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THE AMERICAN NATION : A HISTORY
VOLUME 9
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
NEW YORK AND LONDON
HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS
published 1905, public domain
IN the spring of 1777 the British government renewed the plan of campaign which had been partly executed in the preceding year. The city of New York was now in British hands, and Washington at Morristown with his remnant of an army was not a serious menace to its possession. At the north, though Carleton, in 1776, had failed to seize Ticonderoga, yet he had driven an entering wedge which would greatly aid an army starting south from that point. Lord George Germaine and General Burgoyne,(1) taking this view of the field, and knowing that the valleys of the Mohawk and the Hudson, which were then the only inhabited parts of New York, were filled with Tories, determined to send three armies along these seeming paths of least resistance, severing the American confederacy at the Hudson, and ending the war by subduing rebellious New England, after it was thus isolated.
General Burgoyne himself was to lead an army down from Canada, taking Ticonderoga, and thence
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(1) Burgoyne's letter, in Gentleman's Magazine, 1778, p.156.
[158] advancing down the line of the Hudson to Albany. Colonel St. Leger was to take a smaller force to Oswego on Lake Ontario, and thence advance upon Fort Stanwix on the upper waters of the Mohawk, taking that with the aid of Tories and Indians, and coming down the Mohawk to meet Burgoyne at Albany. Sir William Howe, meanwhile, was to ascend the Hudson from the city of New York, forcing with the main army the passes of the highlands and joining the other two armies at Albany.(1) The success of the campaign, it will be seen, depended upon perfect co-operation. St. Leger's movement might fail with no fatal consequences, except to his own army, but Burgoyne's and Howe's armies must support each other faithfully, if they were to prevent the danger of being overwhelmed in detail by the Americans operating from the centre of the converging lines of British attack.
It is easy to criticise the plan when we know the outcome. The dangers proved manifold. Burgoyne's army and that of St. Leger had to move through a wilderness almost trackless, which made it impossible to tell how far they could march in a given time. Again, the ministry had forgotten that Burgoyne's proposed route, though it was through country which was loyal enough, was flanked by New England territory the hostility of which was unquestioned. The situation gave the eastern militia precisely the work that they could do best :
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(1) Fortescue, History of the British Army, III., 204-207.
[159] thousands of sturdy farmers who would not join the regular army were ready enough to shoulder a musket for a few weeks and fight the invader. The greatest of all the errors, however, was the attempt to direct the campaign from London instead of leaving the generals in the field the freedom of choice at a critical moment. How fatal this interference was the story will show.
About June 1, 1777, Burgoyne set out with a superb army of nearly eight thousand men-including about four thousand British regulars, three thousand German troops, and about six hundred and fifty Canadian militia and Indians. By July 1 he appeared before Ticonderoga, where St. Clair, with three thousand men, awaited his attack. Though the fort, properly manned, was strong otherwise, it was commanded by the summit of a crag hardly a mile distant.(1) General Gates, who was in command during the preceding year and up to within three weeks of Burgoyne's attack, had refused to fortify this point, and St. Clair had delayed until too late. The British dragged cannon to the summit and the Americans were plainly trapped unless they at once abandoned the fort.(2) Saving what stores they could they fled in the night, and, though, pursued and harassed, they joined General Schuyler who at Fort Edward was in command of the main northern army.
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(1) St. Clair Papers, I., 76; Tuckerman, Schuyler, 193, 194.
(2) Stevens, Facsimiles, No.1571.
[160] So general was the misconception of the importance of Ticonderoga, which had lost much of its value since the capture of New York, that all America was alarmed at its loss. John Adams talked wildly of shooting a general,(1) and though in the following year St. Clair's flight was vindicated by a court- martial,(2) yet Gates, the real culprit, was from now on talked of as the successor of Schuyler, who in some way was blamed for Ticonderoga's loss. To understand this unjust distribution of censure and reward. requires a brief survey of American political and military affairs.
The spring of 1777 found the relations between the several states less unified than in the preceding year. Jealousy between the states was so bitter that when Congress was called upon in February to appoint five new major-generals(3) they could not make appointments according to merit, but were obliged to divide the prizes between the several states. In consequence of this jealousy Benedict Arnold's desperate march through the Maine woods his unsuccessful but heroic attack upon Quebec, and his defence of Lake Champlain could not be rewarded because his state already had more than her share of major-generals.(4)
A still less creditable reason for this neglect of
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(1) John Adams, Familiar Letters, 292.
(2) St. Clair Papers, I., 95.
(3) Journals of Congress, February 19, 1777.
(4) Washington, Writings (Ford's ed.), V., 304.
[161] Arnold was his friendship for General Schuyler, a man of noble and upright character, who belonged to one of New York's finest families, and who had from the first ably commanded the northern department of the army. Schuyler was hated by New England because he actively defended New York's claims to Vermont,(1) and this hostility of the New England men was ably seconded by General Gates, who hoped for Schuyler's place should he lose it. Gates had gained some unearned credit when Carleton failed to attack Ticonderoga in the fall of 1776, and he now vociferously took New England's view in the Vermont dispute, thus rising greatly in the opinion of the two powerful Adamses. Still another fact aided the designing Gates. Out of the ill-fated Canadian campaign grew foolish charges against Schuyler and Arnold, and though both stood an investigation and proved the charges to be unjust,(2) yet there was left a cloud of prejudice and misunderstanding which, later, cost Schuyler his place and subjected Arnold to a series of slights and insults which finally undermined his patriotism.
For the present, Arnold yielded to Washington's entreaty, and promised to serve with his old rank. Almost at once he became the hero of a brilliant exploit near his home at New Haven where he was visiting.(3) Tryon with two thousand British troops
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(1)
Tuckerman, Schuyler, 223-227.
(2) Journals of Congress, July 30,
1776.
(3) Arnold, Arnold, 130.
[162] destroyed the patriot stores at Danbury and fired the town. The local militia resisted, and Arnold with six hundred men engaged the British force at Ridgefield (April 27, 1777), defeating them and barely allowing the remnant to reach the sea and escape. The soldiers declared that Arnold "fought like Julius Caesar "; and Congress now made him major-general, without, however, restoring his relative rank.(1)
The British attacks on Danbury were part of the preliminary work of Howe in preparation for his advance up the Hudson. Washington had collected his stores at Danbury and Peekskill ready for his campaign to prevent Howe's ascent of the river. The British general was not intending that movement at once, however, for he had determined on an attack upon Philadelphia, a design of his own, which was approved and urged upon him by General Lee, who was still a prisoner in New York, and whose fears for his own safety had led him to court British favor by treason against the American cause.(2)
As Howe was about to set out upon this expedition, which the ministry had quite approved, he received (June 5) a copy of the plan of the northern campaign, but no word of instruction for himself. Still following his own plan, however, he prepared to embark his army and to reach Philadelphia by sea. Washington, expecting Howe to go by land, moved
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(1) Journals of
Congress, May 2, 1777.
(2) Moore, Treason of Chas. Lee, 84-93.
[163] down from Morristown to Middlebrook, in the hope of preventing the passage of the British army.(1) Howe saw his aggressive attitude, and with the idea of tempting him to a general engagement delayed and maneuvred for three weeks. After this serious loss of time he embarked, early in July, some fourteen thousand men with whom to capture Philadelphia. Still he delayed until good news came from Burgoyne; then, after losing a week by foul winds, he got his fleet under way, July 23, just as Burgoyne in the north was pushing his way through the tangled forests from Ticonderoga to Fort Edward, and when Howe should have been going up the Hudson to meet him at Albany.
Washington, who knew of Burgoyne's advance from the north, thought that, unless his movement was a mere feint, Howe must be about to move up the Hudson to his support.(2) When, therefore, the news came (July 31) that Howe was off Delaware Bay, Washington was greatly puzzled; nor was the mystery cleared up then, for the naval officers who were with Howe gave him such weighty reasons for not disembarking in the Delaware(3) that he yielded, and lost twenty-four precious days more, sailing around to Chesapeake Bay and up to Elkton, where the troops were landed on August 25, just thirteen miles from the point where they might have landed
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(1) Washington, Writings
(Ford's ed.), V., 444, 450.
(2) Ibid., VI., 1, 2.
(3) Fortescue,
History of the British Army, III., 212.
[164] nearly a month earlier.(1) Here Howe received a note from Germaine, hoping that he might finish this campaign in time to return to the aid of the northern army. That was now almost impossible, as Washington clearly saw, and he wrote, exultingly, now let all New England " turn out and entirely crush Genl Burgoyne."(2)
Already, in fact, Burgoyne had met such an accumulation of difficulties and disasters that relief must be speedy if it would save him. As his army drew near Fort Edward, General Schuyler sensibly withdrew to the south as far as Stillwater.(3) Inadequate transportation facilities delayed the British, while their troubles increased daily.(4) The New England farmers were maddened by the murder of a young woman named Jane McCrea, an atrocious act done by some of Burgoyne's Indian allies.(5) No one was more greatly shocked than Burgoyne himself, and his stringent orders against pillage and murder caused many of the Indians to leave his camp in a rage.
His failing supplies were, however, a more serious matter. The patriot committees throughout the region had compelled every one to remove cattle and stores from the path of the British army. There seemed nothing to do but to make an attempt to
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(1) Kemble
Papers I., 476.
(2) Washington, Writings (Ford's ed.), VI., 49,
n.
(3) Thacher, Military Journal, 91.
(4) Stevens, Facsimiles,
1665.
(5) Thacher, Military Journal, 95.
[165] seize the American stores at Bennington.(1) A motley force of Germans, British, Canadians, and Indians, under Colonel Baum, was sent to unite in this attack with the many loyalists who swarmed in the country, longing, as Burgoyne was assured, to take up arms for the king. To repel this attack, John Stark, acting under the sovereignty of New Hampshire,(2) and on his own responsibility, raised eight hundred men and marched to meet the invader.
When Stark met the British force (August 15, 1777) Baum quickly chose a strong position and threw up intrenchments.(3) It was raining torrents and the attack was delayed a day, Stark promising his men that when the Lord sent sunshine they should have fighting enough. On the morrow, August 16, the backwoodsmen's craft was shown in surrounding their unsuspecting victims, and the British forces were thrown into a panic by an encircling fire which compelled them to surrender within two hours. The tables were then nearly turned by the appearance of a relief party of five hundred Germans, but American reinforcements under Seth Warner saved the day, and the fresh British detachment was also defeated.(4) The evil of this disaster to Burgoyne was not alone in the loss of men, but in the idea that was born in the
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(1) Burgoyne's orders, in Clinton Papers,
II., 242.
(2) St. Clair Papers, I., 84, n.; Vermont Hist. Soc.,
Collections, I., 204, 206.
(3) Ibid., 218.
(4) Thacher, Military
Journal, 93; Vermont Hist. Soc., Collections, I., 207, 223, 225.
[166] minds of New England farmers that Burgoyne's whole army might be taken. The eager New England yeomanry began to pour in and to swell the patriot ranks,(1) while Burgoyne's hopes for aid from St. Leger's force were dashed by the ill reports that came daily into his camp.
St. Leger had landed at Oswego about the middle of July.(2) He was there joined by Sir John Johnson and Colonel John Butler with their Tory followers. The Indians of western New York were divided in sympathy, but the Mohawks, under Joseph Brant, and part of the Iroquois, Cayugas, and Senecas joined St. Leger. With this ill-assorted force he advanced until, August 3, he appeared before Port Stanwix. The German settlers in that neighborhood, led by General Herkimer, came to the rescue of the fort,(3) and scouts from their force arranged for a combined attack on the invader a sortie from the fort and an attack upon St. Leger's rear.
The co-operation was not perfect, and, Herkimer's approach becoming known, Johnson's Tories and Brant's Mohawks prepared an ambuscade in a ravine near Oriskany through which the patriot force must pass. The Americans entered and were partly surrounded, but they fought with such desperate valor that after a struggle with knife, hatchet. and bayonet, unrivalled in its savage horror, the
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(1) Baroness Riedesel, Letters and Journals, 98.
(2)
See St. Leger's account, in Gentleman s Magazine, 1778. p. 117.
(3) Clinton Papers, II., 164.
[167] Indians fled and the Tories retreated.(1) Herkimer's force was too weak to advance, but the sortie from the fort was a success, and Johnson's Tories were driven across the Mohawk. Though St. Leger's force still threatened, yet his prestige had suffered and his Indian allies grew so refractory as to be a source of embarrassment.
While St. Leger continued his siege of Fort Stanwix a patriot force of one thousand two hundred men was coming up the Mohawk under Benedict Arnold, who had been sent north by Washington, and who arrived in Schuyler's camp just in time to command this relief expedition.(2) When within twenty miles of Fort Stanwix, and fearful lest he should arrive too late, Arnold sent ahead a half-witted Tory, who for his services escaped the death of a spy, and who rushed into St. Leger's camp with the report that Burgoyne was defeated and that an overwhelming force was coming to the relief of the fort.(3) The disheartened Indians now refused to obey commands, stole the camp liquors, and rioted all night through the camp, assaulting the soldiers, and creating such a panic among the Tories that on the following day the whole army dispersed and fled, leaving the camp and stores in the patriot possession. A mere handful of St. Leger's troops reached Oswego and returned with him to Montreal.
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(1) Roberts, Battle of Oriskany.
(2)
Arnold, Arnold, 154, Clinton Papers, II., 255.
(3) Stone,
Campaign of Burgoyne, 213.
[168] Thus one of the armies that was to divert the attention of Burgoyne's enemies was now a wreck and instead of aid more enemies were coming. Arnold was hurrying back, and Morgan with five hundred riflemen was on his way to the northern army. More threatening still, as Burgoyne wrote,(1) " Wherever the king's forces point, militia to the number of three or four thousand assemble in a few hours."
The force left in Ticonderoga and his later losses reduced Burgoyne's army to about five thousand men. He would have fallen back to Fort Edward, where he could safely remain awaiting a change of the situation in his front, but his instructions were imperative. He must go straight on to Albany in order to make the junction with Howe. Now appeared the wretched folly of directing a campaign at a distance of three thousand miles from the scene of action. It left time and space to fight on the side of the Americans. Howe had no imperative orders, and although we now know that a despatch was draughted giving Howe positive orders to go up the Hudson, yet Germaine, finding it unready for signature, went off to the country, leaving it unsigned, and the paper that might have saved an army never left its pigeon-hole.
At a time when Burgoyne was sorely in need of Howe's army to divert some of the enemies who were gathering about him, the latter was making his way towards the "rebel capital" at Philadelphia. The
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(1) Vermont Hist. Soc., Collections, I., 227.
[169] presence of the Continental Congress in that city had deluded Howe into the belief that there was the centre of the administrative machinery of the country. He did not realize that Congress needed only a wagon and a few carriages to transport itself and its valuable papers to a new seat of government in any convenient town.
After landing at Elkton the British army advanced through a region not hostile, but also not friendly enough to give much aid. There was no uprising of the local militia such as had proved so disastrous to Burgoyne in the north. At Brandywine Creek, a few miles above Wilmington, Washington waited to dispute this advance. The passage of Chadd's Ford, on the Brandywine, while the American army eleven thousand strong was stationed behind it,(1) was no easy task; but the well-disciplined British troops made it possible for Howe to execute a dangerous flank movement which, on September 11, routed one division of the American army, and compelled the main army to retreat in a confused but not demoralized condition.(2)
Even after losing the battle of the Brandywine, Washington was still strong enough to delay Howe two weeks in his march on Philadelphia. Meantime, many of the inhabitants of the city fled, while Congress hurriedly clothed Washington with the
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(1) Fortescue says twelve thousand, British Army,
213.
(2) Washington, Writings (Sparks's ed.), V., 36-59.
[170] powers of a dictator,(1) and got themselves out of harm's way. On September 25 the British army took possession of the city.
In order to hold Philadelphia through the winter, Howe must control the Delaware. Besides the obstruction that had been placed in the river, there were two forts and a redoubt still held by the patriot soldiers. Part of Howe's forces was sent to reduce these, and three thousand men were detached to escort the supplies sent overland from the Chesapeake. There were now less than nine thousand men in Howe's main army, and Washington resolved to make one last, desperate effort to defeat the main body encamped at Germantown. Washington's attack was skilfully planned,(2) and nothing but a dense fog which enveloped all the forces engaged seems to have prevented a victory. In the confusion a brigade led by Sullivan, which was briskly engaged by the enemy in front, was attacked in the rear by a part of Greene's brigade, and a panic naturally ensued. This misfortune threw into confusion the whole plan, which was, perhaps, too intricate to be successfully carried out by half-trained troops led by inexperienced officers.
The battle of Germantown, as this was called, was fought October 4; and for six weeks longer Howe was kept busy getting the control of the Delaware, which was absolutely necessary if he was
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(1)
Journals of Congress, August 22, 1777.
(2) See "Plan," in Pa.
Magazine, XXVI., 387.
[171] to spend the winter in Philadelphia.(1) Long before he was free to go north Burgoyne was hopelessly entangled, and when Howe went into winter-quarters at Philadelphia, and Washington encamped at Valley Forge, the northern army had met its fate.
Just after the battle of Bennington, and just before Burgoyne got the news of St. Leger's failure, the command of the American army of the north was transferred. Schuyler's enemies had so worked upon Congress that at a time when his laurels were almost gathered they were snatched away and given to Gates. Congress acted August 4,(2) but Gates took command only after the middle of the month. For three weeks thereafter the two armies confronted each other on opposite banks of the Hudson. Then, while the Green Mountain militia hung "like a gathering storm" upon Burgoyne's left,(3) and retreat seemed wise, the British leader determined not to abandon Howe, who was then supposed to be coming up the Hudson. September 13, therefore, the whole British army crossed to the west bank of the river.(4) Retreat was now impossible. The expedition which had been intended, as its leader conceived, to be " hazarded," was now to be "devoted" -sacrificed, (5) that a soldier might obey orders which were issued months before and
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(1) See "Defences of Philadelphia," in Pa. Mag.,
XVIII., XIX.
(2) Journals of Congress, August 2-4, 1777.
(3)
Burgoyne, State of the Expedition, Apps. xxiv., xxv.
(4) Clinton
Papers, II., 431; Hadden, Journal, 144.
(5) Annual Register,
1777, xx., 164. 172
[172] at a distance of three thousand miles from the scene of action.
To prevent the British advance down the river, the American army had taken a fortified position on Bemis Heights, which commanded the Hudson and the roads leading to the south. Burgoyne hoped to carry this position by an attack on the American left.(1) As far as the timid Gates was concerned, success might have crowned the effort, but Arnold ruined the British plan by anticipating the attack. With a command of three thousand men he engaged a large part of Burgoyne's army while Gates held eleven thousand men idle on the heights.(2) The British held the field, but abandoned their previous plan and delayed further assault for eighteen days. One reason for waiting was that Clinton was reported coming up the Hudson from New York;(3) but while Burgoyne waited his supplies diminished and his line of communication was cut by a New England force under General Lincoln.
The American army constantly grew until more than sixteen thousand men confronted Burgoyne's five thousand.(4) In desperation the British commander made another effort, October 7, to turn the American's left. Again it was Arnold who saw the opportunity for a crushing blow. Despite the fact that since the last engagement he had
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(1) Riedesel,
Letters and Journals, 99.
(2) Arnold, Arnold, 178-186.
(3)
Clinton Papers. II., 433.
(4) Ibid., 456.
[173] practically been deprived of his command by Gates, he rode into the midst of the battle and led the delighted soldiers in one charge after another until the field was won and Burgoyne retreated up the river to Saratoga, abandoning his sick and wounded.(1)
The Americans had already made the recrossing of the Hudson impossible, and their overwhelming numbers enabled them so to surround and harass the British army that its position became intolerable. Desertion began, the Germans coming over " in shoals," as Gates wrote.(2) Burgoyne had no news of Clinton, who was in fact coming rapidly up the Hudson, quite outwitting Putnam. After taking two forts in the highlands he wrote Burgoyne, October 8, that there was nothing between him and Gates.(3) This cheering news never reached Burgoyne, who at last wearied of waiting, and on October 14 asked Gates for terms of surrender. Three days of negotiations resulted in the "convention" of Saratoga, as the surrender was called.(4)
By this agreement the British army was to march out with the honors of war, stack their arms, and go under guard to Boston, thence taking ship to England, after promising to serve no more in the American war. There was no attempt to humiliate the British troops as they laid down their arms, and
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(1) Clinton Papers, II.. 384; Riedesel, Letters, 102,
103.
(2) Continental Congress, Papers (MSS.), No. 254, I., 274.
(3) Lossing, Schuyler, II., 359, 360.
(4) Clinton Papers, II.,
439-448.
[174] every courtesy was shown them by the rank and file as well as by the officers of the American army. Congress, however, wrangled with Burgoyne over the carrying out of the terms of the convention,(1) and ended by disgracefully breaking the public faith and never permitting the return of the British troops. Some of them escaped, while many were assimilated among the American people.
The result in America of Burgoyne's surrender was, as a contemporary wrote, that "Rebellion, which a twelvemonth ago was really a contemptible pygmy, is now in appearance become a giant more dreadful to the minds of men than Polyphemus of old or the sons of Anak."(2) The ultimate effect, however, was to set free forces that created changes of world- wide extent, bringing into the struggle first France and then other European countries, until the embattled nations confronted England and compelled her to yield. Before entering upon the history of this vast conflict we must turn to the political events that had been passing while Burgoyne was losing an army and Howe was paying dearly for the possession of the "rebel capital."
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(1) Clinton Papers, II.,
660-665.
(2) Magazine of Am. Hist., VI., 57.
Much source material for this campaign may be found in Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Pennsylvania Archives. W. D. Stone, Battle of Brandywine (pamphlet, 1899), is of value, though the best account of that battle is in Charlemagne Tower, The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution (2 vols, 1895). Worthington C. Ford, "The Defence of Philadelphia," in Pennsylvania Magazine of History, October, 1895, to January, 1897, contains a full presentation of the contemporary documents. Charles J. Stillé, Anthony Wayne (1893), contains a scholarly account of the battles of Germantown, Monmouth, and Stony Point.