry Division Veteran, has written a book describing his service during World War II. In Born in the U.S.A. - Raised in New Guinea, he shares some of his most personal experiences as a member of the "Red Arrow's" 3rd Battalion, 127th Infantry. This book offers a rare, first-hand glimpse of the 32nd Infantry Division in World War II, as seen through the eyes of an enlisted GI. Click on the book cover to the left, it will take you to Mr. Kelley's web site, where you will find information about how to purchase this book.

Luzon, largest of the Philippine group, had added importance because it included Manila, the capital, and because it had been the site of the main U.S. defeat in the Philippines in 1941-42. Bataan and Corregidor were well-remembered names to all Americans.

The 32nd Infantry Division was now a relatively small element in the great ground, air and sea force that was to concentrate its power on the task of freeing the Philippines. But in spite of this situation, so different from the days of 1942, the Division still faced some of the most bitter fighting of its World War II experience. For the Japanese Army was far from finished as a combat force.

The U.S. Military text, The War With Japan, sums up the Japanese attitude this way:

     As the year 1944 closed, the enemy nowhere exhibited any deterioration of his will to resist. He continued to fight with the same fanatic zeal and tenacity of purpose that characterized his fighting in the early days of the war. While Japanese air, ground, and naval strength had been considerably pared down, yet strong forces for defense were still at their disposal. The reduced length of the enemy’s defensive perimeter and his lines of supply inevitably worked to his advantage. Japan had lost the war, but she would not yet admit defeat.

General Marshall’s biennial report tells the story of the early days of the Battle of Luzon. Even as the 32nd Division was completing its part in the Leyte operation, the Luzon campaign opened:

     In the first week of January, a new American assault force gathered east of Leyte, slipped through the Surigao Strait over the sunken wrecks of the Japanese warships that had gone down in their attempts to turn aside the invasion more than two months before, and passed into the Mindanao and Sulu Seas. This American force was threading its way through the heart of the Philippine Archipelago and through waters where the Japanese Navy and air forces had for two years maintained unchallenged supremacy, to invade Luzon by effecting a landing in Lingayen Gulf, its classic point of greatest vulnerability.
     No opportunity was overlooked to conceal this bold plan from the Japanese. While the assault force was proceeding up the west coast of Luzon, Kenney’s planes and the guerrillas under MacArthur’s direction concentrated on the destruction of roads, bridges, and tunnels to prevent General Yamashita from shifting forces to meet the assault. The guerrillas in southern Luzon conducted noisy demonstrations to divert Japanese attention to the south. Navy mine sweepers swept the Balayan, Batangas, and Tayabas Bays on the south coast of Luzon. Landing ships and merchantmen approached the beaches until they drew fire, then slipped out under cover of night. United States transport planes flew over Batangas and Tayabas and dropped dummies to simulate an airborne invasion . . . Japanese forces on the island, harassed by guerrillas and by air, drove north, south, east and west in confusion, became tangled in traffic jams on the roads, and generally dissipated what chance they might have had to repel the landing force. On 9 January the U.S. Sixth Army, now composed of the I and XIV Corps, hit the beaches in the Lingayen Gulf. By nightfall 68,000 troops were ashore and in control of a 15-mile beachhead, 6,000 yards deep.
     The landing had caught every major hostile unit in motion with the exception of the 23rd Infantry Division to the southeast of the beachhead in the central Luzon plain and its supporting 58th independent mixed brigade 25 miles to the north of Lingayen Gulf. Yamashita’s inability to cope with General MacArthur’s swift moves, his desired reaction to the deception measures, the guerrillas, and General Kenney’s aircraft combined to place the Japanese in an impossible situation. The enemy was forced into a piecemeal commitment of his troops. The Japanese 10th and 105th Divisions in the Manila area which were to secure Highway No. 5 on the eastern edge of the central Luzon plain failed to arrive in time. The brunt of defending this withdrawal road to the north fell to the 2nd Japanese Armored Division which seemingly should have been defending the road to Clark Field.
     General MacArthur had deployed a strong portion of his assault force on his left or eastern flank to provide protection for his beachhead against the strong Japanese forces to the north and east.
     In appreciation of the enemy’s predicament the Sixth Army immediately launched its advance toward Manila across the bend of the Agno which presumably should have been a strongly held Japanese defensive line.
     The troops met little resistance until they approached Clark Field. The I Corps, commanded by MG Innis P. Swift, had heavy fighting on the east flank where the Japanese were strongly entrenched in hill positions. For the time being they were to be held there to keep the supply line for the advance on Manila secure.
     On 29 January troops of General Hall’s XI Corps under strategic direction of the Eighth Army landed on the west coast of Luzon near Subic Bay, meeting light opposition. They drove eastward to cut off the Bataan Peninsula where General MacArthur had made his stand three years before, denying the Japanese the use of Manila harbor for months.

During these eighteen days Gen. Krueger had a difficult tactical problem on his hands. Because of the strong forces the enemy had in the area northeast of Sixth Army’s beachhead, Krueger had to be certain that he assigned adequate troops to the defense of his Lingayen Gulf base and to the protection of the left flank of his advance on Manila, 120 miles to the south. On the other hand, there were obvious advantages to pushing southward as rapidly as possible. The Japanese had been thrown off balance by the speed and location of the landings, and the early capture of Manila would not only be of great psychological importance but the port of Manila was badly needed as a supply base for the rest of the Luzon campaign. Believing that a precipitate advance on Manila would lead to the outrunning of his supply facilities and expose his overextended forces to a possibly disastrous attack in the flank, Krueger decided that an all out drive on the capital city was not feasible until the 32nd Division and the 1st Cavalry Division had arrived.

“General MacArthur,” says Krueger, “was undoubtedly greatly disappointed that Manila could not be secured as early as he desired, but refrained from directing me, as he might well have done, to take a risk that I considered unjustifiable with the forces I had available at the time.”

The expected reinforcements began landing on schedule on 27 January. The 32nd Division went ashore in the Mabilao area of the Lingayen Gulf beaches, and assembled in the Manaoag-San Vincente-Mapandan area. On 30 January the Division, less the 126th Infantry, passed to control of I Corps (MG Innis P. Swift). The 126th was placed in Sixth Army reserve.

The Division was promptly committed to action. Although General Krueger had decided against a “precipitate advance” until reinforcements arrived, he had pushed steadily forward both his I Corps on the north and XIV Corps on the south. XI Corps, which had been landed by Eighth Army near Subic Bay, passed to the command of General Krueger on 30 January. The troops were now set for the attack on Manila.

General Swift’s I Corps was in action when the 32nd arrived, with the 6th Infantry Division on the right (south), then the 25th Division on the left of the 6th, and the 43rd Division on the north of the line. The 32nd Division (less its 126th Infantry) was committed on the left of the 25th Division, and by 2 February it had crossed the Agno River and cleared the enemy from the Natividad-San Nicolas-Tayug triangle and captured Santa Maria. The 126th Infantry was held in Army reserve in the Manaoag-Mapandan area.

For the first time in the Division’s World War II history, the 32nd Division Artillery (BG Robert B. McBride, Jr.) was committed in normal fashion at the start of a campaign, armed with standard division artillery weapons. The 126th FA Bn was in direct support of the 127th Infantry. The 129th FA Bn was in direct support of the 128th Infantry. The 120th FA Bn, because the 126th Infantry, which it usually supported, was in Army reserve, was given a general support role with the particular task of reinforcing the fires of the 126th FA Bn. The three light battalions had the 105 mm howitzer. The medium battalion (121st) had its normal role of general support of the Division’s attack. Its 155 mm howitzers were tractor drawn in deference to the difficult terrain of northern Luzon.

The Division’s zone of advance was now in a northeasterly direction astride the Villa Verde Trail. Originally a foot and carabao path pioneered in the 1880s by a Spanish Priest named Juan Villa Verde, this trail leads from the Lingayen Gulf area over the Caraballo Mountains to the lush Cagayan Valley of northeast Luzon. From Santa Maria, where it begins, the trail twists and turns for 27 miles (43 kilometers) to cover the 11-mile, as-the-crow-flies distance to Santa Fe. Before the start of World War II, the trail had been improved to handle cart traffic for about 9 kilometers from Santa Maria, but this section was only a 10 to 12 foot width of ungravelled clay. Although some construction was in progress in 1941 beyond this southern section, most of the rest of the trail was simply a footpath over a 4,800-foot high Salacsac Pass to Imugan, where it joined the road to Santa Fe.

The words of the Sixth Army commander, General Krueger, sum up the situation which the 32nd now faced: “The enemy had made good use of the terrain which, with its sharp ridges and deep ravines, was ideally adapted for defense. He had dug innumerable caves, had provided defense positions on the reverse slopes of the ridges and had established excellent observation stations that permitted him to use his artillery to best advantage. Repeated personal observation convinced me that the advance along the Villa Verde Trail would prove to be costly and slow.”

By 5 February the Division had advanced about a mile northeast of Santa Maria with the 2nd Battalion of the 127th Infantry astride Villa Verde Trail.

Although the 32nd was meeting increased resistance, its progress and that of the other divisions of I Corps had by now deprived the enemy of the capability of moving troops into the Central Plain area and disrupting Sixth Army’s attack on Manila either by attacks on the American rear and flanks or by cutting the attacking troops off from Lingayen Gulf supply bases. The importance of this phase of I Corps’ mission was emphasized by the determined resistance offered by the Japanese to the capture of Manila, a stubborn defense which was not to be completely overcome until 4 March.

Changes in I Corps dispositions and assignments put the 33rd Infantry Division on the left of the 32nd on 12 February, and on 15 February the 126th Infantry was relieved from its Army reserve assignment and returned to Division control. The 126th was committed with a zone of action to the left of the 127th Infantry. The three regiments of the Division were now abreast with the 128th Infantry (COL John A Hettinger), less its 3rd Battalion, on the right; and the 127th (COL Frederick R. Stofft) in the center; and the 126th (COL Raymond G. Stanton) on the left. The 3rd Battalion, 128th Infantry, was in I Corps reserve. One battalion of the 127th was not to be committed except on Division order.

The Division’s part in the Luzon campaign now developed into two separate but related actions. In the excellent Report After Action, prepared by the Division staff at the close of the operation, the attack along Villa Verde Trail northeasterly from Santa Maria during the period 12 to 24 February is called “The Fight for the Bowl.” The other phase of the operation, which started at about the same time but extended to 3 April, is called “Probing the River Valleys.” This phase was conducted mostly by the 126th Infantry and it included the driving of enemy forces from the Arboredo, Ambayabang, and Agno River Valleys to the west of the Villa Verde Trail area.

“The Basin” was formed by ridgelines that curved around and dominated the lower ground through which the trail itself ran. On these ridges the Japanese had established a major defensive position by developing the knolls into a series of mutually supporting strong points.

On 23 and 24 February one platoon of the Division distinguished itself to the degree that it was cited in War Department general orders, a most unusual distinction for such a small unit. The citation reads as follows:

     The 3rd Platoon, Company K, 127th Infantry Regiment, is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy near Santa Maria, Luzon, Philippine Islands, on 23 and 24 February 1945. The enemy was strongly entrenched on high, commanding ground and had succeeded in pinning down a substantial number of our forces for many days, halting our advance. On his own initiative, the commanding officer of Company K, 127th Infantry, asked for and received permission to attack this vital position. On the morning of 23 February 1945, at 1001 hours, he ordered the 3rd Platoon of his company, consisting of 19 men, to take and hold the hill. The terrain that led to the objective was up the face of a very steep hill which afforded virtually no cover or concealment. At 1131 hours, the platoon reached the top of the hill, hitting the enemy from the rear and catching him completely by surprise. The foe was dug in in holes from 4 to 6 feet deep, manned by 31 Japanese armed with machine guns, grenades, mortars, and small arms. For 6 hours under the most trying conditions of weather and terrain the men of the 3rd Platoon, Company K, 127th Infantry Regiment, battled a determined enemy, fighting forward inch by inch. Individual acts of heroism were numerous as man after man charged the enemy in his deep positions, frequently engaging in hand-to-hand combat. Two machine gun positions were stormed and the gunners killed at point-blank range. Though bullets were flying all about them the men of the platoon relentlessly pressed the attack. The battle ended only when every single defender lay dead. During the night and early morning of 24 February 1945 the enemy brought up fresh troops and launched a counterattack. Though greatly outnumbered our forces repulsed the enemy and inflicted heavy casualties on him. By gaining and securing the highly important position the pressure on our forces was greatly relieved and 3,000 to 4,000 yards of road which had previously been blocked were cleared, thereby making it possible to bring up much needed supplies and equipment to our men. This outstanding achievement by a platoon which consisted of only 19 men, in completely annihilating an enemy who outnumbered them and who had the advantage of both position and firepower, is in keeping with the finest traditions of American arms.

With the battle for Manila still raging, only the 25th and 32nd Divisions were available to drive the enemy out of his main position here. The 33rd, operating in the left of I Corps’ zone of action, attacked northward against the Baguio area. The 25th Division on the right pushed north over Highway No. 5 and east of it. The 32nd, in the center, settled down to the hard task of driving the enemy back along Villa Verde Trail toward Imugan and Santa Fe.

The next major terrain feature on the trail is Salacsac Pass No. 2, so designated to distinguish it from another pass farther to the east called Salacsac Pass No. 1. The trail, after running generally northeasterly for about 10,000 yards from Santa Maria, bears east and goes through the two passes in saddles between Mt. Imugan and its connecting ridges on the north and the Caraballo Mountains on the south. It then continues to the east through the village of Imugan to Santa Fe on Highway No. 5. The ridges running west from Mt. Imugan and parallel to and a thousand or more yards north of the trail became known to the men of the 32nd as Yamashita Ridge. Other designations not shown on maps but much used by the Division were numbers arbitrarily assigned to high points in the vicinity of the passes, primarily to assist in calling for artillery fires. These numbers, with a few omissions, ran from west to east and from 502 to 533. Salacsac Pass No. 2 runs between Hills 504 and 505, and Pass No. 1 is between an unnumbered hill on the north and Hill 508 on the south.

The advance from the Bowl to the Salacsac Pass area and the securing of that area was to be a long, hard job for all the elements of the Division. The difficulties for the infantry are plain enough. For the artillery, the problems of getting guns in and out of suitable firing positions, of finding and occupying observation posts, and of maintaining communications and keeping the guns supplied with ammunition – these were all complicated by the rugged terrain and lack of roads. The quartermaster, ordnance, signal, and medical troops had similar handicaps. For the engineers, particularly, the campaign soon became a nightmare of effort to keep Villa Verde Trail open and functioning as the troops advanced.

The bulk of this task fell to the 114th Engineer Battalion, commanded initially by LTC Charles B. Rynearson, then (from 2 to 17 March) by MAJ Orman L. Wallis, and later by LTC Julian V. Sollohub. In Volume I of Engineers of the Southwest Pacific there is this tribute to the Engineers of the 32nd Division:

    The 32nd Division aimed toward Santa Fe . . . by a dogged two flanked drive along the Ambayabang River and the Villa Verde Trail. Here the engineers had to move with the forward elements building a road to support the main movement against circumstances that continually seemed to make further effort futile. All along the Villa Verde Trail, under intense sniper fire and against heavy artillery of all types, they used armored dozers to break their own way and to open up new firing positions for M-4 tanks. Their dozers held first priority on the destruction “Must” lists issued in captured enemy documents. But they built their 18-mile road against all odds and the most important element of the I Corps movement was assured successful completion.

There was one pleasant change for the Red Arrow veterans as the campaign progressed. The days were still hot and the rains poured down as the dry season ended, but the nights were cool and there was even the bracing smell of pine trees as the Division fought its way up onto the knife-like ridges of the Caraballo Mountains. It was a stimulating change from the steaming jungle damp of Buna, Saidor, Aitape, and Leyte.

But there was no comparable encouraging change in the enemy’s resistance. On the contrary, his fanatic will to fight to the death even seemed to increase as the over all war situation grew more and more hopeless for the Japanese Empire.

Tactically the forces opposing the 32nd had many advantages. They not only had better observation from the higher ground they occupied, but they were thoroughly familiar with the terrain over which the Red Arrow Infantry had to advance. As an interior division in the I Corps attack, the 32nd was largely limited to frontal attacks along routes which the enemy was well prepared to defend from dug in positions covered by mines, small arms fire, and bands of machine gun fire, and further supported by registered mortar and artillery fire.

The 126th Infantry, advancing up the Ambayang River valley below and to the left of Villa Verde Trail, had particular difficulty with strong enemy cave positions. On all parts of the Division’s front, techniques combining the use of air attacks and artillery, mortar and machine gun fire with bazookas, flame-throwers and explosive charges on long poles, were developed and perfected as the fight went on. Tanks and armored bulldozers often had a vital part in eliminating a center of resistance.

The enemy did not contend himself with a static defense; sometimes he infiltrated into the Division’s area and made fanatic attacks on command posts, reserve units, and artillery positions.

The enemy’s main defenses were reached early in March. They were generally astride Villa Verde Trail about four miles west of Imugan, and covered the passes.

There is ample record from Division sources of the difficulties of the situation the Red Arrow troops had to face at this time, but General Krueger’s coldly professional assessment is the most impressive: “The terrain in this area was much worse than any which the Division had so far encountered. Hills with nearly perpendicular slopes and deep, precipitous ravines made all movements exceedingly difficult. The enemy had, moreover, utilized the terrain to best advantage by constructing numerous, mutually supporting cave positions, which had to be reduced one by one, in order to permit the eastward advanced of the Division to continue. This advance was, moreover, flanked 1,500-2,000 yards north of and parallel to the Villa Verde Trail by Mt. Imugan, on the forward slopes of which the enemy had established defensive positions and artillery observation posts. The Mt. Imugan positions dominated a stretch of over two miles of the Villa Verde Trail and his observation stations enabled the enemy to adjust his artillery fire on troops and vehicles moving along the trail, which ran along the crest of razor back ridges and formed the only route of advance. Besides, the Mt. Imugan positions enabled the enemy to repulse any direct attack through the valley north of the trail and constituted an ever present threat to the line of communications of the 32nd Division. Under the circumstances, with the enemy holding Mt. Imugan, the 32nd Division had no choice but to crack the enemy defenses on the dominating hills directly in its front some four miles west of Imugan village, since by passing them was impossible. The resulting struggle was slow and bloody and demanded the utmost of valor and fortitude on the part of our troops, especially since the Division was unable to bring all its power into play, because it had to protect its rearward communications all the way from its front lines to San Nicolas.”

Sixth Army had by now split the enemy forces on Luzon into three main groups. By far the largest of these, numbering probably over 110,000, was that in northern Luzon. It was under vigorous personal command of General Yamashita, and he was still believed capable of reinforcing the Balete Pass-Santa Fe-Imugan area. On the other hand, the smaller enemy groups in western Luzon and southern Luzon were each practically isolated and that had largely lost the ability to maneuver. They were incapable of aiding one another or of escaping to join the northern group.

As the operations progressed, it was evident that Yamashita was going to defend at all costs the mountain positions dominating the passes into the great and fertile Cagayan Valley of northern Luzon.

On 27 January 2003 a web site visitor, John Van Bogart, offered the following information about his uncle, SSG Robert "Bob" Van Bogart, and gave his permission to include the information here.
On 5 March CPT Sheldon M. Dannelly and his Co. A, 127th Infantry were given the mission of attacking Japanese forces that were impeding the Division's advance from a hill near Santa Maria, Pangasinan Province, Luzon. SSG Robert "Bob" Van Bogart was leading his platoon on a patrol during this mission when they encountered heavy enemy fire. After some fierce fighting SSG Van Bogart's platoon was successful in eliminating the Japanese machine gun position they encountered. However, in the end, SSG Van Bogart was struck and killed instantly by a Japanese sniper. SSG Robert "Bob" Van Bogart was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his brave and selfless leadership on 5 March 1945. Here is a transcript of his DSC citation:

    “For extraordinary heroism in action near, Santa Maria, Pangasinan Province, Luzon, Philippine Islands, on 5 March 1945.  When Staff Sergeant Van Bogart’s platoon, leading a combat patrol, ran into heavy enemy fire from snipers and a well concealed machine gun, a number of his men were wounded.  His platoon pinned down, Sgt. Van Bogart crawled forward alone in the face of this fire to reach the top of a near by ridge.  There he deliberately exposed himself to draw the enemy’s fire and as bullets struck close by him he located and killed two snipers.  Crawling back, he ordered his men to assault the machine gun, which he had also spotted.  He took the lead and again made his way to the ridge where he stood in full view of the enemy and delivered steady rifle fire against their position.  His men inspired by his fearless example launched an attack which quickly disposed of the emplacement.  Moving out to locate remaining snipers, Sgt. Van Bogart was hit and killed.
    His unhesitating willingness to expose himself to danger and his skilled battlefield leadership saved the lives of many of his comrades and made possible the further progress of the patrol.”

A guerrilla force, consisting largely of Filipinos under the command of COL Russell W. Volckmann, an American officer who had refused to surrender to the Japanese on Bataan in 1942, harassed the enemy throughout northern Luzon. This command, designated Guerrilla Forces, Northern Luzon, was of great assistance to I Corps by reason of its constant interference with enemy troop movements and supply activities. This force functioned, however, directly under the GC, Sixth Army.

The next few weeks were marked by some of the hardest fighting in the 32nd Division’s history. Not only were units of the Division restricted by the terrain and the tactical situation to costly frontal attacks, but the enemy made many vigorous counterattacks.

During a series of these determined onslaughts a Red Arrow man from Campobello, South Carolina, bearing the honored name of Private Thomas Atkins, more than lived up to the traditional reputation of his British namesake. A member of Company A, 127th Infantry, he earned the Medal of Honor and amazingly survived a succession of feats of courage and endurance which the official citation for his decoration barely outlines. Sadly, Thomas Atkins passed away on 15 September 1999 in Spartanburg, South Carolina at the age of 78.

As the attack progressed, positions that could not be readily reduced were by passed, kept ineffective by air attacks and continued artillery fire, and later eliminated when surrounded and cut off from supplies and reinforcements. Antiaircraft guns, little needed for defense against the now almost impotent Japanese air forces, were in some cases used to hit cave strongpoints with their high velocity shells.

As always the final struggles were decided by the leadership of junior infantry commanders. SSG Ysmael R. Villegas, a twenty-one year old squad leader in Company F, 127th Infantry, from Casa Blanca, California, who had been awarded the Silver Star on 1 March for his gallantry in the destruction of a Japanese machine gun nest, earned the Medal of Honor three weeks later during a successful attack against a strong enemy position.

The phrase “swept the enemy from the field” is perhaps not entirely accurate. Lt. William D. Zahnisor reported that after the successful charge made possible by SSG Villegas’ gallantry “seventy-five Japs lay dead in the foxholes.”

General Gill was concerned about the slow progress of the Division’s advance, particularly after one battalion of the 127th was held up for ten days south of the trail and then had to be pulled back because it could not be supplied. He expressed his concern to the army commander during one of Gen. Krueger’s visits to the Division, but Krueger assured Gill that he was fully satisfied that the Division was doing all that was humanly possible under what he called “the incredibly difficult terrain conditions and the enemy resistance facing it.”

On 22 March General Gill made a shift in his line up. The 128th Infantry replaced the 127th in its attack along the axis of the Villa Verde Trail. The 127th, less on battalion which took over the former zone of advance of the 128th, went into Division reserve. The 126th continued with its mission unchanged.

Five days later, COL Hettinger, commander of the 128th, was killed in action. A Cavalryman who had won the Silver Star and the Purple Heart in World War I, COL Hettinger had been an enlisted man in the Kansas National Guard before he was commissioned in the Regular Army in 1917.

COL Merle H. Howe succeeded COL Hettinger in command of the 128th Infantry. COL Howe now had the unique distinction of having commanded each of the three infantry regiments of the 32nd Division. He had commanded the 127th during 1943 and most of 1944, and the 126th from 5 March to 28 March 1945. Command of the 126th passed to LTC Oliver O. Dixon. COL Stofft continued in command of the 127th.

On 31 March another Division veteran, PFC William R. Shockley of Selma, California and a member of Company L, 128th Infantry, won the Medal of Honor.

PFC Shockley, who was twenty-seven, had enlisted in January 1940. He had participated in the Saidor, Aitape, and Leyte campaigns. He had been wounded at Saidor, and was awarded the Purple Heart and the Combat Infantryman Badge after that action.

During April the 33rd Division, aided by elements of the 37th Division which had been assigned to I Corps on 11 April, advanced in the left portion of the Corps zone. On 27 April the 37th Division captured Baguio, and then pushed north and northeast. On the right, the 25th Division continued its advance generally along the axis of Highways No. 5, and by the end of the month was attacking the enemy’s Balete Pass position.

For the 32nd Division April was just another month of hard fighting. There was no decrease in the stubborn resistance of the enemy. And the Division was becoming worse and worse off from shortage of men. The combat units in particular were greatly depleted by losses. The 128th Infantry was at one time down to a total effective strength of about 1,500 – less than half of its authorized strength. And the other two infantry regiments were not much better off.

Among the Division veterans killed during the month was LTC Cladie A. Bailey, commander of the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry.

The supply situation naturally became more difficult as the Division advanced farther into the mountains, and, aside from the problem of getting supplies forward, there were shortages of some kinds of ammunition.

By 3 April the 126th Infantry had largely completed its missions of probing the river valleys to the west of the Villa Verde Trail area. The final major action had been the clearing of the enemy from the horseshoe ridge around the headwaters of the Arboredo River by the 1st Battalion of the Regiment during the time from 10 March to 3 April. By Corps orders, the 126th was relieved in its zone of action by the 130th Infantry of the 33rd Division.

On 6 April the regiment was committed to the Villa Verde Trail fight with the mission of attacking east in a zone north of that of the 128th Infantry. Its objective was the high ground north and east of the trail.

The final push for Salacsac Pass No. 2 now began. The 128th was on the right and the 126th on the left and they were advancing in a generally easterly direction although battalions and companies were often attacking south or north, and sometimes even in a westerly direction, as they forced the enemy into pockets of resistance

A paragraph from the report of LTC Robert B. Vance on the action of the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, in capturing Hill 505, an enemy strong point south of Villa Verde Trail and west of Salacsac Pass No. 2 illustrates the desperate and unusual character of the fighting during this period. The battalion relieved a battalion of the 127th Infantry late in March and took Hill 505 after ten days of combat, 1 to 9 April. “By the third night,” reported LTC Vance, “our positions were past their first line of defense and several positions were directly on top of their dugouts. The openings in rear of our front line that could not be closed permanently, were guarded continuously. When any movement of any kind in the holes was heard, the guard would use hand grenades in it or try to seal it up better with sandbags. Some of the entrances to the firing parapets would go down fifteen to twenty feet with ladders leading up to the positions, which made them very difficult to close.” It was estimated that fifty Japanese committed suicide the fourth night, and as much as a week later enemy soldiers were still trying to dig their way out of some of the holes.

The 2nd Battalion, 128th Infantry, reported that during the period 2 to 11 April it wiped out two machine gun companies, killed 223 Japanese by actual count of bodies, sealed up and additional number of dead in 137 caves, captured or destroyed 12 light machine guns, 13 heavy machine guns, 2 BARs, 1 Thompson sub-machine gun, and 1 U.S. flame-thrower.

The Salacsac Pass No. 2 position was captured after bitter fighting on 10 April, according to Division records, but not until 16 April by other accounts. The discrepancy is probably explained by the fact that the “position” was not an isolated one but part of the whole main enemy position and the fighting continued with no well defined break to mark the completion of the Pass No. 2 action from the attack to capture Pass No. 1.

The 128th Infantry was by now very much down in strength. The 127th Infantry, in Division reserve, had enjoyed nearly three weeks near Asingan. Gen. Gill now ordered it to take over from the 128th. It accomplished the relief on 17-18 April, the 1st Battalion of the 127th Infantry taking over from the 3rd Battalion of the 128th, and the 2nd Battalion replacing the 128th’s other 2 battalions which together hardly had the strength of one.

The 128th was assembled near Asingan, the last elements closing into the area on 19 April. This much-needed period for rest, rehabilitation, and the absorption of replacements was to continue until 4 May, and it would have a marked effect on the future successful action of the Division.

In the meantime, the 126th, north of Villa Verde Trail, and the 127th, astride the trail, continued the pressure against the enemy positions. The 1st Battalion of the Buena Vista Regiment, a Filipino unit attached to the Division, harassed the enemy’s rear in the Imugan area. They used guerrilla tactics and functioned from a patrol base in the little village of Valdez, located to the southeast of the passes.

The fighting followed a familiar pattern for the 126th. With Company K of the 127th attached for part of the time, the regiment advanced generally southeastward, isolating and then eliminating one enemy group after another.

Although enemy air activity was much reduced, it was not entirely eliminated as a source of trouble. On 24 April an enemy plane dropped a single bomb which scored a direct hit on a building that housed the Supply Platoon of the 732nd Ordnance Company. In addition to numerous casualties, virtually the entire supply stock of the Company was destroyed. Sixteen members of the company were later awarded the Soldier’s Medal for heroism in connection with rescues of injured men from the burning building.

On 25 April David M. Gonzales of Company A, 127th Infantry, a PFC with only a little over a year’s service won the eleventh and last Medal of Honor to be awarded to Red Arrow men during World War II. This soldier, from Pacoima, California, had come overseas as a replacement in December 1944. Nevertheless, he had been awarded the Combat Infantryman Badge by 1 February after only a few weeks with his division. The story of his heroism is told in the official citation of the award of the Medal of Honor.

The three men he had rescued recovered after a brief hospitalization and returned to duty. The other two men were rescued later when the enemy fire became less intense. “The bravest thing I have ever seen a man do,” was the comment of one veteran observer.

The 127th Infantry got one company onto the crest of Hill 515 south of Pass No. 1 on 26 April. On the night of 29-30 April, 250 to 300 Japanese launched a vigorous counterattack from three directions against the hill. In the morning 109 bodies were counted around the perimeter of the company’s position. Another small attack the following night was also successfully repelled.

During the period 6-9 May the 126th Infantry was relieved by the 128th, and assembled in a rest area near Santa Maria.

At the same time, the 127th began a coordinated and somewhat complicated drive to clear the Pass No. 1 area. The 1st Battalion made a two pronged attack eastward mostly south of Villa Verde Trail. The 3rd, from a position north of the trail and slightly ahead of the 1st Battalion, attacked southward toward the trail. The 2nd Battalion, south of the trail, and considerably ahead of the 1st Battalion, attacked westward back toward the 1st, and kept pressure at the same time to the east to protect the rear of his attack.

A welcomed improvement in the situation at about this time was the fact that the counterbattery fire of the Division’s artillery had eliminated the bulk of the enemy artillery. It was a disadvantage, however, that particularly heavy rains and much fog handicapped both the fighting units and the supply services.

On 12 May General Krueger and General Swift visited the 32nd Division’s zone of action. “An inspection of elements of the 127th and 128th Infantry Regiments, some artillery units and evacuation hospitals,” says Krueger in his memoirs, “impressed me as on previous occasions with the fine performance of the 32nd Division under extremely difficult conditions.” With some forty-seven years of enlisted and commissioned service behind him, General Krueger had, in General Eisenhower’s words, “an Army-wide reputation as a hard-bitten soldier.” Favorable comment from him could always be accepted without discount.

Fighting continued throughout most of May with a final assault being launched on 23 May against the Japanese position sometimes called the Kongo Fortress and apparently regarded by them as impregnable. Nevertheless, the Division overcame the enemy’s resistance and completely eliminated all organized resistance in the area on 27 May.

Although the final assaults in the Division’s zone of action were made by the 127th and 128th Infantry Regiments, the 126th also had a part in the climax of the Villa Verde Trail operation. On 23 May, in accordance with I Corps orders, the 126th, with supporting units attached to make a combat team, arrived in the Digdig area in the zone of the 25th Infantry Division. That division, suffering heavy losses, had fought its way northward through Balete Pass and on 23 May was within about five hundred yards of Santa Fe in the south, about 1,000 yards in the southeast, and about 1,700 yards in the southwest.

The 126th RCT passed to the temporary operational control of the 25th Division and was given the mission of seizing the high ground north of Villa Verde Trail east of Imugan, and opening the trail from Santa Fe to Imugan.

The 126th accomplished its mission by 28 May. On that same day Imugan was captured. This village, the goal of the Division’s weeks of hard fighting, turned out to be a collection of about half dozen huts housing as many Igorot families. It was perhaps some feeling of an anticlimax which resulted in the inclusion of an explanation of the village’s importance in the Division’s operations report for the day: “This morning elements of the 128th Infantry and the 32nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop captured the important village of Imugan. This village, the center of enemy activity for deployment of troops to the east, south, and west was secured at 1001 when contact was made with elements of the 126th Infantry, now attached to the 25th Infantry Division, on Hill 530 (1,000 yards north of Imugan).”

General Gill radioed General Swift: “The Japanese so-called impregnable defensive lines at Salacsac Pass No. 1 and Hill Mass 527-528 have been broken completely and the defenders crushed. Small isolated remnants of his forces are now fleeing north to Imugan Valley pursued by elements of the 32nd Division. Thus the pincer movement is complete and the Villa Verde Trail is open from Santa Maria to Imugan.”

The Division commander also issued a general order to commemorate the victory:

     The 32nd Division has accomplished its mission. The enemy has been destroyed and the Villa Verde Trail secured. A passage has been forced through the Caraballo Mountains from the Central Plain to the entrance of the Cagayan Valley, thus hastening the completion of the Luzon Campaign.
     After one hundred and twenty days of fierce hand to hand combat over terrain more difficult than any yet encountered in this war, the “Red Arrow” again pierced the enemy’s line. You have crushed completely another of the enemy’s so-called impregnable defenses, brilliantly concluding the Division’s 5th campaign in the Pacific Theater.
     I desire to express to every officer and enlisted man in the Division, as well as those attached, my heartfelt appreciation of the courage and determination each has shown while playing his vitally important part in this long and arduous campaign. You have outfought and destroyed a cunning and determined enemy, and enemy occupying elaborately prepared defenses on ground of his own choosing. Your victory was impressive and decisive and one of which you may well be proud.
     It is with justifiable pride and complete confidence that I look forward to your continued success into the heart of Tokyo.

Later the unit was cited in War Department general orders:

     The 114th Engineer Combat Battalion is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy on Luzon, Philippine Islands, from 1 February to 4 June 1945. During this period, the battalion carried out its duties of supporting the advance of the division attack by means of engineer work, under conditions which demanded the utmost in devotion to duty to overcome the enormous difficulties presented by a combination of incredibly difficult terrain and a stubbornly resisting, fanatical enemy. The enemy, throughout the period, covered the hazardous operations with close range, small arms fire, as well as direct fire from mountain guns. In the close terrain, the  enemy fought fanatically from caves and, since the infantry units were spread along lengthened lines of communication, the engineers frequently furnished close in security for equipment and working parties. Engineer bivouacs were subjected constantly to enemy artillery fire and raiding parties. Dozer operators were harassed continually by enemy small arms fire from positions less than 50 yards away. To give maximum support to the infantry elements, engineer reconnaissance was carried well forward, with engineers accompanying patrols of the advance troops. One such engineer party was wiped out by an enemy ambush but this did not stop the determined engineers from continuing their exacting tasks. Equipment and working parties were endangered constantly by slides and washouts and many men were injured by falling rock banks. Enemy artillery barrages held up work momentarily on occasions, but nothing daunted the engineers, who drove forward, despite the difficulties and dangers. The battalion maintenance personnel went as far forward as road conditions would permit, despite enemy observation and fire. The administrative personnel of the battalion worked long hours to insure adequate engineer supply and proper maintenance of reports. The tremendous accomplishments achieved by the 114th Engineer Combat Battalion were of vital importance to the division’s success in overcoming fanatical Japanese resistance.

    The 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry Regiment, is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy in the Caraballo Mountains, Luzon, Philippine Islands, from 23 March to 30 May 1945. Over what has been officially referred to as “some of the bloodiest fighting in the history of the United States Army,” the 1st Battalion, during this period, attacked and vanquished the fanatical enemy entrenched in seemingly impregnable fortifications controlling the Villa Verde Trail. So long had the enemy been in preparation of its cave fortifications, so elaborate had been their preparations, and so skillfully were these enemy defensive positions located, that the entire operation for the 1st Battalion consisted of assaults upon fortified positions. In the reduction of this force’s forward area near Salacsac Pass Number 2, the 1st Battalion killed 700 Japanese, demolished innumerable cave positions, and captured countless enemy weapons. On May 1945 (sic) the 1st Battalion, after nearly complete replacement of its personnel because of combat casualties, began the attack on Hill 508, the commanding ground in the division sector and the focal point of the elaborate enemy defensive system. By skillful and courageous use of the flamethrowers, demolition charges, and hand grenades, the assault force literally blasted and buried enemy troops to annihilation as the battalion fought its way onto the hill. Because of the clever employment of the enemy's weapons for mutual fire support in breadth and depth, the most exact coordination between elements of the battalion was required. Many times fire direction was given by forward assault groups for adjoining attackers in order to overcome the usual poor observations. Often during the assault on Hill 508, the attackers found that the Japanese tunnels and underground positions extended completely through ridges, all of which were virtually invulnerable to bombs and artillery. After 9 days of constant assault on the hill mass, during which the Japanese made innumerable counterattacks, the 1st Battalion overwhelmed the entire hill to complete the annihilation of the Sampei force. Upon examinations of the conquered fortress, it was found that the main cave was approximately 200 feet long, with numerous compartments leading from the main tunnel. The 1st Battalion suffered 600 combat casualties in this extremely costly battle for control of this sector of the Villa Verde Trail area. The 1st Battalion fought against the enemy’s key positions and his most determined troops, killing more than 1,400. Despite the casualties and adverse conditions the officers and men of the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry Regiment, never wavered from their determination to destroy the enemy and complete an extremely difficult mission.

     The 3rd Battalion, 128th Infantry Regiment, is cited for outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy on Luzon, Philippine Islands, from 24 March to 31 May 1945. The 3rd Battalion, during this period, attacked and vanquished the fanatical and aggressive enemy entrenched in seemingly impregnable fortifications controlling the Villa Verde Trail. The enemy timetable permitted them months of preparation, during which, they honeycombed the hills with elaborate systems of caved, prepared fortified emplacements for artillery and machine guns, familiarized themselves with the terrain, and cached huge stacks of supplies and ammunition. Dense forests, thick scrub and underbrush, and concentrated patches of razor sharp kunai grass afforded the enemy the most ideal natural defensive positions ever encountered. Defense of these hills consisted of series after series of pillboxes heavily armed with machine guns and mutually supported automatic and small arms fire. These position were so well dug in and protected that they were not seriously affected by our artillery and mortar barrages and had to be reduced one by one by organized assault groups. The commitment of the 3rd Battalion, in a series of coordinated attacks against enemy held hills, launched the unit into one of the bloodiest, most bitterly contested engagements of the entire campaign. In one four day period, 220 Japanese were killed and many were buried in the 44 caves and pillboxes sealed and overrun. Bangalore torpedoes, rocket launchers, pole charges, hand thrown demolitions, and flame throwers literally blasted and buried enemy troops to annihilation as the slow, costly advance rolled on until these hills were taken. The capture of these hills isolated cut off pockets of enemy forces and made possible the extension of the supply road. Further advance was impeded by the enemy’s positions on another hill. This hill consisted of a series of steep gullies and ridges approximately 800 yards long, running parallel to the trail and south of it. Its commanding ground dominated over 1,000 yards of the trail and, until secured, prevented all forward movement. The 3rd Battalion was assigned the mission of capturing this hill and establishing a roadblock on the trail from the south by this flanking movement. Again the battalion encountered stiff enemy resistance in well-fortified and mutually supported caves, machine gun pillboxes and dug in snipers. Accurate enemy indirect and point blank artillery subjected our troops to heavy fire. Once again the experienced assault groups burned, blasted, and fought their way through pocket after pocket of these fortified positions. Again demolitions, rocket launcher, flame throwers, pole charges, close in fighting, and hand to hand combat wrested positions form the tenacious enemy. In 4 days of ferocious assault, fortifications were reduce and control of dominating hills established. When advanced elements of the division found themselves isolated, because of cutting of their supply line, elements of the 3rd Battalion were rushed to that area. A new trail was cut to the isolated elements and, in a series of bloody, savage attacks, they completely annihilated the Japanese blockading the old supply route. During this phase, the enemy controlled a section of the Villa Verde Trail. A three-way pincer movement was initiated to eliminate this enemy group. Throughout this entire phase, it was a case of engaging and destroying installations, caves, and pillboxes, one by one. The fanatical enemy had to be killed to the last man, each determined to fight to the end. The onslaught of the American troops, closing from all sides, was so fierce that the spirit of the defenders of the Villa Verde Trail was broken forever. During the above mentions period, the 3rd Battalion killed at least 741 Japanese, while countless others were smothered and buried in caves. The indomitable courage of the 3rd Battalion, 128th Infantry Regiment, and their aggressiveness in battle against an enemy favored by both perfect defensive terrain and oriental fanaticism were determining factors in the conquest of the Villa Verde Trail.

    The 126th Field Artillery Battalion is cited for extraordinary heroism and outstanding performance of duty in action against the enemy on Luzon, Philippine Islands, from 30 January to 3 June 1945. For the entire 125 days necessary to complete this operation, the 126th Field Artillery Battalion was in continuous direct support successively of the 127th, 126th, and finally, of the 128th Infantry Regiments of the 32nd Infantry Division. To do so, it was forced to position itself and its guns amidst treacherous terrain and precipitous cliffs, carving its final position by hand and by bulldozer form a hillside 4,000 yard west of Mt. Imugan, in order that it might support decisive infantry operations toward Mt. Imugan and Santa Fe in the ensuing 10 weeks. Only from this position and no other could fire support be effectively maintained against a fanatical and well dug in enemy, who subjected the unit to all kinds of harassment, registering continually upon its position with small arms and artillery fire of all calibers and ceaselessly practicing well developed infiltration tactics. Regardless of the extreme hazard and danger of necessity placed upon it and with a grim tenacity of purpose and even greater heroism, the 126th Field Artillery Battalion, with a magnificent esprit de corps, maintained both its position and its fires until the completion of the 32nd Division’s operations, covering its relief and withdrawal and being the last unit to leave the scene of the action. In this period it fired more than 69,200 rounds of ammunition for a rate of better than 1 every 2 minutes. Despite this heavy rate of fire, it was successfully delivered without inflicting a single casualty upon the supported infantry, a support action rendered under all but impossible conditions. Wire communications and supply were maintained at a great cost to the battalion, which, in addition, being denied flank support because of a shortage of troops within the Division itself, was forced to maintain its own security by constant patrolling action. Because of the extreme hazard of the position, casualties were heavy, both at the position and in the forward areas, where forward observers and liaison parties consistently operated, the battalion suffering more than all other artillery units of the division concerned. This brought about a critical shortage of personnel, resulting in officers and men maintaining themselves for periods as long as 37 days in the forward areas without relief and despite the need in many cases for hospitalization. Throughout this time, many acts of individual heroism and gallantry were performed by officers and men of the battalion, who so successfully completed their mission as to play a paramount role in the opening of the Villa Verde Trail, an action in which Japanese (commanded by General Yamashita) suffered more than 9,000 casualties. The skill in battle, accuracy of their fires, and selfless devotion to duty displayed by the officers and men of the 126th Field Artillery Battalion, during this critical phase of the Luzon campaign, not only reflect great credit on the members of the battalion but on the battalion itself, the 32nd Division, and military service as well.

The issue of 1 June 1945 included headlines about reports that the Allies had begun prosecution of Nazi war criminals, that withdrawal of Allied troops had been requested by the Iran Government, and that “Soviets Open Great Army Training Camps in Siberia, Call Up 15-16 Year Olds.” Two stories of more immediate interest to Red Arrow men were featured. Boxed on page 1 was this commendation from General Krueger, Sixth Army commander, and General Swift, I Corps commander:

    From:  CG, I Corps
    To:  CG, 25th Inf. Div.
    CG, 32nd Inf. Div.

    The following message from the Army Commander is transmitted with pleasure: “Heartiest congratulations for a fine performance in capturing Santa Fe and Imugan and in opening the Villa Verde Trail for its entire length. Please convey to the officers and men of the 25th and 32nd Divisions and their supporting troops my sincere appreciation of their skill and gallantry, and their fortitude whereby this noteworthy achievement was made possible.” To the above I add my congratulations on the accomplishment of a most difficult task. Swift.

     Tuesday night the voice of a veteran news commentator went out over the CBS network, telling the story of the 32nd Division’s engagement direct from the Division forward CP. In the first broadcast of its kind to be beamed out from this Division, William J. Dunn – himself a veteran of the whole Pacific war – said in part:
     “Two and a half years ago down at Buna on the flat coastal plain of eastern New Guinea I saw this same division fight the first big scale attack ever staged by American troops in the southern Pacific. It was the 32nd that started us on an entirely new type of warfare – jungle warfare – at Buna and taught us how to beat the Japs out of their foxholes and pillboxes.
     “Now the 32nd is just about to complete a four months campaign of an entirely different sort – a mountain campaign over ranges as rugged as I ever saw in New Guinea, China or Burma – a campaign as different from Burma as black from white.”
     Dunn, who flew here to make the broadcast, continued: “This microphone is located in the very heart of what Radio Tokyo not long ago referred to as an impregnable defense line. And Radio Tokyo had reason to boast. The Japs are really dug in and armed as they had never been armed before. For instance, one unit which normally carried eight machine guns was here equipped with 34.”
     In conclusion Dunn said: “Major General William H. Gill has a right to be proud of his fighting 32nd.”

     “That’s Vinegar Joe!” amazed Red Arrowmen exclaimed recently as a dusty jeep sped up the mountain trail. And they were right – the vehicle’s occupant was that legendary figure, the man who led the long, heart-breaking trek through Burma in the early dark days of the war; General Joseph W. Stilwell, now commander of the Army Ground Forces. General Stilwell, on a tour of Pacific fronts, took a good look at the 32nd’s sector. After touring the area over which the Division fought during the past four months, he commented:
     “The 32nd Division has done a very fine and creditable job.” Wearing his battered old-style campaign hat, HBT’s and combat boots, the tall, raw-boned figure was quickly recognized by veterans of the 32nd, although he did not wear insignia. Asked if this campaign was tough as that in Burma, Stilwell said:
     “Tough? This is as tough as anything could be. Terrain doesn’t come any worse. In Burma it was thick impenetrable jungle, and here its cliffs seemingly impossible to scale and the worst sort of mountain terrain. Burma or this sector – it’s a toss up.
     “The Japs used the same type of defense in Burma, only their caves weren’t so elaborate as those found here. Dugouts were their mainstay there.
     “The Division has a splendid record which will be very hard to beat.” The General concluded.

Another publication of great interest to veterans of the Division was a very well done thirty-page history of the Division’s part in World War II. It was titled 13,000 Hours, and included pictures and maps. The Division’s Public Relations Office, which prepared the booklet, based the title on the statement: “Three years overseas, as of midnight, April 21, 1945, 13030 Hours of combat, more than any other division in World War II have gone into the record.” Printed by the 2773rd Engineers and “approved for mailing by military censorship,” it provided them with a record to send home to “the folks.”

General Krueger’s Sixth Army headquarters, planning well ahead as an army headquarters must, had already, on 24 May, issued a field order which included in its provisions the operations to be undertaken by I Corps as soon as the Santa Fe – Imugan area was captured. The 25th and the 33rd Infantry Divisions were eventually to be concentrated in rear areas to ready themselves for Operation Olympic, the invasion of Japan. The 37th Infantry Division was to take over from the 25th and exploit the enemy’s defeat in the Santa Fe – Imugan area. The 32nd was to be withdrawn from Villa Verde Trail as soon as the tactical situation permitted, and was later to relieve the 33rd Division in its zone of action.

I Corps passed these orders on to the 32nd with additional missions and details of time and method. Although a few Japanese positions remained in the Villa Verde Trail area, the seizure of Santa Fe and the activities of the 37th Division as it pushed north would cut off the enemy’s supplies. Not only could these isolated Japanese units be controlled by a small force, but the supply of the Division by way of the Trail was rapidly becoming almost impossible. The heavy downpours and fogs of the rainy season made movements of vehicles very difficult. Washouts and landslides were frequent.

The withdrawal of the Division began on 30 May with the movement of the 128th Infantry, less its 2nd Battalion, to the vicinity of Aringay. The following day, the 127th, less detachments, began moving to the vicinity of Bauang, and the remainder of the Division, less the 126th RCT, following during the ensuing week.

The 2nd Battalion of the 128th Infantry, reinforced, called Holden Force from the name of the battalion commander (LTC Maurice B. Holden), took over the task of cleaning up and controlling what had been the Division’s zone of action. Companies F and G, plus the mortar platoon of Company H, 127th Infantry, and Battery A, 121st Field Artillery Battalion, were attached to Volckmann’s force, the Philippine guerrilla command operating in North Luzon.

The 126th RCT remained attached to the 25th Infantry Division, and was used primarily to mop up the Santa Fe – Imugan area.

During the period 4 to 30 June, the bulk of the 32nd Division was located in the Bauang-Naguilian – Caba – Aringay area engaged in rest, rehabilitation and training, plus security missions in its area. The daily routine pattern was training in the morning, recreation and athletics in the afternoon, and daily motor patrols throughout the area for which the Division was responsible.

On 30 June elements of the Division began to move to the south end of Cagayan Valley. At midnight of that day, the Division passed to control of XIV Corps (LG Oscar W. Griswold). At the same time, the responsibility for all remaining combat missions on Luzon passed from General Krueger to the Commanding General, Eighth Army (LG Robert L. Eichelberger). Sixth Army was to get its troops ready for Operation Olympic, the assault of Kyushu, southernmost island of Japan. Eighth, Tenth and First Armies (the last redeployed from Europe) were scheduled to attack the main Japanese island of Honshu in the early spring of 1946.

The officers and men of the 32nd, as indicated by General Gill’s phrase, “I look forward to your continued success into the heart of Tokyo” in his general order at the end of the Villa Verde Trail operation, expected to be in the final assault on the heart of Japan, but in the meantime they had a job of mopping up to do.

The Luzon Campaign had, in some degree at least, officially come to an end, but it was, in fact, far from concluded. General Eichelberger, in his book, criticizes General MacArthur or “his immediate assistants” for announcing victories too early. He is particularly bitter about the phrase “mopping up.” “If there is another war,” he says, “I recommend that the military, and the correspondents, and everyone else concerned, drop the phrase ‘mopping up’ from their vocabularies. It is not a good enough phrase to die for.”

Actually, 30 June 1945 was only the date of the changeover of command on Luzon. Later, the War Department set 4 July as the termination date for the battle credit, Luzon. But the 32nd Division and other units continued active operations against opposition until 15 August, and as will be seen, it was some time after that before Yamashita surrendered.

The battle casualties of the Division for the Luzon Campaign up to midnight, 30 June 1945, were as follows:
 

Most of the battle casualties occurred in the four month period from 1 February to 31 May 1945.

These figures, however, only partly tell the story of the larger turnover of officers and men during the campaign. In addition to the casualties, several hundred officers and several thousand enlisted men were relieved from the Division under rotation plans. During the operation, 238 officers and 6,661 enlisted men were received as replacements, and 214 officers and 5,747 enlisted men were reassigned to the Division after hospitalization. Some of these latter had, of course, only been absent from the Division for brief periods. But the overall figures indicate that a tremendous personnel administrative and training burden was carried by the Division during and exceptionally difficult period of combat.

The 32nd Division started the campaign considerably under strength, with only 625 officers and 10,499 men present for duty on Luzon. The comparable figures on 30 June 1945 were 623 officers and 12,258 men.

The Division’s after action report for the Luzon Campaign pays tribute to the often forgotten help given by the Red Cross field workers, two of whom, Chet Whidden and Clyde Ryberg, were particularly mentioned in later postwar stories. “The American Red Cross representatives,” says the official Division report, “did a commendable job during the operation, supplying front line troops with necessities and luxury items. Red Cross Canteens were maintained in all rear areas, and improvised mobil canteens served front line troops. Their efforts during this operation deserve much recognition.”
 

Sources:

32nd Infantry Division - World War II
New Guinea - The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War II
Papuan Campaign - The Buna/Sanananda Operation