Mr. Vamadevan in his study of the "National Language Policy in Sri Lanka"(1996), states that the implementation of Tamil language policies in the "Northern and Eastern provinces, save Ampara... was somewhat satisfactory" (International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Occasional Papers - 6). Mr. Theva Rajan in another ICES publication titled "Tamil as Official Language"(1995), states: "A decade of inaction points to the inescapable fact that the function of this Ministry (Tamil Language Implementation) was to see that Tamil language provisions were not implemented". In view of Mr. Vamadevan's observations of "satisfaction" within the Northern and Eastern provinces, Mr. Theva Rajan's reference to "inaction" must necessarily relate to areas outside the North and the East.

Mr. Theva Rajan's belief is that "Unless deep and fundamental changes occur in bureaucratic attitudes it is not possible to implement..." language policies as declared by the constitution. Mr. Vamadevan, on the other hand, states that aside from "basic weaknesses (which he cites)... there is the attitude of the officers both non-Tamil-speaking and Tamil-speaking, their unwillingness to use Tamil, and lack of commitment and indifference to the new language policy, and the preference for use of the link language English among officials and the preference shown for this by Tamil officers as well as the public. All these combine to make the full implementation of Tamil as a language of administration an extremely difficult exercise".

The belief was that without the draft proposals "bureaucratic inaction" that was affecting the implementation of language policies outside the North and the East could not have been overcome. The strategy therefore was to force the implementation of the Language provisions by constitutional authority, outside the North and the East, despite the undeclared "preference" of the officers and the public. The process would then legalize a Language policy that is constitutionally guaranteed with regard to scope and territorial jurisdiction that starts at declaring AGA divisions with 25% minority representation to be bi-lingual, in the hope of revising it later to 10% and finally to 0%. If these proposals are implemented the policies relating to Language would not have a parallel in any other part of the world.

Unlike defined ethno-territories, regions with minority ratios of 25% and less are subject to constant demographic changes. If such changes involve a decrease in the number of ethnic minorities within a region already declared bi-lingual, the administrative arrangements already in-place may either remain or be reviewed, while another region which formerly had less than 25% of ethnic minorities would be entitled to be declared bi-lingual if the ratio reached 25%. The process could be irreversible. On the other hand, any demographic changes resulting from migration of an ethnic majority to regions already enjoying a 25% ratio would be resisted on the grounds that the majority was "encroaching" on the entitlements of a minority. The consequence of assigning ethnic ratios would then be to restrict and dampen the freedom of movement of ethnic majorities, while permitting freedom of movement of ethnic minorities, or to freeze demographic distributions as they stand at any given time. This is discriminatory and a violation of "the right to freedom of movement..." as stated in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Once certain regions are declared bi-lingual, every Tamil-speaking member of the public regardless of where they reside would be entitled to be served by the Government in Tamil in the bi-lingually declared regions. The lack or absence of suitable and satisfactory means of communication would entitle members of the Tamil-speaking public to seek redress from the government. The conditions thus created would naturally encourage the Tamil-speaking public to move to such areas with the added attraction of assured employment prospects in the public sector. Unfortunately, the reverse process for the non Tamil-speaking public to move to the North and the East would be less enticing. The proposal presents distinct advantages for the Tamil-speaking public, and in addition may creat favourable circumstances that would encourage progressive migration from the North to the South.

These provisions make it possible for instance, for a Tamil couple getting married in Colombo or any of the other 25 AGA divisions (cited by Jeyaraj), to have their marriage recorded in Tamil. With time such facilities are to be provided throughout the country. But such extensive countrywide facilities do not exist anywhere in the world because of the enormous administrative and financial costs involved. The Tamils who have migrated to the seven provinces including the Indian Tamils have done so not under duress, but on their own volition to seek economic advancement, similar to their migrations to Malaysia, Singapore, East Africa, and more recently to the West. In all these instances they have to function in the language of the region or country like anyone who leaves their birthplace in search of their personal and not the community's salvation. To seek community and group "rights" later and expect others to bear the cost is beyond the limits of reason. This is the quid pro quo for giving up hearth and birthplace.

Mr. Theva Rajan states that "Communication is the path of a progressive country". How can there be communication between two groups who speak two different languages? Communication is possible if the two groups are conversant with both languages, one knows the language of the other, or both know a third language. Translated in terms of Sri Lanka, either all Sri Lankans must know Sinhala and Tamil, the Tamils must know Sinhala, or both should know English. Mr. Samarasundera Commissioner of Official Languages, advocates the first option (Ceylon Daily News, December 12, 1996). Unfortunately though, knowledge of both languages unreinforced by English limits opportunities for social and economic advancement. Therefore, if the preference is to acquire a knowledge of English, communication through the medium of English would become the norm, and the need to know the language of the other would become academic.

Dialogue and communication among all the groups in a society are essential for participation in the processes of governance. Such participation is not possible at this time because the policy of two languages has divided Sri Lanka and the Sri Lankan society. By mandating certain regions within this divide to be bi-lingual the inducement to know the language of the other becomes less attractive and the divisions in the society are bound to continue. One is limited only to those ideas and points of view expressed by members of one's community. The views and attitudes of the OTHER community are unknown because they are denied through the barrier of language.

For instance, the Sinhala-speaking and the Tamil-speaking public's understanding of the current Devolution proposals would be limited ONLY to those views and opinions that are reported in their respective media and to the interpretations given by their respective leaders. There is no opportunity to become aware of each others opinions, concerns, and anxieties directly. As a result, the opinions of the two language groups are narrow, limited, and subject to distortion. These limitations are a hindrance and a barrier to ethnic harmony and an impediment to the functioning of a healthy democracy. The Sinhalese and Tamil points of view regarding Devolution would be known ONLY to those with the knowledge of English and this is a small percentage of the voting public. The inevitable result is political compartmentalization and social and cultural isolation.

This was the situation during the colonial period. Dialogue was possible only among the elite who had access to English. The rest that constituted nearly 93% of the population who knew only Sinhala or Tamil were isolated not only from the processes of governance, but also from each others "aspirations". Each group was dependent on the interpretations offered by the elite. The barriers of language divided and separated the communities first by class during the colonial period, and after independence, into several groups by ethnicity. Knowledge of each others languages would have permitted dialogue and communication among the bulk of the society, but the class divide would have remained. One solution that would have addressed both class and ethnic divisions would have been to provide access to either of the indigenous languages along with English.

Knowing Sinhala and Tamil without English would not equip Sri Lankans to meet the economic challenges of the forthcoming century. Even within Sri Lanka, it is only those with the knowledge of English that can hope to achieve social mobility and economic advancement. It is they who would be able to communicate with each other across the ethnic divide and continue to be the elite. Those with the knowledge of Sinhala and Tamil ONLY would remain second class citizens, while those with the knowledge of ONLY Tamil would have very limited employment opportunities in the seven provinces because of their lack of Sinhala language skills. This is the advantage that citizens of Canada, Belgium, Switzerland, and other countries have, where there are two or more languages. At least one language is an international language, unlike Sinhala and Tamil.

Leaving aside the draft proposals, even the current constitutional proposals with the discretionary powers assigned to the President are much more extensive in scope than practices in other countries. For instance, as far as the average Canadian citizen is concerned, although both French and English are Official languages, at the operational level, French is monolingual in Quebec and so is English in the rest of Canada. The Canadian Official Languages Act "ensures equality of status and equal rights and privileges as to their use in all federal institutions...". This equality of status applies ONLY to the FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS. In the case of the PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS the Federal Government has committed itself only "to cooperating with provincial governments and their institutions to support the development of English and French linguist minority communities...". In addition, Part IV of the constitution relating to Communications with and Services to the Public, cautions the public that communications and services in either official language is possible "where there is significant demand for communications with and services from that office or facility in that language". This applies to the "National Capital region, in Canada or elsewhere, or the Travelling public"(Official Languages Act R.S.,1985, c.31 (4th Supp.).

Article 4 of the Belgian Constitution states that "Belgium has four linguistic regions: the French-speaking Region, the Dutch-speaking Region, the bilingual Region of Brussels-Capital and the German-speaking Region". The Territorial principle "stipulates that in monolingual linguistic regions the use of a given language ...is compulsory for all public administrative acts, regardless of the tier of government from which they emanate"(Alen, Ergec, 1994, "Fourth State Reform of 1993").

Switzerland also offers an interesting comparison. Prof. K. M. de Silva in his book "Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi-Ethnic Societies"1986, quoting two sources Cynthia H. Enloe and Carol L. Schmid states, respectively, "These cantons are not only remarkably homogeneous, but also persons moving to a new canton are obliged to use its local languages for the transactions of official business"....and "the canton ...determines the official language. The cantonal language is the medium of instruction in the public schools. In addition, all cantonal laws and regulations are issued only in the official language. While compromises are made in practice, the cantons have no legal obligation to provide translations or deal with citizens in languages other than their own".

Numerous other examples illustrate that the practices that exist in other countries are similar, in that, although languages may enjoy equality of status with others within a country, they operate as monolingual languages within defined territories. For instance the Tamil language enjoys regional status within Tamil Nadu in India, but a Tamil living or conducting business in an adjoining state is compelled to operate in the official language of that state, similar to Switzerland and Belgium. Furthermore, if citizens in the state of Tamil Nadu wants to communicate with the center in Delhi, they have to do so in Hindi.

The practices cited thus far are possible when ethnic groups are by and large homogeneous within defined territories. In the Sri Lankan context this would apply to most of the North and the East. A similar number of Tamil-speaking persons (counting all Muslims as Tamil-speaking, as per Jayaraj) live scattered within the rest of the country, except for the Indian Tamils who are concentrated in specific areas. Due to the unique nature of the demographics in Sri Lanka there is every possibility for language policies to function to the satisfaction of the Tamil-speaking public in the North and the East, and to encounter problems in the rest of the country. Such problems would be experienced by anyone outside his or her ethno-territory, similar to a person with only a knowledge of French attempting to live outside Quebec. The constitutional provisions that exist, and what is being attempted in Sri Lanka, is very much more extensive in scope than practices elsewhere.

There are universal beliefs regarding language. For instance, it is believed that language is an integral part of ones culture and therefore is crucial to one's ethnic identity. However this truism may be, what matters is IDENTITY, and ethnicity and all that goes with it, only reinforces identity. The Muslims of the Eastern province speak Tamil, yet are considered ethnically different to the Tamils. Despite the bonding of language there is no ethnic affinity between the Muslims and the Tamils, and so it is between the Sinhala-speaking Muslims and the Sinhalese. They have not lost their identity. A common language does not diminish or threaten ethnic distinctions. Similarly although the Irish and the Scots physically resemble the British and speak the same language they are very particular to emphasize the distinctions between them. The ethnic Germans speak a variety of languages but have not given up their identity as Germans. None of the ethnic groups in Sri Lanka have lost their identity during 450 years of colonial rule even though some were converted to Christianity.

It is therefore evident that in the case of the Sri Lankan Tamils the issue is not limited to language. Robert N. Kearney in his book titled "Communalism and Language in the Politics of Ceylon", 1967, states "Federal party members repeatedly have claimed that the language issue is only a symptom of the deeper communal problem and the solution of the language dispute would profit the Tamils little, as they would remain exposed to the danger of Sinhalese domination and future threats to their existence". Quoting Mr. Rasamanikam, he states "Sinhalese-Tamil problem in Ceylon is not a mere matter of language. It is one that affects our very existence as a national entity in this country". This threat of "domination" will persist as long as the Tamil community continues to maintain itself outside the pale by limiting themselves only to Tamil, or even Tamil and English. On the contrary, ability to function in Sinhala would enable them to compete equally with the rest and yet retain their ethnic identity. It is NOT exclusion but inclusion that will prevent "domination" and preserve them as an "entity" in the country.

A fundamental Human Right is that all citizens should have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language. In the exercise of these rights economic and practical considerations may dictate the status of a language in a country. If the bulk of the population is culturally identified with a particular language, as a matter of convenience such a language is used for official purposes as well. In the Sri Lankan context, since nearly 75% of the population speak one language it would be natural to expect the cultural language of this group to used for official purposes also, provided the cultural use of other languages are not denied. The issue is one of econmy, administrative convenience, and healthy governance.

If however, most of the people belonging to the remaining 25% of the population of Sri Lanka speak another language and are located in defined regions, the cultural language of such a group may also be used for official purposes IN THESE REGIONS. Although the Sri Lankan Tamils in the Northern and Eastern provinces could justify the use of their cultural language for official purposes as well, they constitute only 9% of the population of the country. As far as the Tamil-speaking or Sinhala-speaking Muslims were concerned, both languages were only means of communication and not integral features of their culture. Under these circumstances if "language... would profit the Tamils little" the only reason to incur the administrative and financial costs to maintain two languages in one country would be for the satisfaction of an ethnic pride which is at the expense of denying opportunities for economic advancement for the Tamils in the North and the East. What must be recognized and accepted is that the ethnic pride that is being sought and measures adopted to satisfy them are beyond universally accepted linguistic rights.

Starting with "Sinhala Only" in 1956 where Sinhala was to be the sole Official language and the language of administration throughout the country, language policies have undergone several revisions to emerge in its present form. In its present form Tamil is also an official language throughout the country and the language of administration in the North and the East. The proposal before the Select Committee is to remove the existing discretionary powers assigned to the President and mandate that all AGA Divisions with 25% minority representation be declared bi-lingual.

Without any regard to past and future legislation relating to language, the public has begun to realize that without English, social and economic mobility is limited. This realization has created its own dynamic that is increasingly becoming independent of what is being legislated. The public is exploiting every opportunity to acquire competence in English because of the promise it holds. After the dust of nationalism settles the practical aspects of life will determine the usage of language. It is access to opportunity, equal with the Sinhalese, that will make the Tamil community realize that they are an integral entity of the country. Despite all the rhetoric about language, it is survival and opportunity for advancement that will dictate what language is adopted for economic reasons without prejudice to one's mother tongue. Learning the language of the other should be viewed as acquiring another skill that could lead to economic benefit. Similarly, each learning about the other's culture would lead to mutual respect, greater understanding, and tolerance to accept each others humanity.

The proposal before the Select Committee is an attempt to consolidate and progressively extend the provisions relating to the Tamil language. The strategy has been to use the power of legislation to force acceptance of these provisions. But acceptance cannot be extorted, it must be won by persuasion. The result has been a widening gulf between expectation and realization. Regarding implementation, there is no evidence that any evaluation has been made of the organizational and financial implications of this exercise when these provisions are eventually extended countrywide. It will be the non Tamil-speaking public who will have to bear the cost of this administrative nightmare. At the end, they will not even have the satisfaction that they have contributed to anything achievable. Instead they will be conscious all along that they are contributing towards an exercise that is intended to fulfill an "ideal", whose beneficiaries would ONLY be the Tamil community.

No attempt has been made to involve the public in this venture. All the "pacts" of a bygone era have become irrelevant and a testimony to what happens when the public is not involved. Without public involvement there is no public acceptance. Many wise men have pronounced what ought to be the language policies of the country except the People. It is vital that at least at this stage, the proposals before the Select Committee are made public and the public is given an opportunity to express their views similar to the proposals relating to Devolution. These views could be the foundation for a separate Parliamentary Committee to hold public hearings for the purpose of formulating a meaningful policy relating to language that encompasses legislation, judiciary, and education. By public, what is meant are the non-political organizations and recognized and knowledgeable citizens of Sri Lanka. It is their views that should form the bedrock of future language policy. If the consensus is that it is necessary to retrace past steps for the country as a whole to move forward, the People of Sri Lanka should have the courage to accept it.

Whatever efforts are expended, it would not be possible to achieve the "ideal" where Sinhala and Tamil are official languages from Point Pedro to Devinuwara. Although these proposals may benefit the non Tamil-speaking public in the Northern and Eastern provinces to a limited degree, it is the pursuit of the narrow interests of the Tamil-speaking public outside these two provinces, that are at the heart of this proposal. In the long term this approach would confine and restrict the advancement of the very people whose interests they are hoping to promote. It must be realized that the overall interests of the Tamil-speaking public and therefore their advancement, would best be served when their interests are in harmony and not at variance with the rest of the Sri Lankan People.