In October and November 1941, the Roosevelt administration for the most part felt that war with Japan was inevitable and not necessarily a bad thing. However, strong elements of that administration, including the President, felt that the US should attempt to delay any Japanese attack for a few months if possible by reaching a temporary accommodation with Japan. The army desperately needed at least 3 more months to move more American troops to the Philippines and to finish training and equipping 100,000 or so Filipino troops. In late fall of 1941, the US wasn't really ready to defend the Philippines. By April of 1942 the army thought that it would be. 

The Roosevelt administration seriously considered offering an interim agreement under which the US would sell the Japanese limited amounts of oil and offer a couple of other concessions on a short-term basis. In return, the Japanese would do a partial withdrawal from the southern part of French Indochina. 

The Japanese, or at least part of their government, were actually considering offering a similar deal. From their point of view, delaying a southern attack had both advantages and drawbacks. One advantage was that it gave them a better chance to pick up the spoils of any Soviet collapse. A Soviet collapse would also free up some of the troops the Japanese had tied up along the Manchurian border, which would make an attack south much stronger when it came. If the Soviets collapsed, then the western allies would also be facing the full power of Nazi Germany, and thus would be in no position to oppose Japan in the Far East. On the other hand, the Japanese were aware of the US buildup in the Philippines and they understood the threat that it posed to a move into Malaysia and the Dutch East Indies if it continued.

 The Japanese armed services were somewhat divided, with some elements of the navy favoring an immediate move south, while elements of the army, especially in Manchuria, wanted to postpone any such strike.

 The US never offered its interim plan. There has been a lot of speculation as to why it didn't. The Nationalist Chinese were strongly opposed to it because it included vaguely worded curbs on aid to the Nationalists. Some elements of the Roosevelt administration were afraid that the plan would look like Munich-style appeasement and would cost the administration politically. One author speculates that US or British intelligence obtained a copy of the Japanese war plan and the Roosevelt administration assumed that the negotiations were a scam designed to lull the US off guard.

 Let's say that the two sides manage to patch together an agreement. Elements of both sides wanted one. Those elements prevail. The Japanese shift divisions meant for the southern offensive back north, in position to take advantage of any Soviet weakness. They also move some divisions back into position for another attempt to knock the Nationalist Chinese out of the war. 

The Soviets desperately need the comparatively well-armed and trained divisions that they have in the Far East for the battle shaping up in front of Moscow. Those divisions may have been some of the most effective in the Soviet army because they escaped relatively lightly from Stalin's purge of the Red Army. At the time of the purges Stalin considered Japan a more immediate threat than Germany, and didn't want to tempt the Japanese into adventures against a weakened Soviet Far Eastern army. Those divisions historically did have a major impact in front of Moscow. In this time-line, Stalin needs those divisions in the battle for Moscow, but he doesn't need a second front in the Far East. The Soviets have already pulled some of their veteran divisions out, and are almost ready to move out the rest, replacing them with half-trained conscripts. 

News of the interim agreement forces Stalin to scale down that move considerably—by about half. The Soviet winter offensive against the Germans just got a lot less powerful, with serious consequences down the road. 

The next three months see both sides feverishly preparing for war. The Japanese move troops back into position for an "end the war" offensive against the Nationalist Chinese. The US is in the process of moving marines back to the Philippines from an untenable position in the international area of Shanghai. It also moves B17's into the Philippines as quickly as they leave the assembly line. The defense of the Philippines gets tougher as the US moves over 20,000 more marines in, and gives the Filipino scouts more weapons and training. 

The impact of the interim agreement is felt as far away as North Africa. In our time-line, the Japanese offensive into Malaysia and Burma diverted men and material away from the Middle East. It also tipped the naval balance in the Mediterranean. In this time-line, the balance of power in the Middle East goes against Rommel as British and Australian troops who would have been lost at Singapore or tied down keeping the Japanese out of India stay in the battle of North Africa. 

In the Atlantic, the US gets more deeply into an undeclared war against German U-boats. Hitler doesn't want an open war against the US unless the bulk of US naval power is tied down against Japan, so he grits his teeth and avoids anything that would give Roosevelt an excuse to ask for a declaration of war.

 The US is getting stronger, but not at the pace that it did in our time-line. Isolationism is still strong, and Roosevelt by no means has a blank check to pour money into expanding the armed forces. The tidal wave of US arms that in our time-line arrived on the battlefields in late 1942 and early 1943 will be a little later and somewhat fewer in this time-line. 

And that's when I ran out of time. What do you think? Should I continue this one? So far it looks like pretty much a wash. The Allies come out ahead here, but Axis gains an advantage there. Do things really change that much? They do if the Japanese decide not to enter the war, or if they decide to head north, but those are not the most likely consequences.

If you are enjoying this scenario, or if you are disappointed with it, please let me know. I always read and enjoy any feedback I can get.  

Note: I'm still planning to start an 'e-mail to the editor' section--hopefully next issue.  If you do e-mail me, please indicate whether or not I can use your e-mail in that section.