A Storm in the Cedars:

Colonel John F. Miller’s Brigade at the Battle of Stone’s River

 

By: Daniel A. Masters

Revised: March 29, 2005

 

 

            At dawn December 31, 1862, Private Ira S. Owens crouched behind a limestone outcropping at the edge of a tangled cedar thicket, watching for movement from Rebel pickets just 200 yards away. The sun rising in the eastern sky on that gray overcast morning revealed two great armies nose to nose along the meandering banks of Stones River near Murfreesboro, 30 miles south of Nashville. All night, Owens and his comrades in Company C, 74^th Ohio Volunteer Infantry attempted to ward off the cold while maintaining a sporadic fire with Confederates across a barren field. The night, cloudy and dark, allowed one only to see the enemy by brief muzzle flashes lighting the sky. The coming of day promised Owens relief from picket duty and a chance to warm himself by the fire with his breakfast of hard bread and beans. ¹

About 6 a.m., when Company D, 37^th Indiana Volunteer Infantry relieved Owens’s company, men noticed a tension that signaled something ominous. “Everyone seemed anxious to measure arms with the enemy. We all felt that a fearful and bloody battle was at hand,” remarked company commander Captain Hezekiah Shook. As his men took positions behind trees and rocks, “our thoughts are upon victory, our homes, our wives and little ones, our friends, and upon generations yet unborn.” ² 

During the next three days of fighting, Shook and the 2,180 members of Colonel John F. Miller’s brigade would experience some of the hardest fighting of the war at the battle of Stone’s River, and in the process, build a reputation as one of the finest fighting brigades in Major General William S. Rosecrans’s Army of the Cumberland. The brigade had been formed the past September in Nashville as part of Brigadier General James S. Negley’s division, but outside of a few minor actions near the state capital, had not yet been in a major engagement. The four regiments comprising the brigade (21^st and 74^th Ohio, 37^th Indiana, and 78^th Pennsylvania) had shown promise in earlier actions and were fortunate in having John Miller as commander.

Handsome with thick brown sideburns and mustache, penetrating eyes, and a dogged sense of determination, at age 31 he was a rising star in the Army of the Cumberland. Miller owed his promotion to brigade command not to political clout, but to a reputation of competence and dash shown while commanding the 29^th Indiana Infantry during the spring and summer campaigns of 1862.  A member of his staff wrote, “There was not perhaps in all the army a brigade…having a commander in which it had greater confidence.” ³

Each of the four regiments in the brigade added a distinct flavor to Miller’s command. The 21^st Ohio guarded portions of the Memphis and Charleston railroad in northern Alabama during the summer of 1862, and it had a number of men take part in Andrew’s raid along the Western and Atlantic railroad in the spring of 1862, culminating in the ‘Great Locomotive Chase.’ Raised primarily in Wood and Hancock counties, the regiment was fashioned by pioneers who engaged in taming northwestern Ohio’s Great Black Swamp. Hard, uncouth, contentious, a nightmare to its leaders on the march and to its enemies on the battlefield, they were the very essence of the stereotypical hard-campaigning Western soldier. Led initially by bombastic and well-connected Perrysburg politician Jesse S. Norton, who subsequently resigned after incurring the ire of his commanders for socializing too frequently with well-known Alabama secessionists, it was now under the command of the decidedly unbombastic Lieutenant Colonel James M. Neibling. Long of face with a thin, wiry beard, physically imposing at more than six feet tall, bold, hard-drinking, jovial, and profane, he was the darling of his troops who delighted in the fact that “Colonel Jim” had little regard for pomp or camp discipline and suffered the worst privations of soldiering along with them. Neibling was notorious for his laxness in camp, but beneath Neibling’s light-hearted nature was a fierce combativeness and love for his freewheeling Ohioans that inspired his men to great achievements on the battlefield. ⁴

Raised throughout the southern portion of their state, the 37^th Indiana was comprised largely of farmers, many of whom moved there from Kentucky or were the sons of former Kentuckians. As a result, the regiment was predominately Democratic in politics and was not pleased with the direction the war had taken with Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation. Troubled from the start, the 37^th was initially led by a regular Army officer whose utter lack of regard for the health and welfare of his men sent southern Indiana into a frenzy before his return to the eastern Army. This combined with the occasional mutiny and blatant politicking among the field officers of the command gave the 37^th Indiana the reputation within the army as a troublesome unit. As part of Colonel John Basil Turchin’s brigade, this reputation was cemented by the regiment’s involvement in the sack of Athens, Alabama in early May 1862. Subsequently, Turchin and all four regimental commanders were court-martialed, and the regiments assigned to other brigades. However, Colonel Carter Gazlay of the 37^th was court martialed and dismissed not for his role in the Athens fiasco, but for receiving stolen property among several ethics charges. While guarding sections of the Memphis and Charleston railroad in the summer of 1862, the men acquitted themselves well despite the foibles of the regimental command. Determined to prove themselves, the soldiers of the 37^th Indiana initially took well to the discipline enforced by their new commander Colonel James S. Hull. Colonel Hull took command of the regiment following Gazlay’s dismissal and worked hard to redeem his regiment’s standing in the army. His efforts seemed to bear fruit as the regiment had performed well in two skirmishes near Nashville, but dissatisfaction and low morale still remained a problem. Unfortunately, Hull was not personally popular; while certainly brave, efficient, and competent, his strict manner rubbed against the grain of his volunteers. Heading into the regiment’s most difficult fight of the war, the 37^th had a lot to overcome. ⁵

The 74^th Ohio was the newest and smallest of Miller’s regiments, being raised in Greene County in southwestern Ohio and assigned to garrison duties in Nashville during its entire term of service thus far. Long exposure to the monotonous routine of camp duty had sapped some of the spark from the men, but had given the unit a far more ‘spit and polish’ demeanor than its brigade mates. Colonel Granville Moody set the tone for his regiment. A Methodist preacher before the war, Moody had made a name for himself within clerical circles for his outspoken opposition to “Calvinism, Universalism, Socinianism, Radicalism, intemperance, and disloyalty.” High-browed with deep set, fiery eyes, a scraggly, silver beard and wiry, unkempt hair to match, Moody lacked any military qualifications whatsoever when he took command in late 1861. A stint as commander of Camp Chase helped educate him the ways of garrison duty which did little to develop his command abilities, but his commanding appearance, pious manner and deep concern for the spiritual needs of his soldiers won him a high regard within Negley’s division, and especially among “the boys.” He viewed himself as an instrument of God in putting down “this wicked rebellion.” ⁶

Colonel William Sirwell’s 78^th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry, despite its Eastern origins, had adopted the typical Western distaste for appearance and discipline and retained its effectiveness as a strong fighting unit. The western Pennsylvanians had displayed pluck and resourcefulness in their admittedly minor assignments thus far; some credit for which must go to Colonel Sirwell. A 43-year-old Pittsburgh native, Sirwell was soft-spoken, courageous, casual in appearance and manner, and a born leader with wide-ranging interests. A jeweler by trade, he had devoted a great deal of time to pursuing his life-long interest in military matters. After founding a number of militia units in Pennsylvania and Iowa, he formed the first black militia company in the country during the mid-1850s in Pittsburgh. Although he was not wealthy or politically prominent, he had been commissioned colonel of the 78^th after serving an uneventful three-month term as a captain in the 9^th Pennsylvania Infantry. Of Germanic stock, he sported a thick, black walrus mustache, with dark, languid eyes. In battle, Sirwell was a commanding presence in his old captain’s uniform, which he habitually wore while in the field. ⁷

Now as the brigade was stirring that morning, the dull roar of battle met their ears. The firing moved from the right towards their position, increasing in fury and volume until becoming a “continuous roar of artillery and musketry.” At about 7:30 a.m., General Negley ordered Miller’s brigade forward through the cedar thicket on his left front. Halting near the eastern edge, the brigade lay in wait while the fighting raged unabated to the south and west.

All was chaos in the woods. “Then it was that the balls and the shrieking shells cam whistling over us, and there were to be seen batteries wheeling into position, orderlies riding back and forth, horses without riders, while the yelling of Rebels like so many fiends, and the roar of artillery and musketry, filled the air with a horrid din,” remembered Private Owens. ⁸ After about an hour, Miller was ordered to deploy his brigade at the edge of the thicket to repel an expected assault. ⁹

Miller positioned his men with the hand of a seasoned veteran. On the right, he placed the 555 men of the 78^th Pennsylvania at the brow of a small hillock beyond a field of broken limestone. The 37^th Indiana, with 454 officers and men, was placed just north in an open field. The 74^th Ohio was placed next behind a log fence. Miller’s largest regiment, the 21^st Ohio with 611 men, held the brigade left near a log house at the edge of the cedar thicket. The six guns of Battery G, 1^st Ohio Light Artillery under Lieutenant Alexander Marshall were placed on a small rise between the 37^th Indiana and 74^th Ohio. Lieutenant Alban A. Ellsworth’s 1^st Kentucky battery of three guns was positioned next to the log house on the brigade left. ¹⁰

After wheeling into position, Ellsworth’s battery immediately began firing at the left oblique. The target was Brigadier General James R. Chalmers’s Mississippi brigade, which was caught in its advance towards Federal positions near the Round Forest. “Before my regiments were properly in position, a most terrific fire was opened upon every part of the line by infantry and artillery,” Colonel Miller wrote. ¹¹ Sergeant John H. Bolton of Company F, 21^st Ohio noted that Chalmers’s men “moved at the double quick into the small open field,” and then charged.¹² “The Rebs came up two or three columns deep, screeching and yelping like nigger hounds,” remembered Private Liberty Warner of Company H. He leveled his old smoothbore musket across the fence and “made them yell another tune. I was as cool as a cucumber and took steady aim at the cloud of flash and smoke.” ¹³

Private Jacob Adams of Company F recalled, “This being the first heavy fire the regiment was ever under, the boys stood up under it in fine shape, and were greatly encouraged and enthused when Colonel Jim, as we called Colonel (James) Neibling, went up and down the line repeating ‘Give ‘em hell by the acre boys.” The fire rolled up and down the regimental line, which combined with Ellsworth’s canister fire tore great holes in Chalmers’s formation. ¹⁴

Miller’s left came under fire from two Confederate batteries in its front which concentrated on silencing Ellsworth’s battery. “Here we were subject to a heavy crossfire of canister,” Ellsworth noted. “I immediately ordered a return fire of canister, double shot, firing as rapidly as possible.” While Ellsworth’s efforts did not silence the Confederate batteries, it did stall Chalmers’s advance long enough for the rest of the brigade to get into position. ¹⁵ 

After making room for his guns (the 74^th Ohio moved slightly to the left) on a slight elevation of clear ground Battery G, 1^st Ohio Light Artillery commanding officer Lieutenant Alexander Marshall ordered his caissons to the rear, then wheeled his six guns to the left and opened on the advancing Rebels with canister. ¹⁶ A regiment of Mississippians fixed bayonets and charged the right of the 21^st Ohio line. “When about 30 yards distant, the order was given to fix bayonets,” said Captain Silas Canfield. “But about this time they broke and fled, followed by a volley as a parting salute.” Inspired by his men’s steadiness under their first heavy fire, Lieutenant Colonel Neibling rode along saying, “My God boys! We gave ‘em hell didn’t we?” ¹⁷

Chalmers’s attack was faltering as the 74^th Ohio entered the fray. Colonel Granville Moody wheeled his regiment into line after a session of prayer and exhorted them, “Now men, resume your praying, fight for your God, your country, your kind, aim low and give them Hail Columbia!” His two center companies opened fire and drowned out the end of his speech; his men later claimed he said, “give them hell,” much to the pious colonel’s chagrin. ¹⁸ Private Owens fired his first shots ever at the enemy that morning, after nearly a year in the service. “I was kneeling in a fence corner, loading and firing when we received orders to move to the left and make room for a battery. When I was just in the act of rising, I felt something hit me in the leg, which did not produce much pain at the time.” A Mississippian’s ball had struck his leg, and he soon hobbled to the rear looking for the regimental surgeon. ¹⁹

To bring more fire into Chalmers’s reeling and unsupported brigade, Miller advanced the 37^th Indiana slightly forward of the 74^th Ohio and wheeled it to the left. “At 10 a.m., we were ordered to advance up the eminence to our right, now become our front, and if possible gain the woods but a few rods distant, and through the enemy,” recalled Captain Shook. The enemy was within 80 yards of the eminence and opened a heavy fire upon the 37^th. “Gallantly did our men advance midst the leaden shot. Our line wavered, reeled, but steadied again.” ²⁰ To support the Hoosiers, Colonel Moody advanced the 74^th Ohio by swinging his sword over his head and shouting, “Come on, Christian brethren.” ²¹ The maneuver worked. The battered remnants of Chalmers’s brigade halted then bolted from the field, losing more then 500 men in a little over half an hour. Chalmers himself was wounded later in the attack while rallying his men. After he was wounded, his staff failed to notify the senior colonel of the brigade, and “this veteran brigade became disorganized and driven back.” ²²

Soon after Chalmers’s repulse, General J. Patton Anderson’s brigade, comprised mostly of Mississippians, advanced towards Colonel Timothy R. Stanley’s brigade of Negley’s division positioned next in line to the south. On the brigade right, the 78^th Pennsylvania held its fire until the Rebels were within 200 yards, then let loose. “I poured a terrific volley into their ranks, but as soon as one man was killed, another took his place,” commented Colonel William Sirwell. “The enemy made a desperate charge, with heads down and bayonets glistening.” ²³

“In rapid succession, Anderson threw forward his regiments from left to right, and terrific was the fire to which they were subjected,” observed Confederate General Jones M. Withers, Anderson’s divisional commander. “Time and again checked, and almost recoiling before the fire, the regiments were as often rallied by their gallant officers, and the brigade advanced.”  The 37^th Indiana, having advanced to receive Chalmers’ attack from the northeast, now pulled back into line and began to fire at Anderson’s men. As the Confederate forces neared the hillock, the combined fire of Stanley’s brigade and Miller’s two right regiments devastated Anderson’s right wing regiments (27^th and 29^th Mississippi), which, after losing their regimental commanders, broke and fled.  The left portion of Anderson’s line held ground, slugging it out with Stanley’s brigade at great cost to both sides. ²⁴

The repulse of two determined Confederate assaults elated the men. Sergeant Robert H. Caldwell of Company I, 21^st Ohio wrote home that the battle was “truly sublime, the fierce roar of the artillery and sharp rattle of musketry made an almost indescribable din. I had the pleasure of firing about 10 rounds and I flatter myself that I never pulled the trigger without first getting good sight.” ²⁵ Lieutenant William Curry of Company C, 21^st Ohio reported home that the men of the brigade “fought them like tigers.” ²⁶ Colonel Miller stated “the battle continued with unabating fierceness on both sides until the 60 rounds of ammunition with which my men were supplied were nearly exhausted.” After expending a prodigious number of rounds in the early morning skirmishing, the 37^th Indiana ran low and pulled out of line, heading back into the woods to hunt up the brigade ordnance train.

In the meantime, Anderson regrouped his brigade and the two lines kept up an incessant long-range fire punctuated by artillery fire. Casualties mounted on both sides as dead and wounded soon littered the field.

A few minutes later, Colonel Hull led the 37^th Indiana back into the fight with the disturbing intelligence that the ordnance wagons had fled to the Nashville Pike. The firing to Miller’s right was a constant roar as General Philip H. Sheridan’s division made a gallant stand against overwhelming odds. But Sheridan’s men were also expending their last cartridges and were forced to retreat under heavy fire of General Benjamin F. Cheatham’s division. With Sheridan’s hold broken, Negley’s situation became critical; to be sure, Negley was in the middle of a Confederate nutcracker. ²⁷ Sheridan’s retreat left Negley’s right and rear exposed to an attack from the Wilkinson Pike. Advancing in pursuit of Sheridan’s division was Brigadier General Alexander P. Stewart’s stalwart Tennessee brigade. As the Sheridan’s line broke, Stewart’s men steadied Anderson’s flagging assault and then broke Stanley’s line. In the meantime, the 37^th Indiana had run out of ammunition and pulled back into the cedars. ²⁸

As Stanley’s men pulled back, an unidentified staff officer galloped up to Colonel Sirwell and ordered the Pennsylvanians to retreat from their commanding hill position. Although incredulous, Sirwell promptly obeyed. Fortunately, Colonel Miller witnessed this blunder and rectified it, but the 78^th had to fight its way back unto the hillock as the Rebels were closing in quickly. Miller now attempted to change fronts and face his brigade to the south to receive Stewart’s and Anderson’s assaults. With the difficult movement almost complete, Miller received a belated order from Negley directing him to retire his brigade through the cedars. ²⁹

“The movement was executed in good order by the infantry, but it was impossible for the artillery to obey,” Miller noted in his report. The six guns of Lieutenant Marshall’s Ohio battery had lost a large number of horses and had two guns disabled. Marshall ordered the disabled pieces sent to the rear, while the remaining four guns were ordered to “fix prolonge and fire retiring.” ³⁰ The 78^th Pennsylvania accompanied the battery for a time, but so many horses had been shot down that three pieces had to be abandoned. “As we left the open fields, our eyes looked upon the most terrific scene of slaughter we were ever called upon to witness. The artillery of the enemy was doing fearful execution,” stated one Pennsylvanian. “We saw one shell explode exactly in the line of the regiment to our left, killing at least three men.”

Despite the incessant fire, a determined artilleryman attempted to recover one of the abandoned guns. “One of the last sights witnessed as we entered the cedar woods in our retreat was an artilleryman trying to haul his gun off the field with one horse, the other five being killed,” recalled a member of the 78^th Pennsylvania. “One wheel of the carriage had become fastened between two rocks, and the brave artilleryman was trying with a rail to pry it out.” ³¹

The dark woods filled with Federals troops streaming away from the Confederate divisions closing in. Colonel Hull’s 37^th Indiana had managed to maintain order in line, but disintegrated once it became entangled in the cedars. “We were broken up by a regiment passing through our lines. We again collected our men when the 11^th Michigan passed through our lines, causing some confusion,” stated Lieutenant Colonel William D. Ward. Rallying his regiment once more, Hull marched his men out at the double quick before being felled by a musket ball in his left hip. While most of the regiment made it to safety, more than 100 men were left dead and wounded in the cedar forest. ³²

With the withdrawal of the 78^th Pennsylvania and 37^th Indiana, the 74^th Ohio was also compelled to retreat. Battling against Anderson’s men, Lieutenant David Snodgrass of Company H clapped his hands and cheered his men on saying, “Work away, my lads, we are gaining ground!” Within moments, he was wounded. The Ohioans were horrified when they looked behind them and saw yelping Rebels rapidly gaining their rear. They broke. ³³

Colonel Moody attempted to rally the men once within the cedars, sometimes at gunpoint but with little success. “I rode on in search of further squads and as I neared a wooded region, nine or ten graybacks sprang out of the woods and opened fire on me. My horse was soon crippled, stopped short, and stood still. I applied the spurs; he trembled and shrunk, and fell in agony on the ground, dead.” Pulling himself from under the animal, Moody grabbed his two pistols and ran towards the Nashville Pike. While hobbling along, a mounted officer tendered his horse, but Moody’s lame leg failed him and he sent the man along. A few minutes later, a Irish private from his regiment rode up to the colonel on a captured Rebel horse. “Divil a bit; try again Colonel. Try again, man or the devils will get ye, sure! I tried again and the Patty almost lifted me into the saddle, and amidst the zipping bullets, which came thick and fast, I strode the saddle, and without waiting to find the stirrups, started for our lines.” ³⁴ The regiment’s losses in the fight totaled 107 killed, wounded, and missing. ³⁵

After taking part in the mauling of Chalmers’s brigade, the 21^st Ohio pulled back to the cedar forest’s edge and fought until it witnessed the retreat of the 74^th Ohio. Orders soon arrived to fall back. “Second Lieutenant George Cleghorn of Company I began to cry and said it was a disgrace to retreat and called upon the boys to fight,” remembered Private Samuel A. “Sol” Linton. As Linton headed into the woods, he became separated from his company and found himself surrounded by Rebels. “Soon there came a fire from the right, this said to me git, and for the first twenty rods I just wiggled my toes and flew. I found nothing in my way that I could not get over. The Rebs were helping me by their yells and cries of ‘Halt you damn Yankee son of a bitch, run Yank, Bull Run, git thar damn you!’ I knew they had just fired and if I could outrun them, which I believed I could, I stood a good chance of getting out.” Linton escaped from what was later dubbed the ‘Slaughter Pen’ and rejoined his regiment near the Nashville Pike. ³⁶

Most of the 21^st Ohio formed into column and marched off the field, but a few men stayed unintentionally. “My comrade John Shelly and self did not hear the order to about face and march to the rear we were so busily engaged in loading and firing that we were unconscious of our surroundings until we were ordered to surrender by a Rebel officer,” noted Sergeant John Bolton. “But both of us delivered a hurried shot at them and ran at the top of our speed through a volley of musket fire and succeeded in getting to our regiment with no marks or wounds, but our clothing was in different places pierced with musket balls.” ³⁷

These men who stayed together eluded most of the rebel fire, but it was a close call. “How we got back through the cedars I can never tell, except that we walked--we didn’t run. In falling back, the men of the regiment became badly scattered and mixed with other commands,” recalled Captain Canfield. ³⁸ One unfortunate private driving the regimental ambulance was captured and recaptured three times in an hour during the confusion. ³⁹

Lieutenant Ellsworth’s bloodied battery was the last brigade unit to leave the field. “I noticed that our infantry and artillery were retiring at the same time that a heavy fire was being poured into our right, and almost into our rear. Receiving no orders to retire, made the change of position of the battery to the left and opened fire on the enemy,” reported Lt. Ellsworth. “I soon found it impossible to do more without losing the whole battery, and ordered it limbered to the rear, and retired into the cedar thicket.” His gunners left one cannon and caisson on the field after expending 493 rounds of ammunition. ⁴⁰

In the meantime, Rosecrans patched together a line of batteries and infantry along the pike and rallied his broken divisions. Men, horses, wagons, and cannons poured out of the woods near the road and headed up the pike before regrouping. The Confederates continued their triumphant advance until halted at Round Forest and along the pike. After a morning of strenuous fighting, the victorious Rebel infantry had shot its bolt. It had suffered heavy losses, particularly among the units that hit Sheridan’s and Negley’s divisions.

The full impact of Miller’s severe losses was felt later that night as men reunited with comrades. Lieutenant Colonel Ward of the 37^th Indiana recalled, “this was the gloomiest time I ever remembered to have experienced. We had a very bloody engagement; we knew quite a number had been killed and many more had been wounded, but of the many not present, we could not tell who were killed or wounded. The right of our army had been broken; yes, routed, and not knowing how it happened, we did not know what to expect. Would not that part of the army which had been driven once, break again if assailed again?” He added, “These reflections made the outlook gloomy, indeed.” ⁴¹

The next day, January 1, 1863, began much the same; cloudy and cold. The two armies still were nose to nose. Neither side was anxious to resume the contest, since firm intelligence of the enemy’s strength on either side was lacking. The entire day was spent in desultory skirmishing and cannonading, with no general engagement. Miller’s brigade maintained its position in the Union center all day without incident.

The following day continued much in the way of the previous; light skirmishing and cannonading, but this day would be different. Convinced that if he took the initiative, he could break the Army of the Cumberland, General Braxton Bragg directed Major General John C. Breckenridge’s division to assault the Union left near Stone’s River. The former vice president, whose relationship with the unpopular Bragg was already strained, protested the proposed attack, regarding it as little better than suicide. But Bragg was adamant, and Breckenridge reluctantly followed the order.

At 4 p.m., the division stepped off under cover of artillery and to the Confederates’ surprise, rather quickly knocked Beatty’s small division sprawling towards Stone’s River. Their assault, succeeding by the sheer audacity of the enterprise, utterly discouraged the exhausted Federals. Despite grave misgivings, Breckenridge thought that perhaps his assessment of the attack had been incorrect. But in a few moments, events would prove his analysis eminently prescient.

Earlier that afternoon, Rosecrans’ scouts reported a Rebel division forming on his left and he hurriedly moved brigades to support Beatty’s division. Miller’s brigade was sent to a ridge overlooking Stone’s River above McFadden’s Ford. Miller’s regiments held the left portion of the Federal line, the 21^st Ohio on the left flank, the 74^th Ohio south of it with the right anchored on the 78^th Pennsylvania. The 37^th Indiana was placed immediately behind the main battle line as a reserve. ⁴²

Aware of the threat posed by this Confederate thrust, Major John Mendenhall, chief of artillery for General Thomas L. Crittenden’s corps, began to gather guns, lining them up hub to hub along that same ridge near McFadden’s Ford. Into this small area bordered by the river on three sides, Mendenhall assembled 58 guns supported by Miller’s brigade on the left, Stanley’s brigade on the right, with Cruft’s and Hazen’s brigades in support. ⁴³

Beatty’s men streamed over Stone’s River northward, in utter rout racing from the triumphant Rebels. Miller and his fellow brigade commanders observed this tragic turn of events, and were filled with anger at not being ordered to assist their comrades. “Miller sent his staff officers and orderlies to scour the field and ask permission to cross the stream,” wrote headquarters orderly Wilson J. Vance. While waiting, Miller came to the realization that as the senior officer present, it was his duty to make this decision independently before it was too late. “He was surrounded by a group of regimental commanders who alternately studied the field and his face…he turned to the officers around him saying quietly, I will charge them.” Colonel Joseph Scott of the 19^th Illinois exclaimed that he would support Miller and galloped back to his regiment. The other commanders surrounding Miller enthusiastically supported him and returned to their commands to prepare their men for what appeared to be a very desperate endeavor, indeed. ⁴⁴

From their vantage point above McFadden’s Ford, the heartrending sight of their comrades in full flight convinced a few that the proper place for them was in the rear and skedaddled. “I asked is it any wonder that men talked of running, even to saying ‘I’ll run if you do,’ a few did go,” recalled Private Linton of the 21^st Ohio. “But there was one man, Sergeant Michael Rice, who did more to hold the boys in line at this time than all the officers we had, and he did it by very few words. ‘We can check them, and anyone who runs now is a damn coward.’ At this, all hug the ground the harder and kept quiet.” ⁴⁵

As his brigade opened ranks allowing some of Beatty’s men to flee, Miller and his staff splashed into Stone’s River and coolly observed the Rebels charging for his position and scouted the ground for his own attack. Just then an orderly reported that “only Major General John Palmer could be found and from him came, instead of the desired permission, a positive prohibition—an order not to cross.” Grimly taking stock of the situation, Miller replied “It’s too late now,” immediately raising his sword, he bellowed “Charge!” ⁴⁶

As Breckenridge’s men approached the river, Mendenhall’s artillery belched forth a fire unparalleled in ferocity. Both Miller’s and Stanley’s brigades fired into the onrushing Confederates, slamming the brakes on the Rebels’ impetuous charge. Brigade commander Colonel Robert P. Trabue reported that, “thus exposed to the fire of all his artillery and a large portion of his infantry from unassailable positions, as well as the flanking fire from the right, it was deemed prudent to withdraw.” ⁴⁷

Miller’s men fired a volley into the Rebels, and followed with earsplitting yells as they charged down the slope. “Colonel Miller ordered us to arise, give the enemy a volley, and charge across that river, through ice cold water. It took me up to the waist, I had to hold up my cartridge box to keep my ammunition dry,” remembered Private Adams. ⁴⁸ His comrade Sergeant Bolton reported, “The heavy columns of the Rebels were on top of us and some of them almost through the river into us. We delivered a number of very effective volleys in quick succession and then charged through the river up the bank and drove them steadily before us.” ⁴⁹

Bullets zipped into the ice-cold river and into the concentrated ranks, taking a heavy toll, including those injured and killed by friendly fire. Private Linton related this unfortunate incident.  “I reached the bank all right and had fired once and was loading when a man at my left placed his gun on top of the bank, which was about breast high, and dropped his head to sight his gun, when a ball from the rear struck him in the back of the head, and his brains went over and beyond his gun.” A horrified Linton quickly dropped below the bank and called out to a nearby captain to stop the rear ranks from firing. ⁵⁰

Recovering from their initial panic, some steadfast Confederates took position behind a rail fence near the bank. “At this fence, the Rebels rallied, and as our men ascended the bank, they were greeted by a storm of bullets, which for the moment checked their advance,” recalled Private Owens of the 74^th Ohio. But the Federal assault proved too determined to be halted, and following a few well-directed volleys, the Rebels fled. ⁵¹

“The colors of the 78^th Pennsylvania and 19^th Illinois were the first to cross the river, the men followed in as good order as possible. Taking cover behind a rail fence on the left bank, the men poured a heavy fire into the ranks of the retreating force,” reported Colonel Miller. He received a second order from General Palmer not to cross the river, which he ignored. Noticing the 21^st Ohio closing in on his left in “splendid style,” he urged the men forward to fully exploit their charge.⁵²

Courage and determination were evidenced everywhere. Private Isaac Fair of Company K, 21^st Ohio was rushing forward with his comrades when they came upon an old weather-beaten rail fence and paused to catch their breath. As Fair rested, “a ball struck the fence, one of the rails shattered just in front of him, a splinter struck him and inflicted quite a severe wound.” Bleeding profusely and furious, Fair grabbed his rifle, jumped the fence and continued the pursuit. ⁵³

To the east, Confederate artillerists scrambled to shell the onrushing Federals. But Breckenridge’s men were everywhere, and only a few shells were fired before the Federal line was on the artillery positions. “We opened on the enemy with spherical case and canister, and continued to fire with effect until the enemy had charged within 75 yards of our pieces” reported Lieutenant John Mebane of Wright’s Tennessee battery.

Colonel Miller caught sight of Wright’s Tennessee battery and ordered the 78^th Pennsylvania to take the guns. With a whoop, the regiment advanced, shooting down horses and gunners. Captain Wright was hit and headed for the rear, along with his men who abandoned two guns. “Had our battery gone to the rear when the other batteries of the division did, we would have saved our guns, but being under the immediate supervision of the chief of artillery, we did not move without orders from him,” explained Lieutenant Mebane. ⁵⁴ One jubilant member of the 78^th Pennsylvania was a 16-year-old Tennessee recruit James Thorne, who had recently enlisted in Company A. After the Confederates were driven off, he climbed astride one of the cannon, patted it and called to his company commander exclaiming, “Here it is Captain!” Or so the story goes. (If true, Thorne would have suffered severe burns from the hot barrel of the cannon). ⁵⁵

The advance continued into a cornfield beyond where Sergeant Bolton noticed a beautiful Rebel banner lying on the ground near him. “I picked up the flag and saw it belonged to the 26^th Tennessee Regiment and intended to bring it with me but at once comprehended that it was impossible to use my musket and carry the flag with me, so I hurriedly threw it down by the side of the dead Rebel where I found it.” ⁵⁶ The flag was soon picked up by Private William J. Davis of the 78^th Pennsylvania, who turned it over to Colonel Sirwell. An elaborate story of how the flag was captured recounted that the 56-year-old Davis chased the Confederate standard bearer and shot him. Corporal William L. Hughes of Company B then bayoneted the man and the two captured the flag. It was sent back to Rosecrans with an officer of the 78^th Pennsylvania, the prize having an “electric effect upon our men. Almost instantly soldiers sprang to their feet and cheered for the Union.” Later research revealed that the 26^th Tennessee’s color bearer certainly had been shot, but was not bayoneted. The Pennsylvanians also captured a guidon from the 4^th Florida in this charge. ⁵⁷

The defeat for Bragg was the final straw. Later that evening, he gave orders to retreat towards Tullahoma, his campaign to maintain control of Middle Tennessee a failure. Losses on both sides were heavy, and the battle was later remembered as one of the most sanguinary of the Civil War. The effort of Miller’s brigade was instrumental on both days of the battle, and decisive January 2, 1863. In Van Horne’s history of the Army of the Cumberland, he wrote on Miller’s contribution:

 

Colonel Miller’s movement had great prominence in utterly defeating General Bragg’s object in this engagement, which was to secure the heights commanding his lines across the river. General Rosecrans, being as yet on the defensive, had no thought of aggression from any point of his line, and hence it is not improbable that had not Miller moved promptly to charge Breckenridge’s forces, and had he not followed them in rapid pursuit, they might have reformed upon their objective and held it. As it was, Miller drew after him such a combination as prevented Breckenridge from holding the coveted heights, who having been carried from the hills by his success at first, lost them altogether, his failure costing in various forms of casualty, an aggregate of 2,000 men.⁵⁸

 

Breckenridge’s three brigades lost 136 killed, 867 wounded, and 218 missing, for a total of 1,221 lost in a little over 45 minutes of combat. Nearly a quarter of his division lost, Breckenridge held Bragg accountable and the shaky relationship between the two further deteriorated. Stone’s River was a tragic step in the unraveling of the Confederate high command in the West.

For the men of Miller’s brigade, the battle proved to be their finest moment. Brigade losses totaled 86 killed, 443 wounded, and 214 missing, more than one third of the brigade’s strength on December 31^st. The effect on the brigade’s morale was electric; but the battle also educated Miller’s brigade in the realities and horrors of war. “We learned to have a greater respect for the bravery and courage of our enemies. Second, from the commander of the army down to the private soldier, there was a complete readjustment of our judgments of each other. We discovered that the quiet, thoughtful, and conscientious men were the men to be depended on in the crisis of battle,” noted one insightful member of the brigade. “And these were the men that came to the front.” ⁵⁹

Miller’s brigade would be called upon again, but it would be nine months and more than 100 miles farther south before its next challenge at the bloodiest engagement of the western campaigns, the battle of Chickamauga.

 

References Cited

 

1. Owens, Ira S. Greene County in the War, being a History of the 74^th Regiment with Sketches of the 12^th, 94^th, 110^th, 44^th, and 154^th Regiments, and the 10^th Ohio Battery, embracing anecdotes, incidents, and narratives of the camp, march, and battlefield, and the author’s experience while in the army. Xenia: Torchlight Job Rooms, 1872, p. 32.

 

2. Shook, Hezekiah. Address delivered on the occasion of the second annual reunion of the 37^th Indiana Volunteer Infantry. September 18, 1878. Indiana Historical Society.

 

3. Vance, Wilson J. Stone’s River: Turning Point of the Civil War. New York: The Neale Publishing Co., 1914, p. 53.

 

4. Canfield, Silas S. History of the 21^st Regiment Ohio Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Rebellion. Toledo: Vrooman, Anderson, and Bateman, Printers, 1893. Various

 

5. Puntenney, George H. History of the 37^th Regiment of Indiana Infantry Volunteers. Its Organization, Campaigns, and battles September 1861-October 1864. Rushville: Jacksonian Book and Job Department, 1896. Various.

 

6. Blackburn, Theodore W. Letters from the Front: A Union ‘Preacher’ Regiment (74^th Ohio) in the Civil War. Dayton: Morningside Bookshop, 1981, p. 29.

 

7. Gibson, Joseph Thompson. History of the 78^th Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh Print Co., 1905. Various

 

8. Owens, op. cit., p. 33.

 

9. Official Report of Colonel John F. Miller, commanding Third Brigade. O.R., p. 431-2.

 

10. Ibid.

 

11. Ibid.

 

12. Bolton, John H. Journal 1861-1863. MMS 1488. Center for Archival Collections, Bowling Green State University, p. 83.

 

13. Warner, Liberty. Papers. MS-624mf. Center for Archival Collections, Bowling Green State University. February 10, 1863 Letter.

 

14. Adams, Jacob. Diary of Jacob Adams, Private in Company F, 21^st O.V.V.I. Columbus: F.J. Heer, 1930, p. 19.

 

15. Official Report of Lieutenant Alban A. Ellsworth, commanding 1^st Kentucky Battery. O.R., p. 411.

 

16. Official Report of Lieutenant Alexander Marshall, commanding Battery G, 1^st Ohio Light Artillery. O.R., p. 413-4.

 

17. Canfield, op. cit., p. 73.

 

18. Blackburn, op. cit., p. 29.

 

19. Owens, op. cit., p. 33.

 

20. Shook, op. cit., p.4.

 

21. Puntenney, op. cit., p. 34.

 

22. Official Report of Major General Jones M. Withers, commanding Wither’s Division, C.S.A. O.R., p. 756.

 

23. Gibson, op. cit., p. 180.

 

24. Withers, op. cit., p. 756.

 

25. Caldwell, Robert H. Papers. MS-623. Center for Archival Collections, Bowling Green State University. January 3, 1863 Letter.

 

26. “Letter from the 21^st Ohio Regiment.” Perrysburg Journal. February 4, 1863, p.3.

 

27. Miller, op. cit., p. 432.

 

28. Official Report of Brigadier General Alexander P. Stewart, commanding Stewart’s Brigade, Cheatham’s Division, C.S.A. O.R., p. 724.

 

29. Miller, op. cit., p. 433.

 

30. Marshall, op. cit., p. 414.

 

31. Gibson, op. cit., p. 53.

 

32. Official Report of Lieutenant Colonel William D. Ward, commanding 37^th Indiana Volunteer Infantry. O.R., p. 437-8.

 

33. Official Report of Colonel Granville Moody, commanding 74^th Ohio Volunteer Infantry. O.R.., p. 439.

 

34. Blackburn, op. cit., p. 100.

 

35. Owens, op. cit., p. 93.

 

36. Linton, Samuel A. Records 1861-1863. MMS-1070mf. Tablet 2. Center for Archival Collections, Bowling Green State University, p. 47-8.

 

37. Bolton, op. cit., p. 83.

 

38. Canfield, op. cit., p. 74.

 

39. Military, Historical, and Geographical Encyclopedia (Wood County). Toledo: Transcontinental Publishing, 1885, p. 479.

 

40. Ellsworth, op. cit., p. 411-2.

 

41. Puntenney, op. cit., p. 35-6.

 

42. Miller, op. cit., p. 436.

 

43. Van Horne, Thomas. Army of the Cumberland. New York: Smithmark Publishers, 1996, p. 204.

 

44. Vance, op. cit., p. 70.

 

45. Linton, op. cit., p. 54.

 

46. Ibid, p. 60-1.

 

47. Official Report of Colonel Robert P. Trabue, commanding Trabue’s Brigade, C.S.A. O.R., p. 827.

 

48. Adams, op. cit., p. 20.

 

49. Bolton, op. cit., p. 85.

 

50. Linton, op. cit., p. 55.

 

51. Owens, Ira S. Greene County Soldiers in the Late War, Bring a History of the 74^th O.V.I. Dayton: Christian Publishing House Print, 1884, p. 37.

 

52. Miller, op. cit., p. 434.

 

53. Military, op. cit., p. 478.

 

54. Official Report of Lieutenant John Mebane, commanding Wright’s Battery, C.S.A. O.R., 824.

 

55. Gancas, Ronald S. The Gallant Seventy-Eighth: Colonel William Sirwell and the Pennsylvania Seventy-Eighth-Stones Rivers to Pickett’s Mill. Plum Baro: Mark V Enterprises, 1997, p. 121-2.

 

56. United States. Army. Ohio Infantry Regiment, 21^st. MS 562, Box 13, Folder 2. Center for Archival Collections, Bowling Green State University.

 

57. Gancas, op. cit., p. 122.

 

58. Van Horne, op. cit., p. 205-6.

 

59. Gibson op. cit., p. 65.