The Nuclear Coalition
If Yucca Mountain is not merely a scientific issue, but a battle
of warring ideologies vying for power, who are the warriors in
this conflict? Opposition to the repository is often naively
depicted as a simple grassroots environmental movement. Nuclear
proponents (labeled generically as "the nuclear industry"),
are in contrast seen as a monolithic entity. In reality, the
structure of the two warring camps is much more complex than
this and deserves explanation. We start with the nuclear proponents.
NUCLEAR COALITION VS NUCLEAR INDUSTRY
The most important thing to understand about the nuclear industry
is that there is none. There are utilities that have nuclear
plants, there are companies that provide nuclear components, there
are government agencies that oversee nuclear technology and there
are trade organizations that promote nuclear issues. Nevertheless,
as a whole these entities are not monolithic and are not engaged
exclusively in nuclear energy technology but compete in a variety
of energy and industrial technologies.
Because the industry is so fragmented, nuclear energy has no
dedicated champions willing to risk all in its defense. The result
is that the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository now stands
at risk of being defeated politically before it has been studied
scientifically. Recognizing Nevada is perhaps a final battleground,
the various nuclear entities have begun to evolve from a passive
to active role in promoting the repository. The Nevada Initiative,
a combined public relations and lobbying effort was created in
1991 by the American Nuclear Energy Council and other nuclear
trade organizations to convince Nevadans of the inevitability
and potential benefits of accepting the nuclear repository in
their state. The political sparks now flying in Nevada are in
large part the result of nuclear institutions finally confronting
an already entrenched nuclear opposition on the repository issue.
The Department of Energy is charged with conducting the Yucca
Mountain site characterization, however because of federal restrictions
it is not designed to be an active proponent of nuclear energy.
Nuclear trade organizations like the American Nuclear Energy Council
(ANEC) and more generic power industry groups like the U. S. Council
on Energy Awareness (USCEA) have been at the forefront of the
political war to convince Nevadans of the safety and potential
benefits of accepting the repository. However, these trade groups
have often had conflicting allegiances and sometimes warred with
themselves. For example, while ANEC strictly represents nuclear
interests, the USCEA represents both nuclear and traditional utilities,
some of which have little or no stake in promoting nuclear technology.
Recognizing that they could not effectively promote nuclear energy
as a disjointed industry at odds with itself, in December of 1993
four lobbying organizations combined to create the Nuclear Energy
Institute (NEI). Merged into the new organization were the American
Nuclear Energy Council, the Nuclear Management and Resources Council,
the U.S. Council on Energy Awareness and the Edison Electric Institute.
The first president and CEO of the NEI is former USCEA President
Phillip Bayne. The hope is that consolidation under the NEI will
allow this new coalition to mount an effective counter campaign
against the environmental lobby which has for the last twenty
years monopolized media coverage and political debate on nuclear
issues.
BRIEF HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
After World War II and the exploding of atomic bombs at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, research began on other military uses of nuclear
energy, most notably hydrogen bomb development and the nuclear
submarine reactor program. However, it was the submarine reactors
developed by Admiral Hyman Rickover for the Navy in the 1950s
that eventually became the basis of our commercial nuclear power
industry.
To counter the horrific images of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, President
Harry Truman and U.S. scientists attempted to paint a positive
public perception of the "friendly" atom and were for
the most part successful. This was an era in which scientists
were trusted almost implicitly and there was great optimism that
the atom could be harnessed for peace. Over the ensuing decades
until the present, more than one hundred nuclear reactors were
brought on-line in the U.S., providing 21% of the nation's energy.
Although concerns for disposal of radioactive waste were lax
in the earlier years, the National Academy of Science concluded
as early as 1955 that geologic storage would be the most likely
means of storing the accumulating radioactive wastes. Still,
the first major attempt to seriously study a geologic burial site
was not until a salt dome structure at a site near Lyons, Kansas
was investigated in the early 1970s. This study ended when it
was found that nearby brine extraction activities compromised
the integrity of the site, effectively ending further study of
salt domes for commercial high level waste (although not for military
waste as at New Mexico's Waste Isolation Pilot Project).
Previous to the Carter presidency, an attempt was made to reduce
the volume of waste through a breeder reactor program which would
have recycled spent fuel into new forms of nuclear fuel. The
Clinch River Breeder program was canceled by Carter shortly after
construction began, in part because falling uranium prices made
the separation of plutonium cost prohibitive, and because the
plutonium was viewed in many circles as being part of the expanding
nuclear arms race. This changed the calculus of nuclear waste
disposal because it had been anticipated that spent fuel would
only be stored temporarily near reactor sites in holding pools
before being shipped out for reprocessing. The pools were not
designed for long-term storage and therefore the nation was faced
with the dilemma of finding a way to dispose of the waste.
In 1982, congress attempted to resolve the disposal issue with
enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The act committed the
government to accepting the waste from commercial nuclear utilities,
conditional on setting up a Nuclear Waste Fund paid through a
mill levy on nuclear rate payers. Originally, nine sites were
chosen for study: Yucca Mountain, Nevada; Davis Canyon and Lavender
Canyon, Utah; Deaf Smith and Swisher, Texas; Vacherie Dome, Louisiana;
Cypress Creek Dome and Richton, Mississippi.
In 1987, an amendment to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (the so-called
"Screw Nevada Bill") was pushed through congress which
limited study to Yucca Mountain. Senator Bennett Johnston, D-La.,
sponsor of the amendment, also proposed legislation that would
have substantially increased benefits to Nevada, but his efforts
were rudely rejected by Governor Bryan and Senator Harry Reid
of Nevada, an insult still not forgotten by Johnston.
By 1990, it was clear that the Yucca Mountain project was in
political trouble in Nevada, so much so that the entire project
was in danger of being derailed. At this time, the American Nuclear
Energy Council brought on Las Vegas public relations experts to
bolster the pro-nuclear presence in the Nevada community. ANEC's
Nevada consultants were anxious to go to a full fledged political
war against the anti-nuclear activists in Nevada, backed by promises
of $10 million in funding over three years from the industry.
This strategy was in sharp contrast to the passive approach the
industry had taken until that time. Tentative steps towards an
aggressive advocacy war brought political heat that the industry
was not comfortable handling and they backed down, spending only
$2.5 million over four years, less than the yearly advertising
budget of some Nevada car dealerships.
With the election of Bill Clinton in 1992, the nuclear industry
faced the prospect of being regulated by former senator Timothy
Wirth, the heir apparent to the Secretary of Energy position with
strong ties to the anti-nuclear environmental movement. The industry
was pleasantly surprised with Clinton's choice of Hazel O'Leary,
a lawyer with Washington Beltway and nuclear utility experience
who was sympathetic to the industry position on Yucca Mountain.
Paradoxically, O'Leary caused severe problems for the industry's
efforts in Nevada because nuclear lobbyists felt her position
within the Clinton administration was vulnerable and they didn't
wish to lose this lone ally.
Pro-repository advertising was pulled in Nevada in 1993 because
Secretary O'Leary did not wish to have a confrontational atmosphere
and the nuclear industry was overly eager to please; this effectively
ceded the field to anti-nuclear activists who were under no such
constraint. In late 1993, Secretary O'Leary began revealing past
indiscretions of the Department of Energy in regard to non-consensual
testing of human subjects with exposure to radiation doses. The
ensuing media circus this engendered made objective discussions
of nuclear risks nearly impossible during 1994, biasing the upcoming
1994 elections against those with any allegiance to the nuclear
industry.
The reorganization of the "nuclear industry" lobby,
the appointment of Hazel O'Leary and backroom political maneuvers
substantially neutralized the Nevada Initiative in 1993 and 1994.
The nuclear coalition further weakened its position by agreeing
to a backroom deal, "Nuke Lite", designed to save Democrats
Governor Miller and Senator Bryan from opposition in the 1994
campaign and bolster the Clinton presidency in exchange for promises
of future cooperation. However, these compromises only delayed
a critical future decision for nuclear interests. If present
nuclear facilities are to continue operation (much less for new
nuclear capacity to be brought on-line), the nuclear coalition
must make a decision whether to fight a holding action or go on
the offensive in Nevada. Yucca Mountain is therefore the linchpin
determining whether nuclear technology slowly strangles, or whether
it thrives and sees a new renaissance.