Subj: Re: USA Today article on
Tuesday
Date: 98-11-11 23:26:05 EST
From: jking1@mediaone.net (John
King)
To: PAPCECST@aol.com
CC: clittle@cari.net, EdwBlock@aol.com,
devans@phillips.com, sampson@iinet.net.au, tim@trickypictures.com,
TCHRogers@aol.com, dmohn@uswest.net, barry@corazon.com,
HMS@proparanoid.com, dale@pantellic.com, citabria@ttlc.net,
msheerin@ctv.ca, tim.dobbyn@reuters.com, stalcup@magnet.fsu.edu,
DIVEBOMB@aol.com, jking1@mediaone.net, RCOULTHART@ninenet.com.au
To all:
Here is Tuesday's USA Today article, I haven't got Monday's yet.
Page 14A. November 10, 1998. USA TODAY.
David Mazzarella Editor
Karen Jurgensen Editor of the Editorial Page
Today's debate: Airline safety
About half the world's passenger jets contain wire prone to cracking
and chafing that can ignite fires.
That fact, exposed Monday in a USA TODAY Special Report, comes as no
surprise to the military. After a series of fires and electrical
failures, it backed away from the use of the most controversial wire,
called Kapton, a decade ago and began warning government regulators
and commercial airlines against its use.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is wary, too. It has
investigated nearly two dozen incidents in which wiring was a
factor.
(They still call it, a MECHANICAL
MALFUNCTION!)
So is United Airlines. As long ago as 1989, it demanded that Boeing
use wiring other than Kapton in new jets. But at the top reaches of
the Federal Aviation Administration, which guards passenger safety,
there is only denial. Asked to comment on the extensive evidence of
wiring problems revealed in the USA TODAY report, Thomas McSweeny,
the FAAs director of aircraft certification, essentially dismissed
the problem out of hand. What applies to military jets doesn't apply
to civilian jets, he said, because they face greater stress -- a
comparison rejected by others. And the FAA's own tests, showing
chafed wires can induce electrical arcing and ignite fires, means
little, he said, because there's no evidence arcing has posed a
problem in the air. (SELF DENIAL)
This despite reports of 259 wire-related smoke or fire problems on
planes over the past 24 years and the fact that wiring remains under
investigation in the crashes of TWA Flight 800 in 1996 and Swissair
Flight III in September. Only after TWA 800 exploded did the FAA take
any substantive action on wiring, and only narrowly. Most notably,
last May it ordered inspections of wiring in fuel tanks on Boeing
737s, with alarming results. Chafed wires were found in half of the
first 500 planes inspected. Yet no plane-wide inspections were
ordered.
Wiring is named for its insulation. All types can pose problems, but
the military's experience raised concerns about two: KAPTON: A
polymer insulation trademarked by DuPont in 1966 Aircraft: Used on
40% of commercial jets, including some Boeing 737s, 747s, 757s and
767s; Douglas DC-10s; McDonnell Douglas MD-lls, MD-80s, MD-90's;
Lockheed L-1011s; all Airbus models.
POLY-X: A polymer made by Raychem through 1976. Aircraft: Less than
5% of world fleet, including 145 Boeing 747s made 1970-73 and Douglas
DC-1Os made 1968-75.
The FAA's indifference might be easier to accept were it not such a
familiar and troubling problem. Two notable examples- For a decade,
FAA insiders as well as outside experts warned that tests used to
gauge flammability of thermal and sound insulation used extensively
on planes were inadequate. But the FAA kept relying on those tests
even after Boeing adopted tougher standards in the 1980s and
McDonnell Douglas strongly recommended replacement of some insulation
because of three aircraft fires. Only after the Swissair crash did
the agency act - announcing plans to mandate insulation on almost
every airliner in service because of fire potential.
Beginning in 1988, the NTSB warned the FAA about fire dangers posed
by Class D cargo holds, which lack smoke detectors and
fire-suppression systems. On a parallel track, the NTSB, Air Line
Pilots Association and other groups were seeking tighter control of
hazardous cargo that might end up in those holds. But not until the
deadly mix of hazardous cargo in a Class D hold killed 110 in the
1996 crash of ValuJet Flight 592 in the Everglades, did the FAA act
aggressively. It finally cracked down on hazardous shipments and
ordered airlines to improve cargo fire protection.
In each case, the FAA tightened scrutiny of fire safety after a
calamitous crash. If the agency hopes to save lives that might be
lost because of dangerous wiring, its administrators need to learn
that the time to act is before disaster happens, not after.
(They need a body count. See item
below)
OPPOSING VIEW Preventing accidents, improving safety is agency's job.
By Jane F Garvey
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has one job: aviation safety. There are two ways to make aviation safer. The first is to learn what we can from accidents. The second is to get ahead of potential accident causes, using scientific data to drive decisions to prevent future accidents or incidents.
Important safety advances have evolved from accidents, even in cases where no cause has been pinpointed. Examples include the extensive wiring inspections ordered in recent years in passenger planes and the FAA's recent acceleration of an ongoing fire safety program to improve airplane insulation and save lives. There also is the long running aging airplane program and the FAA's new aging-airplane- systems program that could lead to life limits on key aircraft systems, such as wiring.
When there has been a tragedy, the FAA has acted aggressively. We did not sit idly by as the TWA and Swissair investigations unfolded. We did not wait for final conclusions when we saw steps that could be taken immediately to improve safety. But it is fair to ask whether the FAA has responded quickly enough when there has been an accident. The second way to make flying safer - the proactive approach - is the way of the future in accident prevention. Our "Safer Skies" program uses safety data to pinpoint indicators and clues to assist the aviation community in finding ways to intervene - with training, inspections or new technology. The FAA also soon will launch a program to obtain and study more day-to-day safety data from airlines, again taking the proactive approach. And earlier this year, when a wiring problem was spotted in a single Boeing 737, within days the FAA had effectively grounded many 737s for inspections and repairs to prevent a wiring-related issue from becoming a tragedy. (See item below)
The FAA will continue to learn from accidents and respond rapidly where appropriate. And the second way to make aviation safer -- the FAA's proactive approach of getting ahead of problems -- will make an important long-term contribution to flying safety.
Jane F Garvey is administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.
(Additional FACTS by Patrick A.
Price, Boeing Retired lead Technician, in Arc Testing of A/C
wire:
I suggest to all, that you obtain a copy
of "IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT. . .The Politics of Airline Safety" by the
Center for Public Integrity. Contact Bill Hogan at 202 466 1300 or
FAX 202 466 1101 and ask for a copy. On 20/20's recent TV Program on
A/C wiring, Bill Hogan stated, "The attitude of the FAA, over the
past 2 decades has been, 'SELF DENIAL' regarding A/C wire that has
left a paper trail over a mile long with A/C wiring problems."
Wire is wire, whether it is installed on a military airplane or a
commercial airplane. The bottom line is the Chemical Construction of
the insulation material. If the construction is explosive, fire
producing, and being a possible IGNITER for other materials in the
immediate area i.e., INSULATION BATTS, FUEL FUMES, and other
materials, then the insulation should be banned from being installed
on ALL AIRPLANES! The chemical construction of KAPTON is such that
when it produces a FLASHOVER (Short Circuit), the 'electrical fire'
is so intense, that it MELTS the WIRE. Small nodules of melted wire
(like bb's) are thrown off, in all kinds of directions, and are
IGNITERS!
The FAA Administrator, Jane Garvey, has stated "The FAA has one job:
aviation safety." Yet, she has rewarded Tom McSweeny with a promotion
as Ass't Administrator, who has publicly stated, many times, "what
wire problems. Wiring is installed in a different environment for
commercial airplanes as compared to military aircraft." If you place
a stick of dynamite in a Indy 500 racer or a chauffeur driven limo,
it is still dangerous! You wouldn't place a stick of dynamite in
either type of car, so why would you place KAPTON wire on any type of
airplane?
The FAA has refused to require TKT wire to be installed on ALL new
airplanes. It has refused to call for mandatory testing of all wire
insulation material and insulation batts by 'electrical arc tracking
methods (the real world). TKT wiring is the ONLY WIRE that complies
with the requirements of FAR 25 and yet Garvey says "the FAA has one
job: aviation safety." Who is she kidding?
The only reason that the FAA is in a 'state of self denial' is maybe,
the body count isn't 'high enough yet.' You see, the FAA counts every
person killed in a airplane crash is worth $2.7 million dollars for
purposes of 'cost analysis' as to whether they have to issue a
mandatory AD for a costly repair by the airlines. This figure was
obtained from Greg Phillips of the NTSB.
Therefore, survivors of loved ones killed on an airplane, should
figure on a settlement figure of $11,583,000 which would represent
$2.7 million x treble damages + 10% for expenses x 30% Lawyer
contingency fees. Let's see how the airlines, airplane mfgs. and the
insurance companies will swallow this pill when they know, they could
have used a proactive attitude of addressing the problem of Air
Safety. Swissair 111 would have cost the airline, airplane mfgs., and
insurance companies a total of $26 and a half billion dollars. I
think they will take a very definite 'PROACTIVE' attitude towards Air
Safety.
And let's not pat the FAA on the back for calling for 737 fuel wiring
to be inspected in such a hurry. Back in 1990, they were given
several recommendations by the NTSB to inspect ALL 737 models for
defective fuel system wiring when a 737-300 CWT exploded over in
Manila. The FAA refused to issue any AD's! Now, 8 years later, they
are in a hurry to request inspecting 737 fuel system wiring? This is
speed?
The FAA has to be measured on performance in protecting air
passengers safety and their score is far below acceptable levels.
They are in a STATE of SELF DENIAL! Has Jane Garvey been appointed to
maintain an attitude of 'Self Denial?' 'Body Count will trigger the
FAA's response!'
Patrick A. Price 11/12/98