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Vice-Admiralty Courts. As England first, and Great Britain afterwards, acquired
colonies and possessions beyond seas, vice-admiralty courts
were established. The earliest known was that in Jamaica,
established in the year 1662. Some vice- admiralty courts which were created for prize purposes in the last century were suffered to expire after 1815. In the year 1863, when the
act regulating the vice-admiralty courts was passed, there
were vice-admiralty courts at Antigua, Bahamas, Barbadoes,
Bermuda, British Columbia, British Guiana, British Honduras,
Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, Dominica, Falkland Islands,
Gambia River, Gibraltar, Gold Coast, Grenada, Hong Kong,
Jamaica, Labuan, Lagos, Lower Canada (otherwise Quebec),
Malta, Mauritius, Montserrat, Natal, Nevis, New Brunswick,
Newfoundland, New South Wales, New Zealand, Nova Scotia
(otherwise Halifax), Prince Edward Island, Queensland, St
Christopher, St Helena, St Lucia, St Vincent, Sierra Leone,
South Australia, Tasmania, Tobago, Trinidad, Vancouver's
Island, Victoria, Virgin Islands (otherwise Tortola), and
Western Australia, and (for matters of the slave trade only)
Aden. By the act of 1867 one for the Straits Settlements was added. These courts have been regulated from time to time by the following statutes: 2 and 3 Will. IV. c. 51, 26 and
27 Vict. c. 24 (Vice-Admiralty Courts Act 1863), already
cited, and 30 and 31 Vict. c. 45 (Vice-Admiralty Courts
Act Amendment Act 1867); and by the slave trade acts, of
which the last and consolidating act was that of 1873. In 1890 the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act provided that,
except in the colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, St
Helena and British Honduras, vice-admiralty courts should be
abolished, and a substitution made of colonial courts of
admiralty. There is power, however, reserved to the crown
to erect through the admiralty in any British possession any vice-admiralty court, except in India or any British possession
having a representative legislature. No vice-admiralty court so established can exercise any jurisdiction except for some purpose relating to prize, the royal navy, the slave
trade, foreign enlistment, Pacific Islanders' protection, and
questions relating to treaties or conventions on international law. Vice-admiralty courts exercised all usual admiralty jurisdiction, and in addition a certain revenue jurisdiction,
and jurisdiction over matters of slave trade and prize and under the Pacific Islanders' Protection Act. The appeal from vice-admiralty courts used to lie to the High Court of Admiralty of England, but has been transferred to the king in council.
Colonial Courts of Admiralty. By the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act 1890, already
referred to, every court of law in a British possession
which is declared by its legislature to be such, or if
there be no such declaration, which has original unlimited
civil jurisdiction, shall be a court of admiralty.
India. There used at one time to be vice-admiralty courts for Calcutta,
Madras and Bombay; but by the India High Courts Act 1861, sec. 9, the
admiralty jurisdiction is given to the High Courts of these places. Consular Courts. Consular courts established in Turkey, China and Japan have
had admiralty jurisdiction given to them, and by sec. 12 of
the Colonial Admiralty Courts Act any court established by H.M. for the exercise of jurisdiction in any place outside H.M.'s dominion may have admiralty jurisdiction granted to it. Australia. By the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 a federal supreme court, to be called the High Court of
Australia, is created, and the parliament of the Commonwealth
may make laws conferring original jurisdiction on the High Court in matters of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
The Isle of Man. There is a court of admiralty in the Isle of Man of which the water-bailiff is judae. He is also styled admiral. It is said to have jurisdiction in salvage and over other maritime matters occurring within 3 leagues from the shore. County Local Courts. Modern statutes have given admiralty jurisdiction to the City of London Court, the Court of Passage and to the county courts
in the following matters: Salvage, where the value of the
salved property does not exceed L. 1000, or the claim for reward
L. 300; towage, necessaries and wages, where the claim does
not exceed L. 150; claims for damage to cargo, or by collision,
up to L. 300 (and for sums above these prescribed limits by agreement between the parties); and claims arising out of breaches of charter parties and other contracts for carriage of goods in foreign ships, or torts in respect thereof, up to
L. 300. This jurisdiction is restricted to subjects over which jurisdiction was possessed by the High Court of Admiralty at the time when the first of these acts was passed, except as
regards the last branch of it (the ``Aline,'' 1880, 5 Ex.
Div. 227; R. v. Judge of City of London Court, 1892, 1 Q.B.
272). In analogy with the county court admiralty jurisdiction created in England, a limited admiralty jurisdiction has
been given in Ireland to the recorders of certain boroughs and the chairmen of certain quarter sessions; and in salvage cases, where a county court in England would have jurisdiction,
magistrates, recorders and chairmen of quarter sessions may
have jurisdiction as official arbitrators (Merchant Shipping Act 1894, sec. 547). In Scotland, admiralty suits in cases
not exceeding the value of L. 25 are exclusively tried in the sheriff's court; while over that limit the sheriff's court and the Court of Session have concurrent jurisdiction. The sheriff has also criminal admiralty jurisdiction, but only
as to crimes which he would be competent to try if committed on land (The Court of Session Act 1830, sec. sec. 21 and 22).
By an act of 1821 an arbitral jurisdiction in cases of salvage was given to certain commissioners of the Cinque Ports. Appeals. The appeal from county courts and commissioners is to the High Court of Justice, and is exercised by a divisional court
of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division. In cases
arising within the Cinque Ports there is an optional appeal to the Admiralty Court of the Cinque Ports. The appeal from the High Court of Justice is in ordinary admiralty matters,
as in others, to the Court of Appeal, and from thence to
the House of Lords. But it is specially provided by the Judicature Act 1891, as it was by the Prize Act 1864, that the
appeal in prize cases shall be to the sovereign in council. The unfortunate provisions of the legislature, giving to
the jurisdiction of county courts different money limits in admiralty equity and common law cases, make the distinction
between cases coming under the admiralty jurisdiction and other civil cases of practical moment in those courts. Arguments full of learning and research have been addressed to the courts, and weighty decisions have been given, upon questions
which would never have arisen if the county courts had not a larger money area of jurisdiction in admiralty cases than they have in in other matters (R. v. Judge of City of London Court, 1892, 1 Q.B. 273; the ``Zeta,'' 1893, App. Cas.
468). But as regards the high courts, whether in England,
Scotland or Ireland, it is not now necessary to distinguish
their civil admiralty jurisdiction from their ordinary civil jurisdiction, except for the purpose of seeing whether there
can or cannot be process in rem. Not that every admiralty action can of right be brought in rem, but that no process
in rem lies at the suit of a subject unless it be for a matter of admiralty jurisdiction--one, for instance, that could in
England have been tried in the High Court of Admiralty. Now these matters of admiralty jurisdiction with process in rem range themselves under four primary and four supplementary heads. The four primary are damage, salvage, bottomry,
wages; and the four supplementary are extensions due to one or other of the statutes of 1840 (Admiralty Court) and 1861 (Admiralty Court Act). They are damage to cargo carried in a ship, necessaries supplied to a ship, mortgage of ship, and
master's claim for wages and disbursements on account of a ship. In all these cases, primary and secondary, the process
of which a plaintiff can avail himself for redress, may be
either in personam as in other civil suits, or by arrest
of the ship, and, in cases of salvage and bottomry, the
cargo. Whenever, also, the ship can be arrested, any freight
due can also be attached, by arrest of the cargo to the extent
only of the freight which it has to pay. For the purpose of ascertaining whether or not process in rem would lie, there
have been distinctions as nice, and the line of admiralty
jurisdiction has been drawn as carefully, as in the cases of the
admiralty jurisdiction of the county courts (the ``Theta,''
1894, Prob. 280; the ``Gas Float Whitton,'' 1897, App. Cas.
337). There have been similar questions raised in the United States, from De Lovio v. Boit (1815, 2 Gallison, 398),
and Ramsay v. Allegre (1827, 12 Wheaton, 611), down to
the quite modern cases which will be found quoted in the arguments and judgments in the ``Gas Float Whitton.'' Disciplinary. The disciplinary jurisdiction at one time exercised by the Admiralty Court, over both the royal navy and merchant
vessels, may be said to be obsolete in time of peace, the
last remnant of it being suits against merchantmen for flying flags appropriate to men-of-war (the ``Minerva,''
1800, 3 C. Rob. 34), a matter now more effectively provided
against by the Merchant Shipping Act 1894. In time of war,
however, it was exercised in some instances as long as the
Admiralty Court lasted, and is now in consequence exercisable
by the High Court of Justice (see Prize below). It was, perhaps, in consequence of its ancient disciplinary
jurisdiction that the Admiralty Court was made the court to enforce certain portions of the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870. Finally, appeals from decisions of courts of inquiry, under the
Merchant Shipping Act, cancelling or suspending the certificates
of officers in the merchant service, may be made to the Probate,
Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice. Criminal cases. The admiralty jurisdiction in criminal matters extends over all crimes committed on board British ships at sea or in tidal waters, even though such tidal waters be well within
foreign territory (R. v. Anderson, 1868, L.R. 1 C.C.R.
161), but not over crimes committed on board foreign vessels
upon the high seas (R. v. Serva, 1845, 1 Denison C.C.
104). Whether it extended over crimes committed on foreign ships within territorial waters of the United Kingdom, and
whether a zone of three miles round the shores of the United Kingdom was for such purpose territorial water, were the
great questions raised in R. v. Keyn (the ``Franconia,''
L.R. 2 Ex. Div. 126), and decided in the negative by the
majority of the judges, rightly, as the writer of this
article respectfully thinks. Since then, however, the
legislature has brought these waters within the jurisdiction of the admiralty by the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878. Section 2 runs as follows: ``An offence committed by a person, whether he is or is not a British subject,
on the open sea within the territorial waters of British dominions, is an offence within the jurisdiction of the
admiral, although it may have been committed on board or by
means of a foreign ship, and the person who committed such
offence may be arrested, tried and punished accordingly.''
By sec. 7 the ``jurisdiction of the admiral'' is defined as ``including the jurisdiction of the admiralty of England or Ireland, or either of such jurisdictions as used in any act
of parliament; and for the purpose or arresting any person charged with an offence declared by this act to be within the jurisdiction of the admiral, the territorial waters adjacent
to the United Kingdom, or any other part of her majesty's
dominions, shall be deemed to be within the jurisdiction of any
judge, magistrate or officer.'' And ``territorial waters of
her majesty's dominions'' are defined as ``in reference to the sea, meaning such part of the sea adjacent to the coast of
the United Kingdom, or the coast of some other part of her
majesty's dominions, as is deemed by international law to be
within the territorial sovereignty of her majesty; and for the purpose of any offence declared by this act to be within the jurisdiction of the admiral, any part of the open sea
within one marine league of the coast, measured from low-water
mark, shall be deemed to be open sea within the territorial
waters of her majesty's dominions.'' As to those portions of the sea and tidal waters which, by reason of their partially
land-locked positions, are deemed to be in the body of a
county, there is not admiralty jurisdiction, but crimes are
tried as if they were committed on land within the same county. Pirates, whatever flag they pretended to fly, were, from
1360 onwards, wherever their crimes were committed, subject
to the admiralty jurisdiction. The criminal jurisdiction of the admiralty was first exercised by the High Court of Admiralty; and then, by virtue of the Offences at Sea Act 1536,
transferred to commissioners appointed under the great seal,
among whom were to be the admiral or admirals, his or their
deputies. Admiralty sessions were held for this purpose till 1834. Admiralty criminal jurisdiction is now, by virtue
of the series of statutes, the Offences at Sea Act 1799,
the Central Criminal Court Act 1834, Offences at Sea Act
1844, and the criminal law consolidation acts passed in
1861, exercised by the Central Criminal Court and by the
ordinary courts of assize. Special provision for trial in the colonies of offences committed at sea has been made by an act of William III. (1698-1699), the Offences at Sea
Act 1806, and the Admiralty Offences (Colonial) Act 1849.
Prize. The Admiralty Court had jurisdiction in matters of prize from very early times; and although since the middle of the 17th century the instance, or ordinary civil jurisdiction of the
court, has been kept distinct from the prize jurisdiction,
they were originally both administered and regarded as being within the ordinary jurisdiction of the lord high admiral. The early records of the admiralty show that the origin of the prize jurisdiction is to be traced to the power given to the court of the admiral to try cases of piracy and ``spoil,'' i.e. captures of foreign ships by English
ships. The earliest recorded case of spoil tried before the admiral is in 1357, when the goods of a Portuguese subject,
taken at sea by Englishmen from a French ship which had previously spoiled a Portuguese, were awarded by the admiral as
good prize to the English captors; and Edward III. in a letter to the king of Portugal answering a complaint on the subject gives the admiral's decision as a reason for refusing their restoration. During the 16th century a very large part of the business of the Admiralty Court related to spoil and piracy, and the privy council often directed the judge of the
court how to deal with the spoil cases, with regard to which
foreigners who had suffered from attacks by English ships made petition for redress to the admiral or the council. The spoil suit at this time (causa spolii) was a civil proceeding resulting in a decree absolutoria, dismissing
the defendant, or condemnatoria, ordering restoration
to be made by him. In 1585 the patent of Howard, the lord
high admiral, authorized him to issue letters of reprisal
against Spain; and an order in council regulating the conduct of those to whom such letters were issued provided by an additional article (1859) that all prizes were to be brought in without breaking of bulk for adjudication by the Admiralty Court. The court was also resorted to at this time by captors, sailing under commissions granted by the allies of
England, such as the king of France and the Dutch. About
the middle of the 17th century separate sittings of the court for instance and prize business began, perhaps because of
the conflicting claims to droits of Charles II. and the duke of York as lord high admiral; and privateering under royal commission took the place of the former irregular ``spoiling.'' The account which Lord Mansfield gave of the records of the Admiralty Court, that there were no prize
act books earlier than 1641, or prize sentences earlier than
1648, and that before 1690 the records were in confusion, must
be qualified by the correction that there are in existence prize sentences (on paper, not parchment) as early as 1589.
Although the courts of common law hardly ever seem to have interfered with or disputed the admiralty prize jurisdiction,
its exclusive nature was not finally admitted till 1782; but long previously royal ordinances (1512, 1602) and statutes
(1661, giving an alternative of commissioners, 1670, 1706) had
given the Admiralty Court the only express jurisdiction over prize. The same statute of Anne and acts of 1739 and 1744 give prize jurisdiction to any court of admiralty, and the courts
of admiralty for the colonies and plantations in North America. It has been a disputed question whether the prize jurisdiction of the court was inherent, i.e. coming within the powers
given by the general patent of the judge, in which no express
mention of it is made, or whether it required a special
commission. Upon this subject the judgment of Lord Mansfield in Lindo v. Rodney (1782, Dougl. 612), the judgment
of Mr Justice Story in De Lovio v. Boit (1815, 2
Gallison, 398), and Marsden's Select Pleas of the Court
of Admiralty (introduction), may be consulted. But the
settled practice now and for a long time past has been for a special commission and warrant to be issued for this purpose. In connexion with this it is observable that in 1793 the Admiralty Court of Ireland claimed to exercise prize jurisdiction under its general patent; and it is said to have been the opinion of Sir W. Wynne that the Admiralty Court of Scotland had a similar right (Brown, Civil Law of
Admiralty, vol. ii. 211, 212). Any jurisdiction of the
Scottish court over prize of war was transferred to the English court by the Court of Session Act 1825, sec. 57. As
to the Irish court, by the Act of Union it was provided that
there should remain in Ireland an instance court of admiralty for the determination of causes civil and maritime only. In 1864 the constitution and procedure of prize courts,
which had until then been prescribed by occasional acts passed for each war as it arose, were for the first time made
permanent by the Naval Prize Act, by which the High Court
of Admiralty and every admiralty or vice-admiralty court, or
any other court exercising admiralty jurisdiction in British dominions, if for the time being authorized to exercise prize
jurisdiction, were made prize courts. The High Court of
Admiralty was given jurisdiction throughout British dominions as a prize court, and, as such, power to enforce any order
of a vice-admiralty prize court and the judicial committee of the privy council in prize appeals-- this power mutatis mutandis being also given to vice-admiralty prize courts. An appeal was given from any prize court to the sovereign in council. Prize courts were given jurisdiction in cases of captures made in a land expedition or an expedition made conjointly with allied forces, and power to give prize salvage
on recaptured ships and prize bounty; and a form of procedure was prescribed. The High Court was also given exclusive jurisdiction as a prize court over questions of ransom and petitions of right in prize cases, and power to punish
masters of ships under convoy disobeying orders or deserting convoy. By the Naval Discipline Act 1866, power to award
damages to convoyed ships exposed to danger by the fault of the officer in charge of the convoy was also given to the High Court. Under other statutes it had power to try questions of booty of war when referred to it by the crown, in the
same way as prize causes, and claims of king's ships for
salvage on recaptures from pirates, which could be condemned
as droits of admiralty, subject to the owner's right to
receive them on paying one-eighth of the value, and also
power to seize and restore prizes captured by belligerents in violation of British neutrality, or by a ship equipped in
British ports contrary to British obligations of neutrality. All jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty has since passed to the High Court of Justice, which is made a prize
court under the Naval Prize Act, with all the powers of the
Admiralty Court in that respect; and all prize causes and matters within the jurisdiction of that court as a prize court are assigned to the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty
Division; and an appeal from it as a prize court lies only to the king in council (Judicature Acts 1873 and 1891). By an act of 1894 further provision is made for the constitution of prize courts in British possessions. A commission, warrant
or instruction from the crown or the admiralty may be issued at any time, even in peace; and upon such issue, subject to
instructions from the crown, the vice-admiral of the possessions
on being satisfied by information from a secretary of state that war has broken out between Great Britain and a foreign state, may make proclamation to that effect, and the commission
or warrant comes into effect. The commission or warrant may authorize a vice-admiralty court or colonial court of admiralty to act as a prize court, or establish a vice-admiralty
court for that purpose, and may be revoked or altered at any
time. The court is authorized to act as a prize court during the war, and shall after its conclusion continue to act as
such, and finally dispose of all matters and things arising
during the war, including all penalties and forfeitures incurred
therein. Rules of court may also be made by order in council for regulating, subject to the Naval Prize Act, the procedure
and practice of prize courts under that act, the duties and
conduct of their officers and practitioners, and the fees
and costs therein (Prize Courts Act 1894, sec. sec. 2, 3). This
latter power has been exercised; and prize rules for the High Court of Justice and the vice- admiralty prize courts were framed in 1898 (Statutory Rules and Orders, 1898).
AUTHORITIES.--Marsden, Select Pleas of the Court of
Admiralty, Selden Society, London, 1892 and 1897; Zouch,
Jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England asserted; Robinson,
Collectanea Maritima; Brown, Admiralty; Edwardes, Admiralty;
Phillimore, International Law, vol. i., vol. iii. part xi.;
Pritchard, Admiralty Digest, tit. Jurisdiction. (W. G. F. P.)
UNITED STATES The source of admiralty jurisdiction in the United States is Article 3, sec. 2 of the United States
Constitution:--``The judicial power shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.'' The United States Supreme Court has declared that by virtue of these words the admiralty jurisdiction extends not only to the high seas but to the great lakes and the rivers connecting them, and to all public navigable waters in the United
States (the ``Genesee Chief'' v. Fitz Hugh, 12 Howards
U.S. Rep. 443), including even interstate canals (Ex.
p. Boyer, 109 U.S. Rep. 629, the ``Robert W. Parsons,''
[1903] 191 U.S. 17), and is not confined to tide waters. The
American colonies had vice-admiralty courts with an admiralty jurisdiction equal to the largest claimed by the English admiralty courts even under Edward III. When they became states they delegated to the federal government their several ``admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,'' using these words
in the sense understood in every country in Europe, England
excepted, and in the sense in which they had then been used
in the colonies for a long time, and without reference to
the very narrow jurisdiction of the English admiralty courts then existing (Waring v. Clark, 5 Howards U.S. Rep. 441).
It is settled as to the United States admiralty jurisdiction not that it is ``co-equal with that of the original English,
or that of continental European admiralty, but is rather that
defined by the statutes of Richard II., under the construction
given to them by contemporary or immediately subsequent courts of admiralty'' (2 Parsons Adm. 176), and that it embraced all
maritime contracts, torts, injuries or offences (De Lovio v.
Boit, 2 Gallisons Rep. 398; Waring v. Clark, 5 Howards
U.S. Rep. 441), and that it has never been restricted by the
action of the common law courts as in England under Lord Coke (2 Parsons Adm. 166 n.; Waring v. Clark; De Lovio v. Bolt.) Original admiralty jurisdiction was by the Judiciary Act of 1789 (U.S. Rev. Stats. sec. 563) granted to the United States district courts exclusively, except that concurrent original jurisdiction
was given to United States circuit courts over seizures for slave trading, and condemnations of property used by persons
in insurrection (sec. 629; sec. 5309), and in the coolie trade
(sec. 2159), and by the act of the 3rd of March 1901; the supreme
court of the District of Columbia is given the same jurisdiction as the district and circuit courts. The Supreme Court of the United States has no original jurisdiction in admiralty. All suits are brought in the first instance in the district court. Appeals lie, both on the law and on the facts, from
a final decree of that court to the circuit court of appeals only, except in cases involving the jurisdiction of the court,
the constitutionality of a law of any state or of the United States, or the validity or construction of any treaty of the
United States, and except cases of prize and capital or infamous
crime, in which cases of appeal lies directly to the supreme
court. In cases of gravity and importance the Supreme Court may by certiorari review the judgment of the circuit court of appeals, but such cases are rare (re Lau Ow Bew, 141
U.S. Rep 587; Benedict's The American Admiralty, sec. 607).
Formerly the Judiciary Act authorized an appeal from the district court to the circuit court, and thence to the Supreme
Court. But the act of the 3rd of March 1891 (Ch. 517) abolished this and created the circuit court of appeals, making
it the final appellate court in admiralty, except as above
stated. In any case where the district judge is unable to perform his duties or is disqualified by reason of interest or of relationship, or has acted as counsel for one of the
parties to the action, it may be removed to the circuit
court in that district (U.S. Rev. Stats. sec. sec. 587, 589 and
601). These are now the only cases in which admiralty suits can come before the circuit court (Benedict's Adm. sec. 321). The subject matter in cases of contract determines the jurisdiction (the ``General Smith,'' 4 Wheaton U.S. Rep.
438), and not the presence or absence of tide, salt water,
current, nor that the water be an inland basin or land-locked,
or a river, nor by its being a harbour, or a port within
the body of the county, nor that a remedy exists at common
law. The admiralty courts have jurisdiction over all matters that concern owners and proprietors of ships as such; possessory actions and petitory actions to try title of a ship; cases of mariners' wages, wharfage, dockage,
lighterage, stevedores, contracts of affreightment, charter
parties, rights of passengers as such (the ``Moses Taylor,''
71 U.S. Rep. 411), pilotage, towage, maritime liens and
loans, bottomry, respondentia and hypothecation of ship and
cargo, marine insurance, average, jettison, demurrage,
collisions, consortship, bounties, survey and sale of vessel,
salvage; seizures under the laws of impost navigation or trade, cases of prize, ransom, condemnation, restitution
and damages; assaults, batteries, damages and trespasses on
the high seas and navigable waters of the United States; but not suits in rem for duties (Benedict's Adm. sec. 303a). The U.S. Supreme Court has held in Peoples Ferry Co. v. Beers,
20 Howards U.S. Rep. 393, and in a series of subsequent cases
that a contract to build a vessel is not a maritime contract (the ``Robert W. Parsons''). Contracts to furnish cargo for ships and to furnish ships to carry the cargoes are maritime contracts (Graham v. Oregon R. & N. Co., [1905] 135 Fed. Rep. 608).
Whenever there is a maritime lien, even though created by
state statute as to a ship in her home port, it may be enforced
by suit in rem in admiralty in the federal courts (the `` General . Smith''; the ``Lottawanna,'' 21 Wallace Rep.
558, Benedict's Adm. sec. 270). In all suits by material men
for supplies and repairs or other necessaries for a foreign ship, the libellant may proceed against the ship and freight
in rem or against the master or owner in personam (12th Admiralty Rule; Benedict's Adm. sec. 268; the ``General Smith''). Actions in rem and in personam may be joined in the same libel (Newell v. Norton, 3 Wallace 257; the
``Normandie,'' 40 Fed. Rep. 590). But a contract to furnish
fishermen with clothing, tobacco and other personal effects
for use on a voyage is not a maritime contract, and a court
of admiralty has no jurisdiction to enforce it in rem (the ``May F. Chisholm,'' 1904; 129 Fed. Rep. 814). The state
courts have no jurisdiction in rem over any maritime contract or tort (the ``Lottawanna,'' the ``Belfast,'' 7 Wallace Rep.
624). Admiralty jurisdiction in tort depends on locality; it must have occurred on the high seas or other navigable waters within admiralty cognizance (2 Farsons Adm. 347; the ``Plymouth,'' 3 Wallace Rep. 20; the ``Genesee Chief'' v.
Fitz-Hugh, the ``Blackheath,'' [1903] 122 Fed. Rep. 112).
The U.S. Supreme Court in the ``Harrisburg'' (119 U.S. 199) and the ``Alaska'' (130 U.S. 207), after some conflict of
opinion, held that the admiralty courts have no jurisdiction
under the general admiralty law to try an action for damages for negligence on the high seas, causing death of a human
being, while there was no act of Congress and no statute
of the state to which the vessel belonged giving such right of action (Benedict's Adm. sec. sec. 275-309a), nor
where such statute is that of a foreign country (Rundell v. Compagnie Generale, [1899] 94 Fed. Rep. 366).
Admiralty has jurisdiction in cases of spoliation and piracy, collision and proceedings by owners to limit
their liability under U.S. Rev. Stats. sec. sec. 4281-9. The United States admiralty courts have always had jurisdiction in matters of prize (The Prize Cases, 2 Black U.S. Rep.
635). The district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction (except that circuit courts also have jurisdiction when prize is taken from persons in insurrection), and the supreme court
of the District of Columbia now has concurrent jurisdiction (U.S. v. Sampson, 1902, 187 U.S. 436) and appeals are direct
to the Supreme Court. Special commissioners are appointed on the breaking out of hostilities to act under the orders of the district courts (U.S. Rev. Stats. sec. 4621, Prize Rule 9;
Benedict's Adm. sec. 509; 680 Pieces Merchandise, 2 Sprague
233). These commissioners take the depositions of witnesses and report to the court the evidence upon which it adjudicates. Proceedings in prize cases must be in conformity with admiralty proceedings, where the seizure is on land (Union Insurance Co.
v. U.S., 6 Wallace 759; 2 Parsons Adm. 174). The district
courts have all the powers of a court of admiralty whether as instance or prize courts (Glass v. sloop ``Betsy,''
3 Dallas 6). To adjudicate in matters of prize is one of the ordinary functions of that court (Benedict's Adm. sec. 509). The admiralty courts have jurisdiction over crimes and offences committed upon vessels belonging to citizens of the United States on the high seas or any arm of the sea or any waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States (U.S. Rev. Stats. sec. 5339). High seas include the great lakes ( U.S. v. Rogers, 150 U.S. 249). (J. A. BA.)
OTHER COUNTRIES France, and countries following France.
In France, and in Belgium, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece
--countries which have adopted codes based on the Code Napoleon--the civil, or, as it would have been formerly called
in England, the ``instance,'' jurisdiction of the admiralty
is exercised by the ordinary tribunals, and there are no
separate courts of admiralty for this purpose. France and some other countries have special commercial tribunals, which
deal with shipping matters, but also with ordinary commercial
cases. France has also tribunaux maritimes commerciaux (Code disciplinaire et penal de la marine marchande du 24 mars 1852, loi du 11 mars 1891) to deal with maritime
offences. Austria adopts the French law in commercial matters. Italy had tribunals of commerce, but has given them
up. She has, however, by Art. 14 of her Merchant Shipping Code,
given jurisdiction to captains of ports to decide collision cases when the sum in dispute does not exceed 200 lire. Germany. In Germany there are no special tribunals for admiralty matters. Kammern fur Handelssachen, commercial courts, have been
established in Berlin and some of the principal seaports. These deal with shipping matters, but also with all other commercial suits.
Scandinavian nations. In Denmark, Sweden and Norway there is a maritime code which
came into force in Sweden in 1891, in Denmark in 1892, and
in Norway in 1893. This was intended to be one code for the three countries; but each country as it finally adopted the code made some modifications of its own. Under this code there are in Norway permanent maritime courts for each town presided over by the judge of the inferior local civil court (civile underdommer), or if there be more than one such
judge then by the president, with two assessors chosen out of a
list. Temporary local courts, consisting of the same judge
with two other members of nautical skill and knowledge, can
be constituted in districts where there are no permanent courts. Appeals lie to the supreme court (Hoiesterei.) In Denmark maritime cases are brought before the local courts constituted for maritime and commercial causes (So-og-Handelsret.) In Sweden maritime cases are brought before local courts of first instance consisting of a judge and assessors. There is an intermediate appeal to courts of second instance, and then to the supreme court,
which finally decides upon all causes civil and commercial. Maritime cases in Holland are tried by the ordinary civil tribunals, with the same right of appeal.
Prize jurisdiction. ``By the maritime law of nations universally and immemorially received there is an established method of determination whether the capture be or be not lawful prize. Before the ship or goods can be disposed of by the captor there must be a regular judicial proceeding wherein both parties may be heard and condemnation thereupon as prize in a court of admiralty judging by the law of nations and treaties. . . . If the sentence of the court of admiralty is thought to be erroneous, there is in every maritime country a superior court
of review. . . .'' (duke of Newcastle's letter to M. Michell,
secretary to the embassy of the king of Prussia, 1753). ``So
far as belligerent states do not make a practice of giving up the taking of booty at sea . . . they are required by international law to establish prize tribunals and thus give to their proceedings in the matter of prize a judicial character'' (v . Holtzendorff, Rechtslexikon, tit. ``Prisengerichte'').
In France till the death of the duke of Montmorency in 1632 prize matters were adjudicated upon by the admiral. The duke had sold the office of admiral some years before his death to Cardinal Richelieu; but about the period of the duke's death the office of admiral appears to have been abolished, and one
of grand master of navigation established in lieu. This new office was first held by Cardinal Richelieu and continued till 1695. The grand master took the admiral's place in matters of prize; but in 1659 a commission of councillors of state and masters of requests was appointed to assist the grand master and form a Conseil des Prises. From this conseil there was an appeal to the Conseil d'Etat. When the office of admiral was restored in 1695 he exercised his jurisdiction in prize matters with the assistance of the Conseil des Prises. The appeal was then given to the Conseil Royal des Finances. The Ordonnance sur la marine of August 1681 regulated the procedure. This system continued till the Revolution. The last Conseil des Prises was appointed in 1778. A law of the 14th of February 1793 abolished the Conseil des Prises and gave cognizance of prize matters ``provisionally'' to the tribunals of commerce. On the 8th of November 1793 (18 Brumaire, an II.) this jurisdiction
was taken from the tribunals of commerce and given to the Conseil Executif. Later it was given to the Comite de Salut Public. On the 25th of October 1795 (3 Brumaire,
an IV.) the jurisdiction was restored to the tribunals of commerce. This was again altered on the 27th of March 1800 (6 Germinal, an VIII.), when a Conseil des Prises was established,
consisting of nine councillors of state, a commissary of the
government and a secretary, all nominated by the First Consul.
On the 11th of June 1806 an appeal was given to the Conseil d'Etat. It was disputed among French jurists whether the Conseil des Prises was to be considered as a body actuated only by political considerations or one exercising what the French term an ``administrative jurisdiction''; which is, as nearly as a parallel to it can be found in England,
administration of justice between individuals and the state. As most of the cases arising out of the great wars had been dealt with, an ordinance of the 9th of January 1815
suppressed the Conseil des Prises and directed the Comite du contentieux of the Conseil d'Etat to prepare the remaining prize matters for decision by the Conseil d'Etat. Such prize matters (probably including captures for trading in slaves) as required to be dealt with till 1854, appear
to have been dealt with by this body; an ordinance of the 9th of September 1831 directing that the proceedings before the Conseil d'Etat should be private, was held to show
that the jurisdiction was not political but administrative. An Imperial decree, however, of the 18th of July 1854 restored
the Conseil des Prises, with appeal to the Conseil d'Etat.
This was for the war with Russia. A similar decree was published on the 9th of May 1859 for the war with Austria in Italy. On the 28th of November 1861 a further decree ordered that the Conseil instituted in 1859 should so long as it was kept in being decide all prize matters; and this Conseil has decided on prizes taken in the wars with Mexico and Germany and in Cochin China. It consists of seven judges and a commissary of the government. An appeal to the government in the Conseil d'Etat can be brought within three months. It is then decided by l'Assemblee du Conseil d'Etat. Under the First Empire there were commissions des ports,
commissions colonials and commissions consulaires,
established mainly to collect materials for the Conseil des Prises, but sometimes, when the ship and cargo were clearly
those of the enemy, proceeding to actual condemnation.
In Prussia Regulations of the 20th of June 1864 established a prize council consisting of a president and six associates with a law officer. An appeal was given to an upper prize council (v. Holtzendorff, Rechtslexikon, tit. ``Prisengerichte'').
By a law of the German empire of the 3rd of May 1884 the legality of prizes made during war has to be decided by prize courts, and the imperial government is authorized to determine
the particulars as to the seat of such courts, their members and
their proceedings (Reichsgesetzblatt of 1884, p. 49). Prize
courts were established under this law on the occasion of the East African blockade in 1889 (Reichsgesetzblatt of 1889, pp. 5 sqq.).
In Italy Art. 14 of the Merchant Shipping Code provides that prize matters shall be tried by a special commission established by royal decree. On the occasion of the war with Austria such a special commission was established by royal decree of the 20th of June 1866. For the war with Abyssinia a fresh commission was established by royal decree of the 16th of August 1896. The composition of this commission, which
was slightly different in character from that established in 1866, was as follows: (a) a first president of a court of
appeal or a retired one, or a president of a section of the
council of state or of cassation; (b) two general officers of the navy; (c) a member of the ``contentious part'' of the diplomatic service; (d) two councillors of a court of appeal; (e) a captain of a port, with a commissary of the
government and a secretary; five to be a quorum. There was no appeal; but the ordinary right to have recourse to the Court of Cassation at Rome, if the prize commission proceeded without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, was preserved.
By an ordinance of the 27th of March 1895 regulating the whole matter of prize in Russia, two sorts of prize tribunals of
first instance were contemplated--port tribunals and fleet tribunals. The latter are for captures made by ships of the fleet, and are to be composed of some of the principal officers
of the fleet. The former are to have presidents named by the emperor from among those ``qui font partie de l'administration maritime judiciaire''; the other members are to be appointed by the ministers of the navy, justice and foreign affairs.
The court of appeal is formed by the council of the admiralty with the addition of two members of the senate and a nominee of the minister of foreign affairs (Clunet, 1904, p. 271).
On the occasion of the Russo-Japanese war, port tribunals were
established under the authority of this ordinance by the lord high admiral, the Grand Duke Alexis, on the 13th of March 1904,
at Sebastopol--Port Alexander III., Port Arthur and Vladivostock
(Clunet, 1904, p. 479; London Gazette, 22nd March 1904).
Many cases were heard before these tribunals and on appeal. The procedure in prize cases under the old law of Spain is described in Abreu (Felix Joseph de Abreu y Bertodano),
Tratado juridico Politico sobre Presas de Mar (Cadiz,
1746). On the occasion of the war with the United States the Spanish government published a proclamation stating the circumstances in which captures were to be made and prizes taken; but information is lacking as to the particular constitution of the prize court or courts. In Greece prize questions are apparently left to be tried by the ordinary tribunals. See decision of Civil Tribunal of Athens, 1898, No. 3385 (reported Clunet, 1900, p. 826).
Turkey during her war of 1877 with Russia established a prize court and a court of appeal. The ordinance establishing these courts is set out in the London Gazette of the 6th of July 1877. Japan established, in the war (1904-5) with Russia, prize
courts at Sasebo and Yokosco with a court of appeal at Tokyo. Advocates were heard before these courts, and the procedure
seems generally to have been modelled upon European patterns. AUTHORITIES.--Clunet, Journal du droit international prive,
cited shortly as Clunet; v. Holzendorff, Rechtslexikon,
Leipzig, 1881; De Pistoye et Duverdy, Traite des prises
maritimes, Paris, 1855, vol. ii., tit. viii.; Phillimore,
International Law, vol. i., vol. iii. part xi.; Autran,
Code international de l'abordage, de l'assistance, et du
sauvetage maritimes, Paris, 1902; Raikes, The Maritime
Codes of Spain and Portugal (1896), of Holland and
Belgium (1898), of Italy (1900), London. (W. G. F. P.)
ADMISSION, in law, a statement made out of the witness-box
by a party to legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal,
or by some person whose statements are binding on that party against the interest of that party. (See EVIDENCE.) ADO (d. 874), archbishop of Vienne in Lotharingia, belonged
to a famous Frankish house, and spent much of his middle life in
Italy. He held his archiepiscopal see from 850 till his death on the 16th of December 874. Several of his letters are extant and reveal their writer as an energetic man of wide sympathies and considerable influence. Ado's principal works are a Martyrologium (printed inter al. in Migne,
Patrolog. lat. cxxiii. pp. 181-420; append. pp. 419-436),
and chronicle, Chronicon sive Breviarium chronicorum de sex
mundi aetalibus de Adamo usque ad ann. 869 (in Migne, cxxiii.
pp. 20-138, and Pertzn Monumenta Germ. ii. pp. 315-323,
&c.). Ado's chronicle is based on that of Bede, with which he
combines extracts from the ordinary sources, forming the whole
into a consecutive narrative founded on the conception of the unity of the Roman empire, which he traces in the succession of
the emperors, Charlemagne and his heirs following immediately
after Constantine and Irene. ``It is,'' says Wattenbach,
``history from the point of view of authority and preconceived opinion, which exclude any independent judgment of events.''
Ado wrote also a book on the miracles (Miracula) of St Bernard, archbishop of Vienne (9th century), published in
the Bollandist Acta Sanctorum; a life or Martyrium of St Desiderius, bishop of Vienne (d. 608), written about 870 and
published in Migne, cxxiii. pp. 435-442; and a life of St
Theudericus, abbot of Vienne (563), published in Mabillon,
Acta Sanct. i. pp. 678-681, Migne, cxxiii. pp. 443-450, and
revised in Bollandist Acta Sanct. 29th Oct. xii. pp. 840-843. See W. Wattenbach, Deutschlands Geschichtsquellen,
vol. i. (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1904).
ADOBE (pronounced a-do-be; also corrupted to dobie; from the Span. adobar, to plaster, traceable through
Arabic to an Egyptian hieroglyph meaning ``brick''), a
Spanish-American word for the sun-dried clay used by the Indians for building in some of the south-western states of the American Union, this method having been imported in the
16th century by Spaniards from Mexico, Peru, &c. A distinction
is made between the smaller ``adobes,'' which are about the
size of ordinary baked bricks, and the larger ``adobines,''
some of which are as much as from one to two yards long. ADOLESCENCE (Lat. adolescentia, from adolescere, to
grow up, past part. adultus, grown up, Eng. ``adult''), the
term now commonly adopted for the period between childhood and maturity, during which the characteristics--mental,
physical and moral--that are to make or mar the individual disclose themselves, and then mature, in some cases by
leaps and bounds, in others by more gradual evolution.
The annual rate of growth, in height, weight and strength,
increases to a marked extent and may even be doubled. The development in the man takes place in the direction of a greater strength, in the woman towards a fitter form for
maternity. The sex sense develops, the love of nature and
religion, and an overmastering curiosity both individual and
general. This period of life, so fraught with its power for
good and ill, is accordingly the most important and by far
the most difficult for parents and educationists to deal with efficiently. The chief points for attention may be briefly indicated. Health depends mainly on two factors, heredity,
or the sum total of physical and mental leanings of the individual, and environment. In an ideal system of
training these two factors will be so fitted in and adapted to one another, that what is weak or unprovided for in
the first will be amply compensated for in the second. In an ideal condition children should be brought up in the country as much as possible rather than in the town. Though adults may live where they like within very wide limits and take no harm, children, even of healthy stock, living in towns,
are continually subject to many minor ills, such as chronic
catarrh, tonsillitis, bronchitis,and even the far graver
pneumonia. Removed to healthier conditions in the country their ailments tend to disappear, and normal physical development
supervenes. The residence should be on a well-drained soil,
preferably near the sea in the case of a delicate child, on
higher ground for those of more robust constitution. The child should be lightly clad in woollen garments all the year round, their thickness being slightly greater in winter than in
summer. An abundance of simple well-cooked food in sufficient variety, ample time at table, where an atmosphere of light
gaiety should be cultivated, and a period free from restraint
both before and after meals, should be considered fundamental
essentials. As regards the most suitable kinds of food--milk and fruit should be given in abundance, fresh meat once a
day, and fish or eggs once a day. Bread had better be three
days old, and baked in the form of small rolls to increase
the ratio of crust to crumb. Both butter and sugar are good foods, and should be freely allowed in many forms. The
exercise of the body must be duly attended to. Nowadays this is provided for in the shape of games, some being optional,
others prescribed, and such sports as boating, swimming,
fencing, &c. But severe exercise should only be allowed
under adequate medical control, and should be increased very
gradually. In the case of girls, let them run, leap and
climb with their brothers for the first twelve years or so of life. But as puberty approaches, with all the change, stress
and strain dependent thereon, their lives should be appropriately
modified. Rest should be enforced during the menstrual periods of these earlier years, and milder, more graduated
exercise taken at other times. In the same way all mental strain should be diminished. Instead of pressure being put on a girl's intellectual education at about this time, as
is too often the case, the time devoted to school and books
should be diminished. Education should be on broader, more
fundamental lines, and much time should be passed in the open
air. With regard to the mental training of both sexes two points must be borne in mind. First, that an ample number
of hours should be set on one side for sleep, up to ten
years of age not less than eleven, and up to twenty years
not less than nine. Secondly, that the time devoted to
``bookwork'' should be broken up into a number of short periods, very carefully graduated to the individual child.
In every case where there is a family tendency towards any certain disease or weakness, that tendency must determine
the whole circumstances of the child's life. That diathesis which is most serious and usually least regarded, the nervous
excitable one, is by far the most important and the most
difficult to deal with. Every effort should be made to avoid the conditions in which the hereditary predisposition would be aroused into mischievous action, and to encourage
development on simple unexciting lines. The child should be confined to the schoolroom but little and receive most of his training in wood and field. Other diatheses--the tuberculous,
rheumatic, &c.---must be dealt with in appropriate ways.
The adolescent is prone to special weaknesses and moral perversions. The emotions are extremely unstable, and any
stress put on them may lead to undesirable results. Warm climates, tight-fitting clothes, corsets, rich foods, soft
mattresses, or indulgences of any kind, and also mental
over-stimulation, are especially to be guarded against.
The day should be filled with interests of an objective--in contradistinction to subjective--kind, and the child should
retire to bed at night healthily fatigued in mind and body. Let there be confidence between mother and daughter, father
and son, and, as the years bring the bodily changes, those
in whom the children trust can choose the fitting moments for explaining their meaning and effect, and warning against
abuses of the natural functions. For bibliography see CHILD. ADOLPH OF NASSAU (c. 1255-.1298), German king, son of
Walram, count of Nassau. He appears to have received a good
education, and inherited his father's lands around Wiesbaden in
1276. He won considerable fame as a mercenary in many of the feuds of the time, and on the 5th of May 1292 was chosen German
king, in succession to Rudolph I., an election due rather
to the political conditions of the time than to his personal abilities. He made large promises to his supporters, and
was crowned on the 1st of July at Aix-la-Chapelle. Princes and towns did homage to him, but his position was unstable,
and the allegiance of many of the princes, among them Albert
I., duke of Austria, son of the late king Rudolph, was merely
nominal. Seeking at once to strengthen the royal position,
he claimed Meissen as a vacant fief of the Empire, and in
1294 allied himself with Edward I., king of England, against
France. Edward granted him a subsidy, but owing to a
variety of reasons Adolph did not take the field against France, but turned his arms against Thuringia, which he
had purchased from the landgrave Albert II. This bargain was resisted by the sons of Albert, and from 1294 to 1296
Adolph was campaigning in Meissen and Thuringia. Meissen was conquered, but he was not equally successful in Thuringia,
and his relations with Albert of Austria were becoming more strained. He had been unable to fulfil the promises made at his election, and the princes began to look with suspicion upon his
designs. Wenceslaus II., king of Bohemia, fell away from his
allegiance, and his deposition was decided on, and was carried
out at Mainz, on the 23rd of May 1298, when Albert of Austria
was elected his successor. The forces of the rival kings met at Gollheim on the 2nd of July 1298, where Adolph was
killed, it is said by the hand of Albert. He was buried at
Rosenthal, and in 1309 his remains were removed to Spires.
See F. W. E. Roth, Geschichte des Romischen Konigs Adolf I.
von Nassau (Wiesbaden, 1879); V. Domeier, Die Absetzung Adolf
von Nassau (Berlin, 1889); L. Ennen, Die Wahl des Konigs
Adolf von Nassau (Cologne, 1866); L. Schmid, Die Wahl des
Grossen Adolf von Nassau zum Romischen Konig; B. Gebhardt,
Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, Band i. (Berlin, 1901).
ADOLPHUS, JOHN LEYCESTER (1795-1862), English lawyer and
author, was the son of John Adolphus (1768--1845), a well-known
London barrister who wrote a History of England to 1783 (1802), a History of France from 1790 (1803) and other
works. He was educated at Merchant Taylors' School and at St. John's College, Oxford. In 1821 he published Letters to
Richard Heber, Esq., in which he discussed the authorship of
the then anonymous Waverley novels, and fixed it upon Sir Walter
Scott. This conclusion was based on the resemblance of the novels in general style and method to the poems acknowledged by Scott. Scott thought at first that the letters were written by Reginald Heber, afterwards bishop of Calcutta,
and the discovery of J. L. Adolphus's identity led to a warm friendship. Adolphus was called to the bar in 1822, and his
Circuiteers, an Eclogue, is a parody of the style of two of
his colleagues on the northern circuit. He became judge of the Marylebone County Court in 1852, and was a bencher of the Inner
Temple. He was the author of Letters from Spain in 1816 and 1817 (1858), and was completing his father's History of
England at the time of his death on the 24th of December 1862. ADOLPHUS FREDERICK (1710-1771), king of Sweden, was born
at Gottorp on the 14th of May 1710. His father was Christian Augustus (1673--1726), duke of Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp,
bishop of Lubeck, and administrator, during the war of
1700--1721, of the duchies of Holstein-Gottorp for his nephew
Charles Frederick; his mother was Albertina Frederica of Baden-Durlach. From 1727 to 1750 he was bishop of Lubeck,
and administrator of Holstein-Kiel during the minority of Duke Charles Peter Ulrich, afterwards Peter III. of Russia. In
1743 he was elected heir to the throne of Sweden by the ``Hat'' faction in order that they might obtain better conditions of peace from the empress Elizabeth, whose fondness for the house
of Holstein was notorious (see SWEDEN, History). During
his whole reign (1751-1771) Adolphus Frederick was little more than a state decoration, the real power being lodged in the
hands of an omnipotent riksdag, distracted by fierce party
strife. Twice he endeavoured to free himself from the intolerable tutelage of the estates. The first occasion was in 1755 when, stimulated by his imperious consort Louisa
Ulrica, sister of Frederick the Great, he tried to regain
a portion of the attenuated prerogative, and nearly lost
his throne in consequence. On the second occasion, under
the guidance of his eldest son, the crown prince Gustavus,
afterwards Gustavus III., he succeeded in overthrowing the
tyrannous ``Cap'' senate, but was unable to make any use of
his victory. He died of surfeit at Stockholm on the 12th of February 1771. See R. Nisbet Bain, Gustavus III. and
his Contemporaries, vol. i. (London, 1895). (R. N. B.)
ADONI, a town of British India, in the Bellary district of
Madras, 307 m. from Madras by rail. It has manufactures of
carpets, silk and cotton goods, and several factories for ginning
and pressing cotton. The hill-fort above, now in ruins, was an
important seat of government in Mahommedan times and is frequently mentioned in the wars of the 18th century. Pop. (1901) 30,416.
ADONIJAH (Heb. Adoniyyah or Adoniyyahu, ``Yah is
Lord''), a name borne by several persons in the Old
Testament, the most noteworthy of whom was the fourth son of
David. He was born to Haggith at Hebron (2 Sam. iii. 4; 1 Ch. iii. 2). The natural heir to the throne, on the death of
Absalom, he sought with the help of Joab and Abiathar to seize
his birthright, and made arrangements for his coronation (1
Kings i. 5 ff.). Hearing, however, that Solomon, with the
help of Nathan the prophet and Bathsheba, and apparently
with the consent of David, had ascended the throne, he fled
for safety to the horns of the altar. Solomon spared him on this occasion (1 Kings i. 50 ff.), but later commanded
Benaiah to slay him (ii. 13 ff.), because with the approval
of Bathsheba he wished to marry Abishag, formerly David's
concubine, and thus seemed to have designs on the throne.
ADONIS, in classical mythology, a youth of remarkable
beauty, the favourite of Aphrodite. According to the story
in Apollodorus (iii. 14. 4), he was the son of the Syrian king
Theias by his daughter Smyrna (Myrrha), who had been inspired
by Aphrodite with unnatural love. When Theias discovered the truth he would have slain his daughter, but the gods in pity
changed her into a tree of the same name. After ten months the tree burst asunder and from it came forth Adonis. Aphrodite,
charmed by his beauty, hid the infant in a box and handed
him over to the care of Persephone, who afterwards refused to
give him up. On an appeal being made to Zeus, he decided that
Adonis should spend a third of the year with Persephone and a third with Aphrodite, the remaining third being at his own
disposal. Adonis was afterwards killed by a boar sent by Artemis. There are many variations in the later forms of the story (notably in Ovid, Metam. x. 298). The name is generally
supposed to be of Phoenician origin (from adon--``lord''),
Adonis himself being identified with Tammuz (but see F. Dummler in Pauly-Wissowa's Realencyklopadie, who does not
admit a Semitic origin for either name or cult). The name Abobas, by which he was known at Perga in Pamphyha, certainly
seems connected with abub (a Semitic word for ``flute''; cf. ``ambubaiarum collegia'' in Horace, Satires, i. 2. 1). (See
also ATTIS.) Annual festivals, called Adonia, were held in
his honour at Byblus, Alexandria, Athens and other places.
Although there were variations in the ceremony itself and in its date, the central idea was the death and resurrection of
Adonis. A vivid description of the festival at Alexandria (for which Bion probably wrote his Dirge cf. Adonis) is given by Theocritus in his fifteenth idyll, the Adoniazusae.
On the first day, which celebrated the union of Adonis and
Aphrodite, their images were placed side by side on a silver
couch, around them all the fruits of the season, ``Adonis
gardens'' in silver baskets, golden boxes of myrrh, cakes of
meal, honey and oil, made in the likeness of things that
creep and things that fly. On the day following the image of Adonis was carried down to the shore and cast into the sea by women with dishevelled hair and bared breasts. At the same time a song was sung, in which the god was entreated
to be propitious in the coming year. This festival, like
that at Athens, was held late in summer; at Byblus, where
the mourning . ceremony preceded, it took place in spring.
It is now generally agreed that Adonis is a vegetation spirit,
whose death and return to life represent the decay of nature in winter and its revival in spring. He is born from the myrrh-tree, the oil of which is used at his festival; he is
connected with Aphrodite in her character of vegetation-goddess. A special feature of the Athenian festival was the ``Adonis gardens,'' small pots of flowers forced to grow artificially,
which rapidly faded (hence the expression was used to denote any transitory pleasure). The dispute between Aphrodite and Persephone for the possession of Adonis, settled by the
agreement that he is to spend a third (or half) of the year in the lower-world (the seed at first underground and then reappearing above it), finds a parallel in the story of Tammuz
and Ishtar (see APHRODITE) The ceremony of the Adonia was intended as a charm to promote the growth of vegetation,
the throwing of the gardens and images into the water being supposed to procure a supply of rain (for European parallels see Mannhardt). It is suggested (Frazer) that Adonis is not a god of vegetation generally, but specially a corn-spirit,
and that the lamentation is not for the decay of vegetation in winter, but for the cruel treatment of the corn by the
reaper and miller (cf. Robert Burns's John Barleycorn.) All important element in the story is the connexion of Adonis with the boar, which (according to one version) brings
him into the world by splitting with his tusk the bark of the tree into which Smyrna was changed, and finally kills
him. It is probable that Adonis himself was looked upon as incarnate in the swine, so that the sacrifice to him by
way of expiation on special occasions of an animal which otherwise was specially sacred, and its consumption by its
worshippers, was a sacramental act. Other instances of a
god being sacrificed to himself as his own enemy are the sacrifice of the goat and bull to Dionysus and of the bear to Artemis. The swine would be sacrificed as having caused the death of Adonis, which explains the dislike of Aphrodite for that
animal. It has been observed that whenever swine sacrifices occur in the ritual of Aphrodite there is reference to Adonis. In any vase, the conception of Adonis as a swine-god does not
contradict the idea of him as a vegetation or corn spirit, which
in many parts of Europe appears in the form of a boar or sow. AUTHORITIES.--H. Brugsch, Die Adonisklage und das
Linoslied (Berlin, 1852); Grove, De Adonide (Leipzig,
1877); W. H. Engel, Kypros, ii. (1841), still valuable;
W. Mannhardt, Wald- und Feldkulte, ii. (1905); M. P.
Nilsson, Griechische Feste (Leipzig, 1906); articles in
Roscher's Lexikon and Pauly-Wissowa's Encyklopadie J. G. Frazer, The Golden Bough, ii. (2nd ed.), p. 113, and
Adonis, Attis and Osiris (1906); L. R. Farnell, Cults of
the Greek States, ii. p. 646; W. Robertson Smith (Religion
of the Semites, new ed., 1894, pp. 191, 290, 411), who,
regarding Adonis as the swine-god, characterizes the Adonia
as an annual piacular sacrifice (of swine), ``in which the
sacrifice has come to be overshadowed by its popular and dramatic accompaniments, to which the Greek celebration,
not forming part of the state religion, was limited.''
ADONIS, a genus of plants belonging to the natural order
Ranunculaceae, known commonly by the nomes of pheasant's
eye and Flos Adonis. They are annual or perennial herbs with much divided leaves and yellow or red flowers. Adonis autumnalis has become naturalized in some parts of England; the petals are scarlet with a dark spot at the base. An early flowering species, Adonis vernalis, with
large bright yellow flowers, is well worthy of cultivation.
It prefers a deep light soil. The name is also given to the butterfly, Mazarine or Clifton Blue (Polyomreatus Adonis).
ADOPTIANISM. As the theological doctrine of the Logos which bulks so largely in the writings of the apologists of the 2nd century came to the front, the trinitarian problem became
acute. The necessity of a constant protest against polytheism led to a tenacious insistence on the divine unity, and the
task was to reconcile this unity with the deity of Jesus Christ. Some thinkers fell back on the ``modalistic'' solution which regards ``Father'' and ``Son'' as two aspects of the same subject, but a simpler and more popular method was the
``adoptionist'' or humanitarian. Basing their views on the synoptic Gospels, and tracing descent from the obscure sect
of the Alogi, the Adoptianists under Theodotus of Byzantium
tried to found a school at Rome c. 185, asserting that
Jesus was a man, filled with the Holy Spirit's inspiration
from his baptism; and sa attaining such a perfection of holiness that he was adopted by God and exalted to divine dignity. Theodotus was excommunicated by the bishop of Rome, Victor, c. 195, but his followers lived on under a
younger teacher of the same name and under Artemon. while in the Fast similar views were expounded by Beryllus of Bostra and Paul of Samosata, who undoubtedly influenced
Lucian of Antioch and his school, including Arius and, later,
Nestorius. There is thus a traceable historical connexion between the early adoptian controversy and the struggle in Spain at the end of the 8th century, to which that name
is usually given. It was indeed only a renewal, under new
conditions, of the conflict between two types of thought, the
rational and the mystical, the school of Antioch and that of
Alexandria. The writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia had become well known in the West, especially since the strife
over the ``three chapters'' (544-553), and the opposition
of Islam also partly determined the form of men's views on the doctrine of Christ's person. We must further remember the dyophysitism which had been sanctioned at the council of Chalcedon. About 780 Ehpandus (b. 718), archbishop of
Toledo, revived and vehemently defended the expression
Christus Filius Dei adoptivus, and was aided by his much
more gifted friend Felix, bishop of Urgella. They held that
the duality of natutes implied a distinction between two modes of sonship in Christ---the natural or proper, and the
adoptive. In support of their views they appealed to scripture and to the Western Fathers, who had used the term ``adoption''
as synonymous with ``assumption'' in the orthodox sense; and especially to Christ's fraternal relation to Christians--the brother of God's adopted sons. Christ, the firstborn among
many brethren, had a natural birth at Bethlehem and also a
spiritual birth begun at his baptism and consummated at his resurrection. Thus they did not teach a dual personality,
nor the old Antiochene view that Christ's divine exaltation was due to his sinless virtue; they were less concerned with old disputes than with the problem as the Chalcedon decision had left it--the relation of Christ's one personality to his two natures. Felix introduced adoptian views into that part of Spain which belonged to the Franks, and Charlemagne thought it necessary
to assemble a synod at Regensburg (Ratisbon), in 792, before
which the bishop was summoned to explain and justify the new doctrine. Instead of this he renounced it, and confirmed
his renunciation by a solemn oath to Pope Adrian, to whom
the synod sent him. The recantation was probably insincere,
for on returning to his diocese he taught adoptianism as before. Another synod was held at Frankfort in 794,
by which the new doctrine was again formally condemned,
though neither Felix nor any of his followers appeared. In this synod Alcuin of York took part. A friendly letter from Alcuin, and a controversial pamphlet, to which Felix replied,
were followed by the sending of several commissions of clergy to Spain to endeavour to put down the heresy. Archbishop Leidrad (d. 816) of Lyons, being on one of these commissions,
persuaded Felix to appear before a synod at Aix-la-Chapelle in 799. There, after six days' disputing with Alcuin, he again
recanted his heresy. The rest of his life was spent under the supervision of the archbishop at Lyons, where he died in 816.
Elipapdus, secure in his see at Toledo, never swerved from
the adoptian views, which, however, were almost universally
abandoned after the two leaders died. In the scholastic discussions of the 12th century the question came to the front again, for the doctrine as framed by Alcuin was not universally
accepted. Thus both Abelard and Peter Lombard, in the interest
of the immutability of the divine substance (holding that God could not ``become', anything), gravitated towards a Nestorian
position. The great opponent of their Christology, which
was known as Nihilianism, was the German scholar Gerhoch,
who, for his bold assertion of the perfect interpenetration
of deity and humanity in Christ, was accused of Eutychianism.
The proposition Deus non factus est aliquid secundum quod est homo was condemned by a synod of Tours in 1163 and again by the Lateran synod of 1179, but Adoptianism continued all
through the middle ages to be a source of theological dispute. See A. Harnack, Hist. of Dogma, esp. vol. v. pp.
279-292; R. Ottley, The Doctrine of the Incarnation,
vol. i. p. 228 ff, vol. ii. pp. 151-161; Herzog-Hauck,
Realenclyk., art. ``Adoptianismus.'' (A. J. G.)
ADOPTION (Lat. adoptio, for adoptatio, from adoptare,
to choose for oneself), the act by which the relations of
paternity and filiation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature. Cases of adoption were very frequent among the Greeks and Romans, and the custom
was accordingly very strictly regulated in their laws. In Athens the power of adoption was allowed to all citizens who were of sound mind, and who possessed no male offspring of their
own, and it could be exercised either during lifetime or by
testament. The person adopted, who required to be himself
a citizen, was enrolled in the family and demus of the
adoptive father, whose name, however, he did not necessarily
assume. In the interest of the next of kin, whose rights
were affected by a case of adoption, it was provided that the
registration should be attended with certain formalities, and
that it should take place at a fixed time--the festival of the Thargelia. The rights and duties of adopted children were almost identical with those of natural offspring, and could
not be renounced except in the case of one who had begotten children to take his place in the family of his adoptive father. Adopted into another family, children ceased to
have any claim of kindred or inheritance through their natural father, though any rights they might have through
their mother were not similarly affected. Among the Romans the existence of the patria potestas gave a peculiar significance to the custom of adoption. The motive to the act was not so generally childlessness, or the gratification
of affection, as the desire to acquire those civil and
agnate rights which were founded on the patria potestas. It was necessary, however, that the adopter should have no
children of his own, and that he should be of such an age
as to preclude reasonable expectation of any being born to him. Another limitation as to age was imposed by the maxim adoptio imitatur naturam, which required the adoptive
father to be at least eighteen years older than the adopted children. According to the same maxim eunuchs were not permitted to adopt, as being impotent to beget children for
themselves. Adoption was of two kinds according to the state of the person adopted, who might be either still under the
patria potestas (alieni juris), or his own master (sui
juris). In the former case the act was one of adoption proper, in the latter case it was styled adrogation,
though the term adoption was also used in a general sense to describe both species. In adoption proper the natural father publicly sold his child to the adoptive father, and the sale
being thrice repeated, the maxim of the Twelve Tables took
effect, Si pater filium ter venunduit, filius a patre liber
esto. The process was ratified and completed by a fictitious action of recovery brought by the adoptive father against the natural parent, which the latter did not defend, and which was
therefore known as the cessio in jure. Adrogation could be accomplished originally only by the authority of the people assembled in the Comitia, but from the time of Diocletian
it was effected by an imperial rescript. Females could not be adrogated, and, as they did not possess the patria potestas,
they could not exercise the right of adoption in either kind. The whole Roman law on the subject of adoption will be found in Justinian's Institutes, lib. i. tit. II.
In Hindu law, as in nearly every ancient system, wills
were formerly unknown, and adoptions took their place. (See
INDIAN LAW.) Adoption is not recognized in the laws of England, Scotland or the Netherlands, though there are legal
means by which one may be enabled to assume the name and arms and to inherit the property of a stranger. (See NAME.) In France and Germany, countries which may he said to have
embodied the Roman law in their jurisprudence, adoption is
regulated according to the principles of Justinian, though
with several more or less important modifications, rendered
necessary by the usages of these countries respectively. Under French law the rights of adoption can be exercised only by those who are over fifty years of age, and who, at the time of
adoption, have neither children nor legitimate descendants.
They must also be fifteen years older than the person adopted. In German law the person adopting must either be fifty years of age, or at least eighteen years older than the adopted, unless
a special dispensation is obtained. If the person adopted is a legitimate child, the consent of his parents must be
obtained; if illegitimate, the consent of the mother. Both in
Germany and France the adopted child remains a member of his original family, and acquires no rights in the family of the
adopter other than that of succession to the person adopting. In the United States adoption is regulated by the statutes of the several states. Adoption of minors is permitted by statute in many of the states. These statutes generally require some public notice to be given of the intention to adopt,
and an order of approval after a hearing before some public authority. The consequence commonly is that the person adopted becomes, in the eyes of the law, the child of the person
adopting, for all purposes. Such an adoption, if consummated
according to the law of the domicile, is equally effectual
in any other state into which the parties may remove. The relative status thus newly acquired is ubiquitous. (See Whitmore,
Laws of Adoption; Ross v. Ross, 129 Massachusetts Reports,
243.) The part played by the legal fiction of adoption in the constitution of primitive society and the civilization of the race is so important, that Sir Henry S. Maine, in his Ancient
Law, expresses the opinion that, had it never existed, the
primitive groups of mankind could not have coalesced except on terms of absolute superiority on the one side and absolute subjection on the other. With the institution of adoption,
however, one people might feign itself as descended from the
same stock as the people to whose sacra gentilicia it was admitted; and amicable relations were thus established between stocks which, but for this expedient, must have submitted
to the arbitrament of the sword with all its consequences. ADORATION (Lat. ad, to, and os, mouth; i.e. ``carrying
to one's mouth''), primarily an act of homage or worship,
which, among the Romans, was performed by raising the hand
to the mouth, kissing it and then waving it in the direction
of the adored object. The devotee had his head covered,
and after the act turned himself round from left to right. Sometimes he kissed the feet or knees of the images of the gods themselves, and Saturn and Hercules were adored with the head
bare. By a natural transition the homage, at first paid to
divine beings alone, came to be paid to monarchs. Thus the
Greek and Roman emperors were adored by bowing or kneeling,
laying hold of the imperial robe, and presently withdrawing
the hand and pressing it to the lips, or by putting the royal
robe itself to the lips. In Eastern countries adoration has ever been performed in an attitude still more lowly. The Persian method, introduced by Cyrus, was to bend the knee
and fall on the face at the prince's feet, striking the earth
with the forehead and kissing the ground. This striking of the earth with the forehead, usually a fixed number of times,
is the form of adoration usually paid to Eastern potentates to-day. The Jews kissed in homage. Thus in 1 Kings xix. 18, God is made to say, ``Yet I have left me seven thousand
in Israel, all the knees which have not bowed unto Baal,
and every mouth which hath not kissed him.'' And in Psalms ii. 12, ``Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish
from the way.'' (See also Hosea xiii. 2.) In England the ceremony of kissing the sovereign's hand, and some other acts
which are performed kneeling, may be described as forms of
adoration. Adoration is applied in the Roman Church to the ceremony of kissing the pope's foot, a custom which is said
to have been introduced by the popes following the example of the emperor Diocletian. The toe of the famous statue of the apostle in St Peter's, Rome, shows marked wear caused by
the kisses of pilgrims. In the Roman Church a distinction is made between Latria, a worship due to God alone, and
Dulia or Hyperdulia, the adoration paid to the Virgin,
saints, martyrs, crucifixes, &c. (See further HOMAGE.)
ADORF, a town of Germany, in the kingdom of Saxony, 3 m. from
the Bohemian frontier, at an elevation of 1400 ft. above the
sea, on the Plauen-Eger and Aue-Adorf lines of railway. Pop.
5000. It has lace, dyeing and tanning industries, and
manufactures of toys and musical instruments; and there is a convalescent home for the poor of the city of Leipzig. ADOUR (anc. Aturrus or Adurus, from Celtic dour,
water), a river of south-west France, rising in the department
of Hautes Pyrenees, and flowing in a wide curve to the Bay of
Biscay. It is formed of several streams having their origin in the massif of the Pic d'Arbizon and the Pic du Midi de Bigorre, but during the first half of its course remains an
inconsiderable river. In traversing the beautiful valley of Campan it is artificially augmented in summer by the waters of the Lac Bleu, which are drawn off by means of a siphon, and
flow down the valley of I esponne. After passing Bagneres de Bigorre the Adour enters the plain of Tarbes, and for the
remainder of its course in the department of Hautes Pyrenees is of much less importance as a waterway than as a means of feeding the numerous irrigation canals which cover the plains on each side. Of these the oldest and most important is the Canal d'Alaric, which follows the right bank for 36
m. Entering the department of Gers, the Adour receives the
Arros on the right bank and begins to describe the large westward curve which takes it through the department of Landes to the sea. In the last-named department it soon becomes navigable,
namely, at St Sever, after passing which it is joined on the
left by the Larcis, Gabas, Louts and Luy, and on the right
by the Midouze, which is formed by the union of the Douze
and the Midour, and is navigable for 27 m.; now taking a
south-westerly course it receives on the left the Gave de Pau, which is a more voluminous river than the Adour itself,
and flowing past Bayonne enters the sea through a dangerous estuary, in which sandbars are formed, after a total course
of 208 m., of which 82 are navigable. The mouth of the
Adout has repeatedly shifted. its old bed being represented by the series of etangs and lagoons extending northward as far as the village of Vieux Boucau, 22 1/2 m. north of
Bayonne, where it found a new entrance into the sea at the
end of the 14th century. Its previous mouth had been 10 m. south of Vieux Boucau. The present channel was constructed by the engineer Louis de Foix in 1579. There is a depth over the bar at the entrance of 10 1/2 to 16 ft. at high tide. The area of the basin of the Adour is 6565 sq. m. ADOWA (properly ADUA), the capital of Tigre, northern
Abyssinia, 145 m. N.E. of Gondar and 17 m. E. by N. of Axum,
the ancient capital of Abyssinia. Adowa is built on the slope of a hill at an elevation of 6500 ft., in the midst of a rich
agricultural district. Being on the high road from Massawa to central Abyssinia, it is a meeting-place of merchants from
Arabia and the Sudan for the exchange of foreign merchandise with the products of the country. During the wars between the Italians and Abyssinia (1887-96) Adowa was on three or four occasions looted and burnt; but the churches escaped destruction. The church of the Holy Trinity, one of the
largest in Abyssinia, contains numerous wall-paintings of
native art. On a hill about 2 1/2 m. north-west of Adowa are the ruins of Fremona, the headquarters of the Portuguese
Jesuits who lived in Abyssinia during the 16th and 17th centuries. On the 1st of March 1896, in the hills north
of the town, was fought the battle of Adowa, in which the
Abyssinians inflicted a crushing defeat on the Italian forces (see ITALY, History, and ABYSSINIA, History).
ADRA (anc. Abdera), a seaport of southern Spain, in the
province of Almeria; at the mouth of the Rio Grande de Adra, and
on the Mediterranean Sea. Pop. (1900) 11,188. Adra is the port
of shipment for the lead obtained near Berja, 10 m. north-east;
but its commercial development is retarded by the lack of a railway. Besides lead, the exports include grapes, sugar and
esparto. Fuel is imported, chieffly from the United Kingdom.
ADRAR (Berber for ``uplands''), the name of various
districts of the Saharan desert, Northern Africa. Adrar
Suttuf is a hilly region forming the southern part of the Spanish protectorate of the Rio de Oro (q.v.). Adrar or Adrar el Jebli, otherwise Adghagh, is a plateau north-east of
Timbuktu. It is the headquarters of the Awellimiden Tuareg (see TUAREG and SAHARA). Adrar n'Ahnet and Adrar Adhafar are smaller regions in the Ahnet country south of Insalah. Adrar Temur, the country usually referred to when
Adrar is spoken of, is in the western Sahara, 300 m. north
of the Senegal and separated on the north-west from Adrar Suttuf by wide valleys and sand dunes. Adrar is within the French sphere of influence. In general barren, the country
contains several oases, with a total population of about
10,000. In 1900 the oasis of Atar, on the western borders
of the territory, was reached by Paul Blanchet, previously
known for his researches on ancient Berber remains in Algeria. (Blanchet died in Senegal on the 6th of October 1900, a
few days after his return from Adrar.) Atar is inhabited by Yrab and Berber tribes, and is described as a wretched
spot. The other centres of population are Shingeti, Wadan and
Ujeft, Shingeti being the chief commercial centre, whence
caravans take to St Louis gold-dust, ostrich feathers and
dates. A considerable trade is also done in salt from the sebkha of Ijil, in the north-west. Adrar occupies the most
elevated part of a plateau which ends westwards in a steep escarpment and falls to the east in a succession of steps. Adrar or Adgar is also the name sometimes given to the chief settlement in the oasis of Tuat in the Algerian Sahara. ADRASTUS, in Greek legend, was the son of Talaus, king of
Argos, and Lysianassa, daughter of Polybus, king of Sicyon.
Having been driven from Argos by Amphiaraus, Adrastus fled to
Sicyon, where he became king on the death of Polybus. After
a time he became reconciled to Amphiaraus, gave him his sister
Eriphyle in marriage, and returned to Argos and occupied the
throne. In consequence of an oracle which had commanded him to marry his daughters to a lion and a boar, he wedded them
to Polyneices and Tydeus, two fugitives, clad in the skins of
these animals or carrying shields with their figures on them,
who claimed his hospitality. He was the instigator of the famous war against Thebes for the restoration of his son-in-law Polyneices, who had been deprived of his rights by his brother
Eteocles. Adrastus, followed by Polyneices and Tydeus, his two
sons-inlaw, Amphiaraus, his brother-in-law, Capaneus, Hippomedon
and Parthenopaeus, marched against the city of Thebes, and
on his way is said to have founded the Nemean games. This is the expedition of the ``Seven against Thebes,'' which the
poets have made nearly as famous as the siege of Troy. As Amphiaraus had foretold, they all lost their lives in this war
except Adrastus, who was saved by the speed of his horse Arion
(Iliad, xxiii. 346). Ten years later, at the instigation of
Adrastus, the war was renewed by the sons of the chiefs who had
fallen. This expedition was called the war of the ``Epigoni'' or descendants, and ended in the taking and destruction of
Thebes. None of the followers of Adrastus perished except his son Aegialeus, and this affected him so greatly that he died
of grief at Megara, as he was leading back his victorious army.
Apollodorus iii. 6, 7; Aeschylus, Septem contra Thebes; Euripides,
Phoenissae, Supplices; Statius, Thebais; Herodotus v. 67.
ADRIA (anc. Atria; the form Adria or Hadria is less correct: Hatria was a town in Picenum, the modern Atri), a
town and episcopal see of Venetia, Italy, in the province of
Rovigo, 15 m. F. by rail from the town of Rovigo. It is
situated between the mouths of the Adige and the Po, about
13 1/2 m. from the sea and but 13ft. above it. Pop. (1901) 15,678. The town occupies the site of the ancient Atria,
which gave its name to the Adriatic. Its origin is variously ascribed by ancient writers, but it was probably a Venetian,
i.e. Illyrian, not an Etruscan, foundation--still less a
foundation of Dionysius I. of Syracuse. Imported vases of the second half of the 5th century B.C. prove the existence of trade with Greece at that period; and the town was famous in Aristotle's day for a special breed of fowls. Even at that period, however, the silt brought down by the rivers
rendered access to the harbour difficult, and the historian
Philistus excavated a canal to give free access to the sea. This was still open in the imperial period, and the
town, which was a municipium, possessed its own gild
of sailors; but its importance gradually decreased. Its remains lie from 10 to 20 ft. below the modern level. The Museo Civico and the Bocchi collection contain antiquities. See R. Schone, Le antichita del Museo
Bocchi di Adria (Rome, 1878). (T. As.)
ADRIAN, or HADRIAN (Lat. Hadrianus), the name of six
popes. ADRIAN I., pope from 772 to 705, was the son of
Theodore, a Roman nobleman. Soon after his accession the
territory that had been bestowed on the popes by Pippin was invaded by Desiderius, king of the Lombards, and Adrian found
it necessary to invoke the aid of Charlemagne, who entered
Italy with a large army, besieged Desiderius in his capi
