It is only by understanding the history associated with each of these countries that one can begin to appreciate the rationale for the particular political arrangements that exist in these countries. For example, the separation of Singapore from the Malaysian federation was natural since there was no historical link between the two. In 1867, Singapore became the administrative seat for the Straits Settlements which was a British crown colony. In 1946, the Straits Settlements were dissolved and Singapore became a separate crown colony that was granted full internal self-government (not a sovereign state) in 1959. Subsequently, she became a part of Malaysian federation along with parts of Borneo in 1963 as part of the decolonization of the British Empire. The separation of Singapore from the Malaysian federation in 1965 was at the insistence of the Malays who otherwise would have become a minority within the federation. This paved the way for Singapore to become an independent sovereign state. The separation of Singapore from the Malaysian federation has absolutely no parallel with the history of Sri Lanka.

Similarly, in regard to the former Czechoslovakia, the territories in which the Czechs and the Slovaks lived had existed as separate units for over 10 centuries until the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, when both wanted the creation of a united national state. A common state thus emerged in 1918 called Czechoslovakia. The first republic existed from 1918 until 1938, and the second republic lasted only one year during which period Slovakia was granted autonomy in internal affairs. During the German occupation from 1939 until 1945, Slovakia was declared an independent state. After World War II, the third republic lasted three years and in 1948 the country was taken over by the Communists. in 1968, two federal republics were created. After the abolition of the Communist Party, and with growing disagreement between the two federal Republics, the State of Czechoslovakia was dissolved in 1993. Therefore, Czechoslovakia as a country existed only for 69 years in the last one thousand years. In addition the two ethnic groups can be considered to be homogeneous in each region since the Czechs are 95% in their Republic and the Slovaks are 86% in Slovakia. Where is the similarity to Sri Lanka?

The federal arrangements that exist between the federal units and the center in Switzerland, the United States, and Canada, are often cited as suitable for a federal framework in Sri Lanka. At no time are the constitutional arrangements in one particular country cited as a model suitable for Sri Lanka. Instead, those who advocate a federal framework for Sri Lanka have the habit of extracting what they think is best from the costitutional arrangements in each of these countries. The result is an amalgam of constitutional arrangements that has no relevance to reality, nor to the history associated with these federations. All the federations referred to grew with time to be what they are today. All of them involved processes where autonomous regions decided to federate progressively over a period of time, some by conquest, and others for reasons of mutual advantage, with the result that, the federal arrangements vary from country to country, and among the units within each country, depending on the history and circumstances of the union.

What is proposed for Sri Lanka is the division of a unitary state, a process that has no parallel with the experiences of any of the countries that are cited as models of federalism. Referring to the separatist movement in Canada, Mr. Robert W. Thacker, Director of Canadian Studies at St. Lawrence University in Canton, N.Y. (U.S.A) stated that "There are provisions for admitting provinces into the federation, but none for the break up of the country" (The New York Times, October29, 1995).

The most recently cited example of an autonomous region as being appropriate to Sri Lanka is the Aland province of Finland. This particular region of Finland enjoys a special arrangement with the rest of the country because of the history of Finland.

Finland remained under Swedish rule for about 600 years, from about the 13th to the early 19th century, but instead of being a colony, was considered an equal with the other provinces of Sweden. During this period Swedish had become the sole language of Finland and its political, social, legal, and educational institutions developed along the Swedish patterns. In 1809 a defeated Sweden ceded Finland to Russia under whom Finland came to enjoy extensive autonomy. The result was the emergence of a national identity along with Finnish as a language. In 1863 both Finnish and Swedish were equal in status.

After Finland gained independence from Russia, the people who inhabited the islands of Aland (who were descendents of Swedish settlers) wanted union with Sweden. "But (in 1921) the League of Nations ruled that Finland would retain sovereignty over the province. The Alanders refused to accept the autonomy act" (The Christian Science Monitor, October 19, 1995). In fact the reaction to the ruling by the League of Nations was so strong that the Alanders have portrayed their reaction in a mural that hangs in their parliament building. The result was that Finland had to allow extensive powers of autonomy to the Alanders without allowing it to become an independent state in order to retain these islands within the sovereignty of Finland. In spite of these unique arrangements and by virtue of their history, a group of Alanders even today want to be completely free of the Finnish yoke.

The history associated with any of these countries do not bear any similarity to the history and the circumstances in Sri Lanka. Whether the countries separated or enjoyed extensive autonomy, the common denominator was that in each of these instances, an overwhelming majority of a particular ethnic group was associated with a particular region. If the same criteria are applied to Sri Lanka, similar ethno-territories exist only in three out of the seven districts that form the Northern and Eastern provinces. Two of these districts, namely, Jaffna and Mullaitivu are contiguous and the third which is Batticaloa is isolated. In these three districts, namely Jaffna, Mullaitivu, and Batticaloa, the Sri Lankan Tamils are 95%, 76%, and 71% respectively of each district's population (1981 Census). In the remaining four districts the Sri Lankan Tamils are only 32% of the population of the four districts; a decided minority. Therefore, there are no grounds whatsoever to justify the claims for federalism or autonomy similar to other countries based on the concepts of ethno-territory that can be applied to all seven provinces as claimed by the Sri Lankan Tamils.

It is for this reason, namely, the absence of a "continuous Tamil territory" that Mr. Chelvanayakam's initial concept was for "ethnically autonomous Tamil-speaking units" to be modeled on the lines of the Swiss cantons. Mr. Chelvanayakam's idea of an autonomous Tamil unit was confined to districts such as Jaffna, Batticaloa, Mannar etc: and districts where they were a minority they "would become component cantons or half-cantons" (A. J. Wilson, 1994). The basis for claiming all seven districts in the Northern and Eastern provinces on the justification of ethno-territory has no parallel anywhere in the world, particularly when the Tamils collectively are a minority in four of the seven districts. In terms of territory, these four districts that cover more than half the total area of the two provinces, are being claimed by a minority in these four districts.

The justification of autonomy for the Northern and Eastern provinces in Sri Lanka on a basis similar to what exists in the Aland islands of Finland is baseless. The inhabitants of Aland who are of Swedish decent are almost a homogenous community. In contrast, the Sri Lankan Tamils constitute only 65% of the population of the Northern and Eastern provinces, much less than the 74% of the Sinhalese in the whole island. In addition, they comprise only 32% of the population in four of the seven districts that form the two provinces. The criterion for autonomous arrangements in other parts of the world is the concentration of ethnic groups in defined regions, such as the Alanders who are almost homogeneous, and the French-Canadians who are nearly 82% of the population of Quebec. It appears that only the Jaffna district qualifies according to this criterion, and even if the criterion is to be applied more generously, only three districts out of a total of seven would qualify.

The EPDP statement in the Island International (27th September, 1995) states: "the people of Aland have voluntarily decided to be part of the Finnish nation, and have never shown any desire to to seek independence from Finland, or to join neighbouring Sweden". This statement is erroneous. As explained earlier, the association of the province of Aland with Finland was because of a ruling and not by choice, and the only manner in which these islands could be retained within the sovereignty of Finland was to grant them extensive powers of autonomy that have been extended from time to time to please the Alanders.

The first Autonomy Act between the province of Aland and Finland in 1922 proved to be inadequate and a revised version appeared in 1951. Even this revised Act proved to be inadequate and a new and improved version was adopted in 1991. Even under the latest Autonomy Act, what the EPDP statement omitted to mention were the regulations pertaining to supervision. According to a publication by the Alands landskapsstyrelse (PB 60, SF - 22101), "Laws passed by Aland Parliament are inspected by the President of Finland, And if the Aland Parlaiment has exceeded its legislative competence in any way, the President can impose his veto. Then the bill cannot come into effect. The President bases his decision upon statements from the Aland Delegation and sometimes from the Supreme Court too. The Aland Delegation, half of whose members are appointed by the Government of Finland and half by the Aland Parliament, also has the task of supervising that Aland does not exceed its right of economic self-administration". Since the Autonomy Act of the Aland province with Finland is held up as a model for Sri Lanka, it is natural to expect the supervisory clauses quoted above also to be part of a future Sri Lankan Act if it ever comes to pass. To quote only those particular aspects of an arrangement that are only favourable, is to be disingenuous to say the least.

What Horowitz has to say about devolution is also very relevant. "Proposals for devolution abound, but more often than not devolution agreements are difficult to reach and, once reached, soon abort. Most such agreements are concluded against a background of secessionist warfare or terrorist violence. Where central authority is secure, as in India, the appropriate decisions can be made and implemented by the center. But, where the very question is how far the writ of the center will run, devolution is a matter of bilateral agreement, and an enduring agreement is an elusive thing" ( Ethnic Groups in Conflict 1985). The difficulty of working out "enduring agreements" is seen in the case of Canada and Quebec, and the regular revisions to the Autonomy Act between the province of Aland and Finland.

The range of models that have been cited as suitable for Sri Lanka start with Mr. Chelvanayakam's Swiss model. The latest model to be cited is the autonomous arrangements between the province of Aland and Finland. All these proposed solutions have been based on the preconceived notion that the Sri Lankan Tamils have rights that could be claimed on the basis of ethno-territory. Judging from the fact that only three out of a total of seven districts qualify under this criterion, it becomes clear that this basic assumption of a justifiable claim based on ethno-territory, that has guided the Sri Lankan Tamil people is fundamentally flawed, if measured by standards in the rest of the world. The solutions for their concerns must lie elsewhere.

Neville S. Ladduwahetty, November 4, 1995