Attack At Chickamauga:

The Confederate Command of James Longstreet

by David M. Smith

©1996 David M. Smith and The Cincinnati Civil War Round Table

It all started with a wild train ride. By the time it was finished, two divisions of the famed I Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia would leave an indelible stamp on the events and memories of the western theater during the Civil War. Its leader, Georgian Lieutenant General James Longstreet, would nearly single handedly direct a battle that came the closest to the annihilation of a major army, North or South, as seen during the War. The two day battle of Chickamauga, fought in mid-September of 1863, is all the more fascinating to the student of the Civil War for the circumstances and personalities surrounding the battle.

James Longstreet

Our goal here tonight is to focus on the efforts and results of Longstreet's command. Well known by this time in the War for his defensive capabilities, he never-the-less had led several of the most successful attacks that General Robert E. Lee's army had known. These included the superbly timed attacks at both Second Manassas as well as the second day at Gettysburg. But it was on the banks of a sluggish stream in northern Georgia that his finest leadership was performed. Longstreet took approximately half of the Army of Tennessee on a devastating attack that punched a hole in the center of Federal Major General William Starke Rosecrans' Federal army and nearly led to its complete destruction.

Leading a command he barely knew, over ground he had never seen before, and with virtually no assistance or support from his immediate superior, "Old Pete" still managed to send all but the extreme left of the Federal army streaming in a complete panic towards Chattanooga. That the renowned Federal stand of Major General George H. Thomas atop Horseshoe Ridge and Snodgrass Hill averted complete Federal disaster is due not to Longstreet's inability to finish off the Federal forces, but the inability of the other half of the Confederate command to effectively join in a timely attack on the eventual defenders of Horseshoe Ridge. Braxton Bragg's ineptness in the tactical handling of troops in battle again led to disappointment for the Army of Tennessee.

Braxton Bragg

In May of 1863, Confederate corps commander James Longstreet first proposed that units of the Army of Northern Virginia be used to reinforce those of Braxton Bragg to inflict a crushing defeat on Federal forces in mid-Tennessee. Longstreet's forces had not participated in the Rebel victory at Chancellorsville, and Longstreet suggested that they could be better utilized in a rapid transfer west. Edward Porter Alexander, who served as Longstreet's chief of artillery during the War, noted in his post-war memoirs: "But looked at purely as a technical military question [of] which of the two plays in May 1863 was the most judicious for the Confederacy - to transfer as fast as possible heavy reinforcements to the West, or to invade Maryland & Pennsylvania - I must confess that the former seems to me so very much the best." Although General Longstreet's suggestions were not adopted that spring, they set the stage for similar actions later that year.

By August, results of Lee's second invasion of the North dictated further consideration of the western concentration "theory". Lee's army was back in Virginia, and Longstreet remained hurt from the memories of Gettysburg. He wrote Secretary of War James Seddon requesting a transfer west, and urged that the Army of Northern Virginia reinforce the Army of Tennessee. "Old Pete" was concerned that unless something were done to wrest the initiative away from the Federals, the enemy would soon be marching through Georgia.

It is generally about this time in his career that historians begin concentrating on the political side of James Longstreet. Many consider him to have been politically conniving, working hard to obtain permanent command in the West as a means of furthering his ambitious career goals. They typically point to the ensuing controversy that occurred in the aftermath of the Chickamauga/Chattanooga campaign as evidence of a literal "premeditation" on his part.

I do not believe that command chicanery was at heart in Longstreet's push for a western concentration. Several things were likely at work in the mind of the Georgian lieutenant general. As recent biographer Jeffry Wert notes, the bitter memories of the second and third days of Gettysburg gnawed at Longstreet. He saw the changing character of the war, and although he continued his friendship with Lee, he wanted no part of the eastern war if it would continue to be fought as had been fought in Pennsylvania.

In a letter to Senator Louis Wigfall, Old Pete confided that "If I remain here, I fear that we shall go, little at a time, till all will be lost. I hope that I may get west in time to save what there is left of us . . ."

And then there was the situation in the West. Vicksburg had fallen, and the Army of Tennessee, under the leadership of Braxton Bragg, seemed incapable of dealing with his Federal counterpart. Moreover, Bragg was heartily disliked by his officers and had proven unable of directing troops in battle. Bragg's army, however, was very important strategically -- posted as it was in the center of the Confederacy. If his Federal counterpart, William S. Rosecrans, could be soundly defeated, strategic initiative could pass back to the Confederates.

In August of 1863 Longstreet again communicated with Secretary of War Seddon regarding a general transfer of troops to the West. His arguments mirrored those presented prior to the Gettysburg Campaign, but were met with greater reception. President Davis communicated with General Lee, who still expressed reluctance regarding a concentration in the West.

Robert E. Lee

As will be evidenced later, the Confederate high command almost waited too long to make a decision. Asked to move west to take command, Lee demurred. Finally, on September 6, Marse Robert gave the orders to Quartermaster General A.R. Lawton to make preparations to move the I Corps to the West. Action quickly followed the order.

The delays inherent with making a positive decision made the transfer of troops more difficult. The direct route -- that of moving forces through the eastern Tennessee city of Knoxville -- was closed due to the energies of Federal General Ambrose Burnside. As a result, rebel reinforcements would have to take the more circuitous route of transferring troops through Atlanta before heading north towards Chattanooga.

"The journey through the States from Virginia was a continuous ovation to the troops", wrote a member of Longstreet's staff. A colonel in an Alabama regiment recalled, "At many places, in anticipation of our coming, the patriotic people, especially the good ladies, prepared abundant and excellent lunches for us." The historian from Kershaw's brigade remembered it this way: "Our whole trip was a grand ovation. Old men slapped their hands in praise, boys threw up their hats in joy, while the ladies fanned the breeze with their flags and handkerchiefs; yet many a mother dropped a silent tear or felt a heart-ache as she saw her long absent soldier boy flying pass without a word or kiss."

A consistent theme among the soldiers who made the trip was the food. And with small wonder -- by the late summer of 1863 any period of time in which there seemed to be more food than could be reasonably or unreasonably eaten had to be viewed with unaffected wonder. In Sumter, South Carolina, the artillery battalion of Porter Alexander was fed from one long table.

In spite of the fond memories, the trip tried both the Confederate logistical system as well as the backs of the soldiers. Finding themselves riding on flat cars as well as cattle cars, the men endured hours of cramped solitude while traversing the South. A trip that would have taken two to three days had the route been directly to Knoxville now took nearly three weeks to complete. By travelling through the Carolinas, into Georgia and Atlanta, and finally north towards Chattanooga, the trip covered over 900 miles and used a staggering total of sixteen separate railroads. These railroads were typically of differing gauges, which constantly caused the troops to disembark their current train to move to another.

Lafayette McLaws

The divisions of Major Generals Lafayette McLaws and John Bell Hood made the trip. Major General George Pickett's division of Virginians, so decimated from the third day of Gettysburg, remained behind. The men were, of necessity, travelling light. The rail transport of two full divisions of eastern troops would have to be accomplished without the traditional wagon support one would have expected.

The trip was not without its notoriety. By this time in the War, anti-war sentiment in the South was growing, and evidences of that feeling were found along the way. The troops, most of whom were from the lower South, were understandably not in the mood to put up with non-supporters back home while they sacrificed in the field. In Raleigh, North Carolina, Georgia troops attacked the offices of the Raleigh Standard, a paper known for its criticism of the war. A conductor of one of the sixteen separate railroads, perhaps thinking he had found himself a means of earning a few quick Confederate dollars, demanded fares from the soldiers. The troops of Longstreet's corps, pointing their Enfields at the conductor explained through the eloquence of one soldier that "I paid my fare at Gettysburg." -- and the train moved on.

As it was, the trip for the individual soldiers took three to four days. The extended length of the caravan allowed the troops to arrive piece-meal. Alexander's artillery never made it to the fight, as was the case with General McLaws and two brigades of infantry. As we shall see, however, the timely arrival of the eastern forces, as limited as they were, nearly tipped the tide of the battle along Chickamauga Creek.

John B. Hood

On Thursday, September 17 the division of General Hood chugged into Catoosa Station in northern Georgia. The first to arrive was the famed Texas Brigade under Brigadier General Jerome Robertson. A few hours later the brigade of Georgians under Henry "Rock" Benning arrived as well. Hood was still a day away, and General Longstreet, travelling with the second division under the temporary command of South Carolinian Joseph Kershaw, was still two days away.

As the day of the 17th of September progressed, reports began to filter in to Federal headquarters regarding the concentration of Rebel troops. Union cavalry commander Robert Minty brought word that Rebel stragglers had reported Longstreet's arrival. Corps commander Thomas Crittenden reportedly laughed at the idea with the remark, "Longstreet is in Virginia." "Pardon me, General Crittenden, Longstreet, with a considerable force from the Army of Northern Virginia, is now at and near Ringgold," Minty stated. "General Rosecrans," Crittenden retorted, "I will guarantee, with my corps, to whip every rebel within twenty miles of us." Crittenden and his troops did not fare well during the next several days.

It would be difficult to find a better pair of divisions than those of Hood and McLaws. Hood had made his name as a brigade and division commander; the brigades of Robertson (his former famed Texas Brigade), Evander Law (whose troops had so stubbornly tried to take Little Round Top at Gettysburg) and "Rock" Benning were as tried and true as any Confederate troops. The division of Lafayette McLaws featured the brigades of Joseph Kershaw and Benjamin Humphreys (whose brigade had been led at Gettysburg by the fiery lawyer William Barksdale). Both divisions had been the troops that were so instrumental in the attack on July 2 at Gettysburg. At Chickamauga, Kershaw would direct the division of McLaws.

The Battle of Chickamauga opened with neither commander quite sure of his adversary. Because our protagonist, James Longstreet, was en route to a rendezvous at Catoosa Station later in the evening of September 19, we will merely attempt to highlight the action to set the stage for the second day.

The battle was intended by the Confederates to be a fight to cross Chickamauga Creek and cut the Union army from its base at Chattanooga. There were two principle bridges over which the creek could be crossed -- those of Alexander's and Reed's bridges. All throughout the day of the 19th the battle swirled back and forth as both sides continued to "up the ante" by committing division after division.

The early rumor of Federal intelligence had a single Confederate brigade across Reed's Bridge. A brigade under Colonel John T. Croxton was dispatched to capture this lone unit; after driving Rebel cavalry under Nathan Bedford Forrest, one can only imagine the consternation Croxton must have felt to slam head-long into an entire division of infantry under the command of a Confederate brigadier with the unlikely first name of "States Rights" -- States Rights Gist. His original instructions having gone up in smoke, Croxton still had the sense of humor with which to ask headquarters: "Which brigade am I supposed to capture?" Prudently, he also asked for reinforcements.

Chickamauga Creek winds its way northward after crossing the La Fayette Road at Lee and Gordon's Mill. The Federals opened September 19 in control of the road, and it was in an attempt to flank the position that the bridge crossings were made by the Rebels. Between the bridges and the road were a limited number of pathways that cut through extremely dense forests. The limited visibility of the battlefield -- where small clearings defined positions for both sides -- limited the use of artillery and made battlefield control difficult for both sides.

The battle swayed back and forth, with the freshest divisions holding the upper hand. Gradually the battle worked its way towards the south and west -- back towards the La Fayette Road. It was here that the troops from the east -- the division of John Bell Hood -- got its first taste of battle in the western theater.

During the day, Hood had waited for orders while the battle had raged around him. At about 4:00 p.m., he aligned his division of troops under Law with a Western division under Bushrod Johnson and began pushing the Federal troops of Major General Jefferson C. Davis. As his troops marched past the tired troops of General A.P. Stewart, one of Hood's men called out in a bantering tone, "Rise up, Tennesseans, and see the Texans go in!"

As it was, they almost succeeded. Their attack, unsupported as all Confederate attacks that day seemed to be, was serious enough to create consternation in Rosecrans' headquarters at the Widow Glenn House. A counter-attack by Union Major General Thomas J. Wood, who would figure so prominently in the next day's battle, flanked Hood's position and caused the eastern Rebels to fall back.

It was a different sort of command -- that of the western Rebel army. General Hood, in command while awaiting the arrival General Longstreet, went to army headquarters that evening. The sanguine Hood was taken back by the lack of spirit among the ranking officers of the army. Meeting up with fellow Kentuckian John Breckinridge, Hood stated his determination to rout the enemy the next day. Breckinridge is alleged to have responded, "My dear Hood, I am delighted to hear you say so. You give me renewed hope; God grant it may be so."

And what of Longstreet? As battle raged amid the forests near Chickamauga Creek, Old Pete was nearing his final rail destination at Catoosa Station. About 2:00 p.m. the General and several members of his staff arrived; at 4:00 p.m. their horses arrived. Things were in such disarray that the Rebels had to jump their horses from the cars in order to start the trip to the front.

By September of 1863, James Longstreet was one of the most successful generals in the Southern service. Born in 1821, he lived in Georgia and Alabama prior to entering West Point in 1838. Graduating a less than distinguished 54 in a class of 62 in 1842, Longstreet was a bear of a man, reportedly standing over six feet and weighing over 200 pounds. His stamina on the battlefield was renowned. He exited the Mexican War a brevet major, a rank that he gave up on June 1, 1861 in order to accept the rank of brigadier general in the Confederate service.

Distinguished service during the First Manassas campaign as well as tough fighting in a rear-guard action at Williamsburg elevated the major general to prominence in the Confederate command hierarchy. While his counterpart Stonewall Jackson was stunning the country with his exploits in the Shenandoah Valley, the two generals were positioning themselves for what would result in dual corps command -- a relationship that would work incredibly well up until Jackson's untimely death at Chancellorsville in April of 1863.

The Longstreet we see today is often a dour, plodding man of little humor. What many people do not realize is that prior to the death of three of his children to scarlet fever in Richmond in January of 1862, Longstreet's camp was known for gaiety and good times. Indeed, Old Pete was known as a master poker player. It was, however, his children's death that led to the dedicated, somber Longstreet we see today. In spite of this, there is ample evidence that Robert E. Lee greatly enjoyed the Georgian's presence, often choosing to camp with the General while on the march.

An awful performance at Fair Oaks was followed by superb marching and fighting during the Seven Days campaign. By the end of the Second Manassas campaign, Longstreet and Jackson had emerged as the dominant subordinate commanders under Lee. Old Pete served with distinction at Antietam and Fredericksburg, and his command at Gettysburg is well chronicled.

Lost in the view of Longstreet as the defensive fighter are the splendid offensive attacks during the Seven Days, at Second Mannassas and Gettysburg. Indeed, in comparison with the vaunted Jackson, Longstreet's offensive displays as a corps commander arguably overshadow Jackson's main offensive gem at Chancellorsville. Old Pete's capabilities for offensive command were well proven by this point in the war.

Moxley G. Sorrell

When we last left him, the General had departed Catoosa Station in the company of two members of his staff -- Moxley Sorrell and Peyton Manning. It was a clear sign of the disarray of Bragg's command that the commanding general had sent no one to the rail station to greet the senior corps commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. As Colonel Sorrell wryly pointed out, ". . . it would appear that if Bragg wanted to see anybody, Longstreet was the man."

Without guides and in search of Bragg's headquarters, the General and staff narrowly avoided capture by Yankee pickets. A challenge of "Who goes there?" was answered by a cautious "Friends." Luckily, the Confederates managed to ask the guard what troops they were, and an answer that gave the number of the brigade and the division alerted the Rebels to the presence of Yankees. Confederate brigades and divisions were usually named after their commanders. Keep in mind, the three eastern Confederates, alone in the forests of northern Georgia, would likely have known little about the brigade and even division command structure of Bragg's army, and only their quick wits saved them.

Saying loud enough for the pickets to hear, "Let us ride down a little way to find a better crossing", the three adventurers beat a hasty retreat. Between ten and eleven o'clock the party found the camp of General Bragg, who was asleep in an ambulance. A conference of perhaps an hour allowed Bragg to impart the plans for the next day, and in light of the importance placed upon General Longstreet, it is amazing that Bragg did not have his entire staff searching for the eastern general.

The orders Bragg gave for the battle on September 20 were a masterpiece of simplicity, yet puzzling in the extreme. Perhaps there exists no greater evidence of the unsuitability of Braxton Bragg to understand all of the interlocking aspects of fighting a major engagement than that contained in those orders.

Simple the plan was. Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk as senior corps commander of the western army, would command the right wing. This wing would be formed of the divisions of John C. Breckinridge and Pat Cleburne under the command of the caustic D.H. Hill, Walker's and St. John Liddell's divisions under W.H.T. Walker, and the hard-hitting division of Ben Cheatham. The left wing was commanded by Longstreet, and he had fighting for him the western divisions of T.C. Hindman, A.P. Stewart, William Preston, and Bushrod Johnson. In addition, Old Pete had his own divisions of McLaws and Hood.

The attack was to open at daylight on the right wing by General Polk. It was then to proceed from the right to the left, and the success of each division would push the Federal army to the south, away from Chattanooga, and into the open country of McLemore's Cove. As simple as it was, it unravelled as quickly as it was to begin.

Certain aspects of the battle plan seem to defy logic. Recall that Longstreet and his staff of two reached the field after dark. It was close to midnight before Old Pete left General Bragg's headquarters, and the plans gave him several hours to find, place, and communicate with the subordinate commanders under his control. Worse, the Georgian probably could have identified few of those commanders by sight, much less have known much regarding their individual strengths and weaknesses. James Longstreet had several hours to deploy half an army over ground he had never seen to fight a battle that could decide the war in the west. The success that followed is a testament to the command capabilities of the man.

General Hood finishes off his view of the prevalent attitudes of the western Rebel army by noting he met up with the new wing commander the morning of the 20th, and enthusiastically stated that the Yankees would be routed before sunset. "The distinguished general," remembered Hood, "instantly responded with that confidence which had so often contributed to his extraordinary success, that we would of course whip and drive him from the field. I could but exclaim that I was rejoiced to hear him so express himself, as he was the first general I had met since my arrival who talked of victory."

After gaining a few hours rest, Longstreet rode off in search of his command, armed with a topographical map that contained the prominent land features from Chickamauga Creek to Missionary Ridge. Old Pete quickly found an old West Point classmate, A.P. Stewart, and ordered that Rebel general to close up Longstreet's right portion of the wing command with the left of Polk. A gap of almost one half mile had opened up during the consolidation of forces during the night.

Before we move into extended discussion of the attack made by Longstreet's left wing, there are two side themes that need some explanation since they occurred just prior to the attack by the forces of Lee's Old War Horse.

The first concerns the attack of General Polk, or lack thereof, on the Confederate right. If the Confederate left wing, under Longstreet, seemed to be hanging without command support, the same could not be said of the right wing. D.H. Hill, who had been sent west by Richmond, was a lieutenant general without a command, and acted as a de facto subordinate wing commander for Polk. Through a comedy of errors that would prove critical later in the day, Bragg's orders for a daylight attack reached Polk, but never reached Hill. Worse, John C. Breckinridge, one of the division commanders expected to open the attack, spent the night at Polk's camp but was never informed of the attack!

Leonidas Polk

Daylight came and went. General Bragg fumed at his headquarters, wondering where the attack was. Major Lee was sent to Polk's headquarters to determine the cause of the delay. To the aide's surprise, he found the bishop-general contentedly eating his breakfast. General Polk, having wondered at the delay in the attack himself, had issued direct orders to Cleburne and Breckinridge for an attack. The image of the wing commander, however, sitting at his breakfast while his army was failing to execute orders was never forgiven by Bragg.

Word finally reached Hill, and the proud North Carolinian determined that his men still required breakfast prior to making an attack. It would, he reported to Polk, be "an hour or more" before he would be ready. Poor Bragg, guilty of sloppy staff work to start the fiasco, now fumed over his subordinates' inability to start a simple attack. Cursing his generals in a style already famous, he sent off peremptory orders to start the battle.

The attack finally started at approximately 9:45 a.m. The three brigades Breckinridge led off the assault. Although the brigades drove within thirty yards of the Federal position, they were repulsed with heavy casualties. During the Confederate attack, Brigadier General Ben Hardin Helm, brother-in-law of Mary Todd Lincoln, fell mortally wounded.

Next to attack was the vaunted division of General Cleburne. Cleburne's troops, located further south than those of Breckinridge, fared no better than those of the former Vice President. Cleburne lost Brigadier General James Deshler in the attack.

Cleburne's troops having been repulsed, General Polk committed the divisions of Walker and Cheatham. Those troops, as you might well assume, also failed to pierce the Federal line.

The Federal troops Polk attacked were under the command of a Virginian, Major General George Thomas. The men of Thomas had spent the night building makeshift breastworks on the best defensive line they could find. Those works were strong enough to allow Thomas to shift his troops from threatened point to threatened point. The piece meal attacks by the Confederates, while conforming to the orders of General Bragg, did not cause the anticipated rout of Union forces.

The attacks, however, had a cause and effect relationship on the rest of the battle. The first effect was to cause Thomas to call for reinforcements for his part of the line. General Rosecrans began pulling away units from his right flank -- the flank Longstreet was preparing to attack. The second effect was one of the more tragic blunders of the war, committed by a member of General Rosecrans staff, Captain Sanford Kellogg.

Passing along the Federal works, Kellogg thought he saw a gap near the center of the line. The good Captain mistakenly assumed that the alleged gap came from one of those division-sized reinforcements Thomas was requesting and receiving. Rosecrans immediately ordered Major General Thomas J. Wood's division out of its place in line to close up on General Reynold's' division --"as fast as possible."

Wood knew better -- he knew that no gap existed. He was, however, currently quite in a snit concerning his commanding general. Earlier, during Breckinridge's attack, the division of James Negley was ordered to the support of Thomas. Two of Negley's brigades had to wait while the division ordered to replace them arrived. That division was -- of course -- the division of General Wood. Rosecrans, an excitable type who cursed fluently when mad, blew up at Wood: "What is the meaning of this, sir? You have disobeyed my specific orders! By your damnable negligence you are endangering the safety of the entire army, and by God, I will not tolerate it! Move your division at once, as I have instructed, or the consequences will not be pleasant for yourself!"

Thomas J. Wood

What was Wood to do? The aide sent with the order attempted to get Wood to hold off executing the command. This the major general refused to do. The order "was clear and undoubted.", he recalled. As Wood was leaving to move his division, he remarked to his staff with a wonderful sense of irony, "Gentlemen, I hold the fatal order of the day in my hand and I would not part with it for five thousand dollars."

And as Wood exited stage left, Longstreet entered stage right. The area left wide open was an area directly in the vicinity of the Brotherton House, which included a cleared opening appropriately named the Brotherton Field. Along a line perhaps a half mile long and parallel to the La Fayette Road, only one to two hundred yards of clearing separated the woods on the east side of the road -- inside of which Longstreet's troops were massing, and the evacuated lines previously held by Wood's division.

If we step back in time for a moment, we will recall that General Polk started his attack about 9:30 that morning. Prior to that, General Longstreet had been readying his command for his share of the upcoming battle. His choice of tactics were remarkably simple. Rather than stringing his divisions out and attacking piece meal as Polk had done, Old Pete determined to stack his divisions up in massed formation, and to punch a hole in the Federal line. In concept it reminds one much of Pickett's Charge, except for the significant facts that in this case the troops only had to cover a couple of hundred yards before reaching the Federal works, and the Federal artillery would little influence this charge as it had at Gettysburg. For those that contend Old Pete was a one dimensional general, only versed in defensive warfare, a serious examination of this battle reveals otherwise. He not only used a tactic he had argued against with his commanding general two months before, but refined and executed the tactic to perfection. We will talk more on that later.

Historian Jeff Wert described Longstreet that morning as "placid", and a "picture of composure." Those familiar with Lee's Old War Horse in the eastern theater might not have found that surprising, but to the Army of Tennessee veterans it was indeed unusual. He put in his first line the divisions of Stewart, Johnson, Hindman and Preston. Behind Johnson lay the division of Hood. McLaws division, consisting of the divisions of Kershaw and Humphreys, arrived at 10:00 a.m. and filed in behind Hood. Six divisions of 11,000 men piled up in the woods outside of Tom Brotherton's cabin.

Historian Wert points out that while hundreds of small irritants must have annoyed the commander, four major problems had to be dealt with. First, the senior corps commander, Simon Buckner, was without a command because his divisions lay on each end of the left wing. Perhaps success heals wounded pride, for the record reveals no petty bickering on the part of Buckner -- something very unusual from the Army of Tennessee.

The second problem was the fact that no one was available to serve as chief of artillery. The logical candidate Porter Alexander, was still en route from Atlanta. Third, the brigades of Kershaw and Humphreys had not arrived, but would indeed appear shortly. The final problem was noted earlier -- the gap between Polk's left and Longstreet's right. That gap was resolved quickly.

Historian Shelby Foote commented that "Old Peter had followed the progress of the fight with mounting dissatisfaction. Up to now, the piecemeal nature of the attacks had given the battle an all-too-familiar resemblance to Gettysburg, and he wanted no more of that than he could possibly avoid." With McLaws' division up at 10:00, the Confederate attack force was complete. At approximately 11:00, the sound of musket fire came from the Confederate right and the area under the command of A.P. Stewart. In the fine tradition of Braxton Bragg's leadership style, an aide from Bragg's staff ordered Stewart forward without informing wing headquarters. Longstreet, evidently not intending to mirror the piece meal attacks of Polk, started his troops forward at 11:10 a.m.

Into the gap left by the withdrawal of Wood's division stormed the Confederates. Very little stood in their way. So complete was the rout of Federal troops that the ensuing action took the form of two separate battles -- that of the remainder of the Federal right south of where Wood's division had been, and the attempt by the Confederates to turn north and drive the Federals under Thomas off the field. Old Pete, with some 23,000 men under his command, had split the Federal army in two. Whether or not the opportunity could be exploited into a major rout and annihilation of an enemy army remained to be seen.

William S. Rosecrans

Perhaps the best description of the surprise of the Confederate attack came from General Rosecrans headquarters. Charles Dana, a correspondent and literal spy sent to keep an eye on Rosecrans, found a much needed nap disturbed by the attack. Recalled Dana: "I was awakened by the most infernal noise I ever heard. I sat up on the grass, and the first thing I saw was General Rosecrans crossing himself -- he was a very devout Catholic -- 'Hello!' I said to myself, 'if the general is crossing himself , we are in a desperate situation.'"

It was worse than that, as Dana soon determined. "I had no sooner collected my thoughts and looked toward the front, where all this din came from, than I saw our lines break and melt away like leaves before the wind." Rosecrans saw the situation clearly. "If you care to live any longer, get away from here, " he told his staff. Dana continued: "Then the headquarters around me disappeared. The graybacks came through with a rush, and soon the musket balls and cannon shot began to reach the place where I stood. The whole right of the army had apparently been routed."

Rosecrans' headquarters were at the Widow Glenn House, located to the Federal right and rear of the Brotherton House line. Those of you who have visited Chickamauga will doubtless recall that as opposed to the wooded terrain east of the La Fayette Road, the area west opens into cultivated fields prior to becoming foothills that would find themselves part of the Missionary Ridge/Lookout Mountain string of elevations. From the vantage point of headquarters, it must have a site long remembered.

Bushrod R. Johnson

Compare the recollections of Dana with that of Confederate General Bushrod Johnson, who commanded the leading elements of the attack: "The scene now presented was unspeakably grand. The resolute and impetuous charge, the rush our heavy columns sweeping out from the gloom of the forest and into the open fields with sunlight, the glitter of arms, the onward dash of artillery and mounted men, the retreat of the foe, the shouts of the hosts of our army, the dust, the smoke, the noise of firearms -- of whistling balls and grapeshot and of bursting shell -- make up a battle scene of unsurpassing grandeur." One may surmise that during his service in the western theater General Johnson had seen such a sight on very rare occasions.

The right hand elements of Rosecrans' army were composed of the divisions of Generals Jefferson C. Davis and Philip Sheridan, and the rout of these units was only a matter of time. The Confederate division of Thomas Hindman headed left through the breach and immediately routed the troops of Davis.

Providence aided the attacks on Davis and Sheridan. Two of Sheridan's brigades, those of Layboldt and Bradley, were in formation in the rear of Davis division, on the move north to aid Thomas. Hindman's troops slammed into the confused mass, and panic ensued. As Rebel troops pushed forward, the most stubborn resistance came from one of Sheridan's brigades under Cincinnatian William H. Lytle. Lytle's command sold itself dearly in repelling attacks by rebel General Arthur Manigault; the valor of Lytle's brigade included the death of the brigadier general himself. Lytle's efforts helped cover the panicked retreat of the Federal right. That the panic was complete there is no doubt; many units did not stop until they reached Chattanooga.

Actually, the battle was not really going to plan from the Confederate perspective. Longstreet realized the lack of success of the rebel right -- the wing under Polk -- would force the battle in that direction, not in the direction that General Bragg wished it to go. Longstreet sent for the cavalry of Major General Joseph Wheeler to secure the far left and ordered Hindman to turn his troops north in support of Bushrod Johnson and the Confederates who had borne to the right.

The columns that turned to the right met much more stubborn resistance. Hood's division moved to the attack, and lost its leader about 2:30, who fell with his second serious wound in two months. This one would cost him a leg, and Hood would never be the same. Longstreet had been counting on Hood to provide cohesion on the right -- a confidence placed with the knowledge of superb fighting on so many battlefields -- and the loss of this able fighter slowed the Rebel attack. After the battle, Longstreet recommended Hood be promoted to lieutenant general, a request seconded by Bragg. It was one of the few things the two men would agree on during the campaign.

As the battle of Chickamauga turned to the north, the pace slowed. From the Dyer Field -- to the north of which the frowning eminence of Horseshoe Ridge could be seen, General Benjamin Humphreys joined Longstreet. Remembered Humphreys: "I never saw him wear so bright and jubilant a countenance." Returning a salute, Longstreet sent the brigadier into battle with "Drive them, General. These western men can't stand it any better than the Yankees we left in Virginia. Drive 'em."

Driving them, as Old Pete directed, was not as easy on the right as it had been on the left. Hood's division had run into stubborn Yankees, as had Bushrod Johnson. Johnson was ordered to have his men rest while Hindman brought his men up in support. Longstreet and corps commander Buckner settled down for a lunch of fried bacon and sweet potatoes -- a luxury the Georgian must have relished indeed. The spot the lunch was enjoyed can be seen today, and one merely has to look northward to mark the location of Horseshoe Ridge -- the ultimate goal of the day's action.

Although the battle predates Dr. Heimlich and his famous maneuver for clearing food in choking victims, Longstreet related an incident regarding those same sweet potatoes that the good doctor might well have approved of:

Then, before we had half finished, our pleasures were interrupted by a fragment of shell that came tearing through the woods, passed through a book in the hands of a courier who sat on his horse hard by reading, and struck down our chief or ordnance, Col. P. T. Manning, gasping, as was supposed, in the struggles of death. Friends sprang forward to look for the wound and to give some aid and relief. In his hurry to enjoy and finish his lunch he had just taken a large bite of sweet potato, which seemed to be suffocating him. I suggested that it would be well to first relieve him of the potato and give him a chance to breathe. This done, he revived, his breath came freer, and he was soon on his feet ready to be conveyed to the hospital.

Shortly after lunch, Longstreet was summoned to see General Bragg. Longstreet's recollection of the meeting lends an almost surreal effect to the battle. Old Pete noted that headquarters were "some little distance in rear of our new position." Even though it appears from the record that Bragg was somewhat forward from his Reed's Bridge headquarters, that the commanding general was nowhere near the scene of Confederate success is astounding. That Bragg did not have members of his staff in constant contact with the wing commander is almost beyond comprehension.

Regardless, the meeting with Bragg bordered on the absurd. Longstreet reported on the success of his attack, and the follow up orders to Johnson and Hindman. He recommended that the right wing, inactive since Cleburne's repulse, be put on the defensive, and available units be shifted to the left in support of the successes gained to that point. The left wing commander reported a partial success with intent to follow it into a total success.

Having worked with Robert E. Lee since June of 1862, The Old War Horse would be pardonably excused at expressing surprise at Bragg's response. Bragg would not recognize the success to that point, and still miffed at the right wing's slow actions under Polk, stated "There is not a man in the right wing who has any fight in him." Anyone familiar with the fighting divisions of Cheatham and Cleburne know fully well that there were plenty of fighting men available from the right wing. Bragg would discuss it no farther, and returned to his headquarters well to the rear of the action near Reed's Bridge.

In Shelby Foote's view, if Bragg "could not win in just the way he wanted, he did not care about winning at all, or anyhow he wanted no personal share in such a victory. Bragg was miffed because his design for herding the Bluecoats into McLemore's Cove had gone astray."

Longstreet was on his own. It was about 3:00 in the afternoon by this time, and daylight hours were becoming few and precious. The Federal line consisted of the divisions under the command of Thomas, who had also begun placing troops on the eventual Snodgrass Hill / Horseshoe Ridge line as a means of protecting his retreat back to Chattanooga. Rosecrans had fled the field, and with Bragg's personal retreat to Reed's Bridge, Thomas and Longstreet were the de facto commanders in the field.

James Longstreet readied himself for the attacks that would hopefully lead to the annihilation of the Federal army. Bushrod Johnson aligned his division and that of Hindman facing Snodgrass Hill, with Hood on his right and the division of William Preston in reserve. Joseph Kershaw, capably in command of McLaws' division, coordinated the attacks.

William C. Oates

As the division from the eastern theater finalized their preparations for the attack on the Horseshoe Ridge line, one of Hood's regiments was moving to find the rest of its brigade. The 15th Alabama, under the command of William C. Oates, the same regiment and commander that had crested Big Round Top and fell with such a vengeance on the 20th Maine during the Little Round Top fighting on the second day of Gettysburg, found itself separated from its sister regiments and spent the early part of the attack fighting on the left with Hindman's divisions. As Oates moved his men through the fields towards Longstreet's position, he discovered a boy, about 15 and a member of Company G, lagging in the rear and crying. Oates did his best to console the boy, and told him not to cry, and that he had not been hurt and it was unmannly to be crying. The boy had a quick reply, "Afraid, hell! that ain't it; I am so damned tired I can't keep up with my company." So often we lose sight of the simple truths of the Civil War, in which fifteen year old boys became men, carried rifles, fought, bled and died in a war uniquely American.

Kershaw led several brigades to the attack, but received such a sustained and well directed fire that they had to fall back. Johnson and Hindman moved forward to try to take Thomas in the flank and rear. For a brief time, the crest was taken by the Confederates, but a charge led by Union General John Beatty drove the Confederates off the hill. For the moment, the Federal line had held, but without reinforcements, disaster lurked for Thomas.

To the rescue came Major General Gordon Granger. Placed at Rossville with the reserve corps, he ignored orders and marched to the battle. His troops arrived at Snodgrass Hill in the nick of time, and yet, the balance of the battle remained in doubt.

As the shadows lengthened and the sun began to work its way down the back side of the ridges, Longstreet redoubled his efforts. Preston's reserve division attacked with a vengeance, moving forward over the prone bodies of their fallen comrades. Fighting became hand-to-hand, but still the Federal line held. Longstreet estimated he sent a total of twenty-five attacks against the Federal line. Whether or not that is the correct number of attacks, Old Pete pounded the position of Thomas throughout the afternoon. In spite of near and partial successes, the Federals held well enough until nightfall.

At night, Thomas pulled out of his position and moved to catch up with the rest of the retreating Federal army. Longstreet's troops held the field, and as the General recalled, he "ordered . . . ammunition boxes to be filled, and everything in readiness for the pursuit in the morning." Thomas, as the rear guard of the Federal army, expected pursuit as well.

On the battlefield, Polk's right wing finally linked up with Longstreet's left, and the western Confederate army split the night with the Rebel yell. So great was the cheering that the retreating Federals long remembered it after the war. Then again, it had been a long time for the Army of Tennessee to gain a victory like this, and they were in a mood to celebrate.

While this talk has only touched on some of the comedy associated with Bragg's and Rosecrans' handling of the campaign and two day battle, its final chapters still continue on in the same vein. General Polk, long so inactive on the right wing, got Bragg out of bed in order to inform that general that the Federals had fled the field, and a pursuit was needed. According to an aide present, Bragg "could not be induced to look at it in that light, and refused to believe that we had won a victory."

If that wasn't bad enough, a Confederate soldier who had been captured, but escaped, was produced to corroborate the story of the retreating Federal army. Bragg still refused to believe. "Do you know what a retreat looks like?", he snapped at the soldier. Setting the stage with an unforgettable one-liner that was the talk of reunions for year, the Rebel fired back, "I ought to, General; I've been with you during your whole campaign." Bragg's reply was not captured for the record.

The battle was over, but the campaign and squabbling between Bragg and his generals were far from over. Bragg finally pursued Rosecrans to the entrenchments of Chattanooga, and a siege ensued. Petty bickering among the generals and their commander broke out, and General Longstreet found himself in the midst of the action. The eastern rebel troops would finally be shipped to Knoxville by the petulant Bragg, and the weakening of his army at Chattanooga significantly contributed to the resulting debacle at Missionary Ridge. Longstreet, without support, low on supplies and with winter coming on, floundered at Knoxville, wintered in eastern Tennessee, and finally rejoined Lee in 1864 in time for the opening of Grant's Overland Campaign. While leading his troops in another vicious attack on the second day of the battle of the Wilderness, the corps commander was severely wounded when shot by his own men. Returning to the army at Petersburg, he served out the war with Lee and surrendered at Appomattox.

Author Peter Cozzens, who so ably wrote of the battle of Chickamauga, criticizes Longstreet for not keeping Bragg informed during the day of the 20th as to his progress, per Bragg's request. That request, however, came at the same time that Bragg was refusing any support to further extend the results Longstreet had gained. Old Pete directed the battle in the style of Lee -- by giving orders to his subordinates and allowing them the discretion to carry them out. Under the circumstances, with a limited staff and even more limited knowledge of subordinates and terrain, the success gained during the battle is a testament to the leadership and tactical capabilities of the general.

That the Army of Tennessee troops who fought under Longstreet were impressed by his presence and leadership there can be little doubt. Brigadier Zacharias Deas of Hindman's division recalled as Longstreet was placing his brigade in position for the 11:10 attack, "Longstreet is the boldest and bravest looking man I ever saw. I don't think he would dodge if a shell were to burst under his chin." The resulting success helped solidify that view.

Was the attack at the Brotherton House a fluke, only successful because of the withdrawal of Wood's division? I think not. Wood's division might have slowed the attack, but not for long. No single division could have withstood the assault of the Confederate divisions massed in the forests east of the La Fayette Road. At Gettysburg, Longstreet's men had a full mile of open ground to cover; at Chickamauga, they only had two hundred yards of open ground to carry.

That the battle was the costliest western battle in terms of human carnage is well documented. The ferocity of the action certainly justified the observations of the Paris Figaro: "These Americans are fighting on a military system inaugurated by the Kilkenny cats. The two armies meet and fight and slaughter each other with the utmost fury. Then they fell (sic) back and reorganize for another general massacre. Positively, the war will end when the last man is killed."

So what of the value of the victory, bought at such cost by the men of butternut and gray? Bragg, true to the style of leadership shown consistently in his tenure as commander of the Army of Tennessee, pursued slowly. Was Longstreet justified in his advice to Secretary Seddon regarding a western concentration? I think so. Regardless of the outcome (and a fallout of that timid pursuit was a confrontation between Generals Bragg and Bedford Forrest, in which Forrest allegedly threatened to kill Bragg if he ever gave the Tennessee cavalry leader an order again), the risks of the movement were justified by the results. Newspaperman E.A. Pollard, writing after the war, called it "Nothing was more brilliant in all of Napoleon's Italy campaigns. Chickamauga was equally as desperate as the battle of Arcola; but it was productive of no decisive results . . ." Historian Clifford Dowdey described Chickamauga as "the only big battle ever decisively won by the Confederates in the West -- and nothing came of it." The successes of September 20 were quickly lost.

D. August Dickert, historian for Kershaw's Brigade, summarized his view of the battle of Chickamauga in this manner:

Of all the great Captains of that day, Longstreet was the guiding genius of Chickamauga. It was his masterful mind that rose equal to the emergency, grasped and directed the storm of battle. It was the unparalleled courage of the troops of Hood, Humphreys and Kershaw [pardonable pride for the Army of Northern Virginia troops], and the temporary command under Longstreet, throwing themselves athwart the path of the great colossus of the North, that checked him and drove him from back over the mountains to the strongholds around Chattanooga. and it is no violent assumption to say that had the troops on the right under Polk supported the battle with as fiery zeal as those on the left under Longstreet, the Union Army would have been utterly destroyed and a possible different ending to the campaign, if not in final, results might have been confidently expected.

In summary of Longstreet's actions, let me quote from biographer Jeffry Wert, because I do not feel I could conclude my comments on Lee's Old War Horse any better. Wert writes:

The orderliness and mode of attack rank him as one of the preeminent combat generals of the war. Few officers of that rank grasped the realities of or situation on a battlefield better than Longstreet. He saw what would not work at Gettysburg and fashioned what would work at Chickamauga and then utilized his intellect and experience to formulate the tactical scheme that brought victory. It was the performance of a first rate soldier, of a man who knew his trade.

In closing this talk, please allow me to quote from a letter written by a World War II combat general to Glenn Tucker, known Civil War historian and author on the battle of Chickamauga. Wert uses this passage to close out his discussion in his chapter on Chickamauga:

There were two kinds of officers in the Civil War, on both sides. Neither were schooled beyond the basic training at West Point. One sort never learned anything -- kept making the same mistakes over and over again. The other sort had the intellectual capacity to reason; to calculate what would work and why. Such was Longstreet. His attack in depth was the perfect solution. Today army schools teach the attack in depth for an envelopment (which Longstreet made), and when the situation is obscure. But no one taught it to him. He figured that one himself.

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