On July 17, 1996, at 8:31 p.m., TWA flight 800, a Boeing 747-100, tail number N93119, bound for Paris, France, crashed into the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of Long Island, New York, shortly after takeoff from Kennedy International Airport (JFK).
The Coast Guard responded to the accident immediately, dispatching numerous search and rescue vessels. Along with the New York City Police Department, the New York State Police, and the Suffolk County Police Department, they worked through the night, protecting the accident site and searching for survivors. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) personnel from its Parsipanny, New Jersey, regional office also were on scene the evening of the accident. Numerous private vessels were also involved in the initial search and recovery efforts.
The NTSB investigative team, or Go-Team, departed Washington, D.C., the following morning at 5:00 a.m., arriving on Long Island at 6:10 am. Command Centers were set up at the Air National Guard Facility and at the Coast Guard Center in East Moriches, New York. The NTSB formed the following investigative groups: systems, structures, air traffic control, operations, maintenance records, and powerplants. As the investigation progressed other groups were formed, i.e., fire and explosion, forensics, database, cabin reconstruction, and metallurgy. Representatives from the parties to the investigation serve on each of the groups. Parties to this investigation include: the FBI, the FAA, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), the Suffolk County Police Department, Boeing, TWA, Pratt & Whitney, the Air Line Pilots Association, the International Association of Machinists, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, and Honeywell. Representatives from the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Singapore, and New Zealand were present.
In the following weeks, much of the investigative work centered on Long Island, but work took place in other locations as well. For example, NTSB investigators reviewed air traffic control information at JFK, and maintenance records for the airplane and its engines at TWA's facility in Kansas City, Missouri. The FBI conducted thousands of interviews, both in the United States and Europe.
The initial and continuing recovery efforts focused on victim recovery, as well as identifying and mapping the debris fields. The Coast Guard was responsible for searching the surface of the ocean, and the Navy for underwater efforts. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) vessel RUDE volunteered her services to the Coast Guard the night of the accident, arriving on- scene the following morning. RUDE used her side scan sonar to map the wreckage fields, as did the Navy and NYPD. There was a considerable amount of surface wreckage seen and recovered the first days after the accident. Finding the wreckage on the Ocean floor was a much more difficult task. The Coast Guard vessels such as the JUNIPER were on scene recovering small debris. Navy vessels USS GRASP and USS OAK HILL from Norfolk, Virginia, and a contract vessel, PIROUETTE, from New Jersey, were on scene and moored by July 25, 1996.
Diving operations were conducted by the New York City Police Department Scuba Team, the New York State Police, and the U.S. Navy Scuba and Surface Supply Dive Units.
The NYPD vessel and NOAA's RUDE searched for the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder, or "black boxes," but the "pingers" were never detected. The recorders were located by U.S. Navy divers on July 24, 1996. Both recorders, which received only moderate impact damage, were immediately sent via Coast Guard aircraft to the NTSB's Washington, D.C., laboratories for analysis. The data on both recorders ended abruptly and at about the same time, revealing no significant information.
With wreckage being brought to the surface, the NTSB, FBI and ATF moved their command centers to the abandoned Grumman facility in Calverton, New York. Once the manufacturing site of military fighter aircraft, the Grumman facility offered not only office space but several hangars in which the wreckage could be stored and reassembled. The main hangar was used to lay out the wreckage from the fuselage. Another hangar would house the engines, another the cabin interior, and yet another the carpeting from the plane.
The incoming wreckage was closely examined, tagged and catalogued. The wreckage was then laid out on the hangar floor, which had been marked off by sections. The FBI and ATF field tested for explosive residue, sending some pieces to Washington, D.C., for further, more accurate testing. Microscopic traces of explosive residue were found on pieces of wreckage. However, no conclusions were or have been drawn, as other physical evidence would have to be evident to determine an explosive device. This plane had been used in a law enforcement training exercise for bomb-detection dogs one month before the accident, and was also used to transport military personnel, which could account for the trace amounts of residue found.
The Navy vessel DIANE G arrived on scene on July 26, 1996, equipped with an experimental laser scanning system. The system provided very high resolution imagery of the ocean floor. Upon completing her duties, in late August the DIANE G was released. The USS GRAPPLE, sister ship to the USS GRASP, was on scene and moored by July 29, 1996.
Engine numbers 1 and 2 were recovered by August 10, 1996. The number 3 engine was recovered on August 11, and the number 4 engine arrived at the hangar on August 16, 1996. All were recovered in relatively good condition. The engines were meticulously examined and disassembled by the Powerplants Group with no significant findings.
Based on the condition of the wreckage from the center section of the plane and that surrounding the center fuel tank, the investigators are particularly interested in this area. Scaffolding has been erected on which this section of plane is being reassembled in order to give the investigators a better picture of what occurred. It is apparent that an explosion occurred in the center fuel tank, but the origin of the explosion and whether it was the initial event or a secondary event is not yet known (i.e. whether an explosive device caused the explosion, or a mechanical malfunction provided a spark to ignite the explosion).
The Systems Group took fuel system components to the Marshall Spaceflight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, where they began testing on August 26, 1996. Testing was completed by August 28, 1996, with no significant findings. Some fuel system components have yet to be retrieved from the ocean floor, including the scavenge pump and fuel probes from the center tank.
The Navy continues to search for wreckage and the remaining victims. After clearing debris fields 2 and 3 of major wreckage, the USS GRASP was released. The MARION C has taken over the duties of the PIROUETTE, and the USS TRENTON has replaced the USS OAK HILL. High seas caused by hurricanes have suspended diving several times, and the Navy vessels have
twice been temporarily moved to Staten Island, New York. To ensure that everything possible has been done to recover all the wreckage possible, the NTSB has contracted with a private salvage operation to supplement the work of the Navy.
Work in the hangar continues. To date, approximately 85% of the aircraft has been recovered from the ocean floor. The wreckage is being documented and work continues on the mockups. Investigators are still considering three theories as explanations to the tragedy; a bomb, a missile, and mechanical failure. In deciding the future course of the investigation, several options have been discussed. These options include flying in a Boeing 747-100 for the investigators to use as a model and reference, as well as blowing up shells of 747s to observe how they break up. It has been decided that a full mockup of the aircraft will be attempted. The logistics of this, however, have to date not been worked out.
Two hundred thirteen of the 230 victims have been recovered. Two hundred twelve have been positively identified and returned to their families; one victim remains unidentified. Navy divers continue to search for victims.
The Navy continues its recovery effort. Surface supply divers off the GRAPPLE continue to recover wreckage and the ROV is being utilized. The MARION C continues her side scanning sonar operations and TRENTON remains in her support role. To date, almost 1400 Naval personnel have assisted in the search and recovery operations. Almost 3000 dives have been conducted with almost 1400 hours of total bottom time.
The NTSB has contracted with a private firm to assist in the recovery effort - see attached press release.
HANGAR OPERATIONS
Work on the mockups continues. Investigators continue to document and catalogue wreckage. A large piece of the center fuel tank, approximately 10' x 6', was delivered to the hangar last night. With the addition of this piece, virtually all of the floor of the center tank has been recovered. Preliminary testing shows the piece to be unremarkable. Fuel probes have also recently been recovered, from where in the plane they came is, as of yet, undetermined.
MEDICAL EXAMINER
The Navy continues its recovery effort. GRAPPLE has moved from her moors in debris field #1 so that the MARION C and the ABLE J can re-side scan sonar the debris fields. TRENTON remains in her support role. Sonar guided dive operations are expected to continue for the immediate future.
HANGAR OPERATIONS
Work on the mockups continues. Investigators continue to document and catalogue wreckage. A fuel quantity probe from the center fuel tank has been identified. It was sent to the NTSB laboratory in Washington, DC for testing. Although the probe was too badly damaged to conduct an electrical test, internal examination proved no remarkable findings. Six probes from the center tank remain either unrecovered or unidentified. Key pieces of wreckage still missing include the center fuel tank scavenger pump and remaining fuel quantity probes, as well as, pieces of the center fuel tank itself.
THE INVESTIGATION
NTSB investigators briefed the NTSB Board Members, representatives from the White House, the FAA, the US Navy, the FBI, and the US Coast Guard on October 2, 1996. They addressed the work that they have done, sharing the great deal of information they have gathered, and spoke of the work they need to do. In addition, Admiral Kristensen, US Navy, briefed on Navy operations and the different salvage options available.
MEDICAL EXAMINER
A meeting was held today in New York City between the NTSB, FBI, and the U.S. Navy to discuss the status and future of the TWA 800 investigation. Several important decisions were made.
The Navy has identified 400 - 500 targets remaining on the ocean floor. The Navy will need four full days of diving to investigate all of the targets. It is likely that less than 50% of the targets will end up being wreckage from flight 800. Scallop trawling of the ocean floor will begin soon after diving is complete. The trawling will begin with a test area over debris field #1 where the rear 2/3 of the aircraft was discovered. If the trawling proves successful a broader area will be searched.
It was decided to extend the mockup of the center section of the aircraft, making it about 92 feet long. A full mockup is not thought necessary and will not be attempted at this time. The center fuel tank mockup will be kept separate. A grid structure will be incorporated internally to represent the cabin floor, to allow viewing from the bottom to the top, and to allow access at higher levels.
Testing of jet fuel will be conducted at the California Institute of Technology within the next 30 days. Full size explosion testing of separate Boeing 747 airplane center wing fuel tanks and complete Boeing 747s with ignition in the center wing fuel tanks is likely to be conducted within the next six months.
In addition, one more victim has been recovered and identified, bringing the total victims recovered to 214. 213 victims have been identified.
The three theories; bomb, missile and mechanical failure remain. No conclusion as to the cause of this accident has been determined.
The next briefing by Vice Chairman Francis will be October 28, 1996 at 3:30 p.m. Eastern time.
SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes This action requires a one-time inspection to detect damage of the sleeving and wire bundles of the boost pumps of the numbers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks, and of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps (if installed); replacement of any damaged sleeving with new sleeving; and repair or replacement of any damaged wires with new wires. For airplanes on which any burned wires are found, this action also requires an inspection to detect damage of the conduit, and replacement of any damaged conduit with a serviceable conduit. This amendment is prompted by an FAA determination that an environment conducive to vibration exists in the conduit and wire bundles of the boost pumps and of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps, which can cause abrasion of the Tef1on sleeving and subsequent abrasion of the wires in the bundles. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect and correct such abrasion, which could result in electrical arcing between the wires and the aluminum conduit and subsequent fire or explosion of the fuel tank.
The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register a of January 21, 1997.
Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before March 4, 1997.
ADDRESSES: Submit comments in triplicate to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Transport Airplane
Directorate, ANM-103, Attention: Rules Docket No. 96-NM277-AD, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 980554056.
The service information referenced in this AD may bc obtained from Boelng Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. This information may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, I)C. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: G. Michael Collins, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office; 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (206) 227-2689; fax (206) 227-1181.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On July 17, 1996, a Boeing Model 747 series airplane broke up during climb over the Atlantic Ocean after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York. Although the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has not determined the cause of the accident, it has identified mechanical failure as one possible cause. The NTSB also stated that the center fuel tank exploded at some time during the accident. However, the NTSB has not determined if that explosion was the cause of the accident or the result of some other event. Following the accident, the FAA began investigating potential failures that could result in ignition sources in the fuel tanks installed on Model 747 series airplanes. Other Relevant Rulemaking and Survey
As part of its investigation, the FAA reviewed the actions required by certain existing AD's, and the results of a survey conducted on in-service Model 747 series airplanes, as discussed below.
In 1979, the FAA issued AD 79-05-04, amendment 39-3431 (44 FR 12636, March 8, 1979). That AD was prompted by a report indicating that the fuel pump wires in an aluminum conduit in an auxiliary fuel tank on a Model 747 series airplane chafed through the insulation. Electrical arcing from the chafed wire to the aluminum conduit caused a hole in the conduit; however, the arcing did not cause a fire or explosion. The hole in the conduit was discovered because fuel leaked through the hole and out of the conduit at the rear spar.
AD 79-05-04 required discontinuing the use of the auxiliary fuel tanks, draining fuel from those tanks, and opening and collaring the circuit breakers for the auxiliary tank jettison pumps. Those actions were required to be accomplished prior to further flight. The actions required by that AD affected 10 Model 747-200 series airplanes, unless Teflon sleeving had been installed on the wire bundles in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-28A2091, Revision 1, dated February 5, 1979, or unless the pumps had been deactivated previously in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-28-2067, dated November 11, 1977. The FAA has been advised that use of the fuel tanks has been discontinued on eight of the affected airplanes, and that Teflon sleeving has been installed on the wire bundles of two of the affected airplanes.
Following the issuance of AD 79-05-04, a survey involving an inspection of the wires in the conduits for the numbers 1 and 4 fuel tank pumps was conducted on approximately 26 in-service Model 747 series airplanes. The results of that survey revealed that numerous wires in these conduits were chafing against the conduit. Although none of the wires inspected at that time had worn completely through the insulation, chafing through up to 80 percent of the total insulation thickness was found on numerous wires.
Based on these survey results, the FAA issued AD 79-06-02, amendment 39-3439 (44 FR 16362, March 19, 1979). That AD requires an inspection, repair, and modification of the outboard main fuel tanks (numbers 1 and 4) boost pump wires in the conduits located in the inboard main fuel tanks (numbers 2 and 3) on Model 747 series airplanes. Any chafed wires are required to be replaced, and Teflon sleeving is to be installed to prevent chafing or abrasion of the wires against the conduit. Those actions were required to be accomplished within 750 hours time-in-service or 2 months whichever occurred first, after the airplane had accumulated either 6,000 or 30 00 total hours time-in-service, depending upon the type of wires installed. The modification required by AD 79-06-02 involves tying the wires together every six inches and installing two concentric Teflon sleeves over the wire bundle. The requirements of that AD were intended to prevent abrasion of the electrical wires of the fuel tank boost pumps.
The number 1 and 4 main fuel tanks (outboard main tanks) on Model 747 series airplanes each have two boost pumps that are located in dry bays ("dog houses") inside the numbers 2 and 3 main fuel tanks (inboard main tanks). The electrical power for these boost pumps is supplied by wiring routed through aluminum conduits inside the inboard main tanks. These conduits begin at the wing rear spar and end at the boost pump dog houses. The wires are separated from the conduit by two concentric Teflon sleeves that are installed over the wire bundles.
The auxiliary tank jettison pumps, if installed, are located in the auxiliary fuel tanks. These pumps are mounted in dog houses inside the auxiliary fuel tanks. The electrical power for these pumps is routed through aluminum conduit inside the auxiliary fuel tanks, similar to the conduit of the boost pumps for the numbers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks.
Vibration of the conduit and wire bundles can cause abrasion of the Teflon sleeving, which could lead to abrasion of the wires in the bundles. Such abrasion, if not corrected, could result in electrical arcing between the wires and the aluminum conduit and subsequent fire or explosion of the fuel tank.
The FAA finds that an environment conducive to vibration still exists in the conduit and wire bundles of the fuel boost pumps and the auxiliary tank jettison pumps (if installed). The FAA has determined that wire chafing has occurred on Model 747 series airplanes inside other conduits located outside the main fuel tanks in the vicinity of the conduits addressed in AD 79-06-02. In some cases, chafing through both the Teflon sleeving and the wire insulation has occurred on these airplanes [reference Al) 96-03-14
amendment 39-9511 (61 FR 6500, February 21, 1996), and AD 89-14-04, amendment 39-6246 (54 FR 27157, June 28, 1989)]. The FAA concludes that follow-on inspections of the Teflon sleeving must be accomplished to determine if the sleeving continues to provide a protective barrier after extended time in service.
The FAA reviewed and approved Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-28A2204, dated December 19, 1996, which describes procedures for a one-time inspection to detect damage of the sleeving and wire bundles of the forward and aft boost pumps of the numbers I and 4 main fuel tanks, and of the wire bundles of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps (if installed); and repair or replacement of damaged parts with new parts For airplanes on which any burned wires are found, the alert service bulletin describes procedures for an inspection to detect damage of the conduit, and replacement of any damaged conduit with a serviceable conduit.
Since an unsafe condition has been identified that is likely to exist or develop on other Boeing Model 747 series airplanes of the same type design, this AD is being issued to detect and correct abrasion of the Teflon sleeving and wires in the bundles of the fuel boost pumps for the numbers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks, which could result in electrical arcing between the wires and the aluminum conduit and subsequent fire or explosion of the fuel tank. This AD requires a one-time inspection to detect damage of the sleeving and wire bundles of the forward and aft boost pumps of the numbers 1 and 4 main fuel tanks, and of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps (if installed); replacement of any damaged sleeving with new sleeving, and repair or replacement of any damaged wires with new wires. For airplanes on which any burned wires are found, this AD requires an inspection to detect damage of the conduit, and replacement of any damaged conduit with a serviceable conduit. The actions are required to be accomplished in accordance with the alert service bulletin described previously.
This AD also requires that operators submit a report of inspection results to the FAA. In addition, this AD requires that operators submit damaged Teflon sleeving, wires, and conduits to the FAA.
Boeing Model 747 series airplanes having line numbers 433 and subsequent are equipped with fuel pump wire conduits made from corrosion-resistant steel (stainless steel). Arcing from the fuel pump wires to the stainless steel conduit will result in opening the fuel pump circuit breaker before sufficient heat is generated to penetrate the stainless steel conduit. The FAA is considering additional rulemaking to require replacing the aluminum conduits located in the fuel tanks with stainless steel conduits following accomplishment of the one-time inspection required by this AD. The details of the requirement to replace the aluminum conduits with stainless steel conduits will be finalized after reviewing the reports of inspection results required by this AD.
Additionally, the FAA recognizes that the degree of wear or damage to the parts may be difficult to describe in a written report of inspection results. Consequently, the FAA finds it necessary to require that any damaged parts be submitted to the FAA for examination. Examination of these parts will enable the FAA to determine whether a need exists to require future replacement of aluminum conduits with stainless steel conduits, and to develop appropriate compliance times based on the extent of wear or damage found.
The required compliance time of 120 days is usually sufficient to allow for a brief comment period before adoption of a final rule. In this AD, however, that compliance time was selected in order to allow the requirements of the AD to be performed at a maintenance base where special equipment and trained maintenance personnel will be available without significant disruption of normal operations. Nevertheless, the FAA has determined that immediate adoption is necessary in this case because of the importance of initiating the required one-time inspection as soon as possible.
Since a situation exists that requires the immediate adoption of this regulation, it is found that notice and opportunity for prior public comment hereon are impracticable, and that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.
Although this action is in the form of a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety and, thus, was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment, comments are invited on this rule. Interested persons are invited to comment on this rule by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as they may desire. Communications shall identify the Rules Docket number and be submitted in triplicate to the address specified under the caption "ADDRESSES." All communications received on or before the closing date for comments will be considered, and this rule may be amended in light of the comments received. Factual information that supports the commenter's ideas and suggestions is extremely helpful in evaluating the effectiveness of the AD action and determining whether additional rulemaking action would be needed.
Comments are specifically invited on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the rule that might suggest a need to modify the rule. All comments submitted will be available, both before and after the closing date for comments, in the Rules Docket for examination by interested persons. A report that summarizes each FAA-public contact concerned with the substance of this AD will be filed in the Rules Docket.
Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments submitted in response to this rule must submit a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: "Comments to Docket Number 96-NM-277-AD." The postcard will be date stamped and returned to the commenter.
The regulations adopted herein will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States. or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with Executive Order 12612, it is determined that this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Assessment.
The FAA has determined that this regulation is an emergency regulation that must be issued immediately to correct an unsafe condition in aircraft, and that it is not a "significant regulatory action" under Executive Order 12866. It has been determined further that this action involves an emergency regulation under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979). If it is determined that this emergency regulation otherwise would be significant under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures, a final regulatory evaluation will be prepared and placed in the Rules Docket. A copy of it, if filed, may be obtained from the Rules Docket at the location provided under the caption "ADDRESSES."
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the Federal Aviation Administration amends part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as follows:
l. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
39.13 - [Amended]
2. Section 39.13 is amended by adding the following new airworthiness directive:
96-26-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-9870. Docket 96-NM-277-AD.
Applicability: Model 747 series airplanes having line numbers up through 432, certificated in any category.
NOTE 1: This AD applies to each airplane identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For airplanes that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (d) of this AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.
To detect and correct abrasion of the Teflon sleeving and wires in the bundles of the fuel boost pumps for the numbers l and 4 main fuel tanks and of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps (if installed), which could result in electrical arcing between the wires and the aluminum conduit and subsequent fire or explosion of the fuel tank, accomplish the following:
(a) Within 120 days after the effective date of this AD, perform a one-time inspection to detect damage of the sleeving and wire bundles of the forward and aft boost pumps of the numbers l and 4 main fuel tanks, and of the wire bundles of the auxiliary tank jettison pumps (if installed), in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-28A2204, dated December 19, 1996.
(l) If any damaged sleeving is found, prior to further flight, replace the sleeving with new sleeving in accordance with the alert service bulletin.
(2) If any damaged wire is found, prior to further night, repair or replace the wire with new wire in accordance with the alert service bulletin.
(3) If any burned wire is found, prior to further flight, perform an inspection to detect damage of the conduit, in accordance with the alert service bulletin. If any damage is found, prior to further flight, replace the conduit with a serviceable conduit in accordance with the alert service bulletin.
(b) Within 14 days after accomplishing the requirements of paragraph (a) of this AD, submit a report of inspection results to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, WA 98055-4056; fax (206) 227-1181. The report shall include the information specified in paragraphs (b)(l), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), and (b)(5) of this AD. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056.
(1) The airplane serial number.
(2) The total hours time-in-service accumulated on the airplane.
(3) The total number of flight cycles accumulated on the airplane.
(4) A description of any damage found.
(5) The location where the damaged part was installed.
(c) If any damaged sleeving, wire, or conduit is found during any inspection required by this AD, within 14 days after accomplishing the inspection, submit the damaged part to the Manager, Seattle ACO, along with the report of inspection results required by paragraph (b) of this AD.
(d) An alterative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.
NOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.
(e) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
(f) The actions shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-28A2204, dated December 19, 1996. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U S C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW, Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.
(g) This amendment becomes effective on January 21, 1997
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: G. Michael Collins, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056; telephone (206) 227-2689; fax (206) 227- 118l