Militant Tricks: Battlefield
Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent

Paperback: 412 pages, ISBN: 0963869582
Product Dimensions: 8.3 x 5.5 x 1.1 inches
Militant Tricks: Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgent
1. Synopsis
There
are two foreign factions at work to eject the Western occupier from Iraq.
Quite obviously, there is al-Qaeda
and its veterans of the Afghan and Chechen Wars.
More secretly, there is Lebanese Hezbollah
(an affiliate of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard) and its veterans of the
Israeli ouster from Southern Lebanon. Both
factions recruit and train local Iraqis to do most of their fighting. While al-Qaeda
operates through tiny, semi-independent cells, Hezbollah
indirectly controls large militias. At
least one of those militias is Sunni. Both
factions and their in-country proxies are highly skilled at deception.
Unless U.S. forces see through that deception soon, they will face a
protracted struggle with a Vietnam-like ending.
2.
What people are saying:
"Our
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are simple.
But, is it possible to win on all fronts? . . . This book is a must read
for anyone who has a stake in the newest war and for every American who wants to
see our values upheld." - Leatherneck
Magazine
"While
many speak and write about war at the strategic level and focus on the plans of
senior headquarters, John Poole instinctively knows that battles are won at the
tactical level by the actions of junior leaders and small units. . . . 'Militant
Tricks' helps those who fight, to fight better and to fight smarter." -
Maj.Gen. John H. Admire USMC (Ret.), former commander of 1st Marine Division
"Militant
Tricks is a worthy supplement to John Poole's previous, excellent books on the
Eastern way of war." - William S. Lind, author of Maneuver Warfare
Handbook
"This
book must be required reading at the War Colleges and . . . by all our military
leaders. It is based on meticulous
. . . research coupled with on-site experience-John Poole is a master of
military history." - Vice Adm. Thomas R. Sargent USCG (Ret.), ship
commander at the Battle of Leyte Gulf
"By
changing our current dependence on firepower and mechanized warfare and adopting
an almost decentralized approach, as found in Chapter 13, . . . we stand a
chance of turning things around in both Iraq and Afghanistan." - Col.
Robert V. Kane U.S. Army (Ret.), publisher emeritus, Presidio Press
"[F]or
those who wish to better understand today's confused events, it [this book] is
well worth reading."- B.Gen. Edwin Howard Simmons USMC (Ret.), former head
of History & Museums Division, HQMC
"He
[the author] provides exactly the sort of material our soldiers and Marines need
in Iraq and Afghanistan if they are to understand their enemies." - U.S.
Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned in
"March 2006 Newsletter"
"[John]
Poole . . . is America's best writer on small unit tactics and
techniques. . . . If
the people at the top will give John Poole's work the attention it is rightly
receiving at the battalion level and below, we would have a better chance of
winning [wars with Islamic militants.]" -
United Press International, 19 November 2005
"John
Poole has written another superb work on the nitty-gritty lessons to be drawn
from the complex conflict our forces face today. He gives our troops a clear understanding of the nature of
the enemy and the tactical lessons needed to defeat him." - General Anthony
C. Zinni USMC (Ret.), former head of CENTCOM
"[This]
412-page book features 45 illustrations and serves as both an intelligence
reference manual and an in-depth solution to the enemy's formula." -
Newport News Daily Press, 8 January 2006
"John
Poole's new book . . . provides a detailed 'blueprint for victory' in not only
Iraq, but also Afghanistan. . . . For all Americans who want to see . . . [the
Muslim militant's] so-far-successful method defeated, I can't recommend this
book highly enough." - Maj.Gen. Ray L. Smith USMC (Ret.), former commander
of Camp Lejeune
"Poole's
book examines war at the tactical level, the level of small units and
individuals, and tries to explain the insurgents' ways of thinking and
fighting." - North County Times (San Diego), 31 December 2005
"The
best book on how to fight militants, resistance fighters, insurgents, or what
ever you want to call them, is Militant Tricks. . . . Poole . . . has a keen
insight [in]to the Islamic [warriors'] combat tactics and how they wage jihad in
all its forms." - www.military.com, 21 December
2005
"Tactics
of the Crescent Moon" and "Militant Tricks" would give all
soldiers the knowledge
base for defeating this enemy. - Stars and Stripes, 9 March 2006
"This
book gauges America's progress in Iraq and Afghanistan from a unique
perspective-that of East Asian battlefield trickery. . . . In combination, those
[famous 36] stratagems . . . [can] make a losing adversary think he is winning.
They have done so to America before." - MMOA Magazine
"On
the tactical level, Poole agrees with virtually every other expert on
counter-insurgency that the key to success [in Iraq and Afghanistan] . . . is a
variant of the Vietnam war CAP [Combined Action Platoon] program, where the
troops defended the local population instead of becoming it."- Washington
Monthly
3.
Table
of Contents
List
of Illustrations
Foreword
Preface
Acknowledgments
Part
One: The Ongoing "War on
Terror"
Chapter 1: The Deteriorating Situation in Iraq
Chapter 2: The Iraqi Insurgents' Tactical Methods
Chapter 3: The Iraqi Militants' Point of Origin
Chapter 4: Developments in Afghanistan
Chapter 5: The Afghan Guerrillas' Tactical Trends
Chapter 6: The Afghan Rebels' Base of Support
Part
Two: Insurgent Tricks of the
Militant Muslim
Chapter 7: Stratagems When in a Superior Position
Chapter 8: Stratagems for Confrontation
Chapter 9: Stratagems for Attack
Chapter 10: Stratagems for
Confused Cases
Chapter 11: Stratagems for
Gaining Ground
Chapter 12: Stratagems for
Desperate Times
Part
Three: Combating the Deception
Chapter 13: Ways to Turn the
Tide in Iraq
Chapter 14: Things to Do for
Afghanistan
Chapter 15: Averting a Wider
Conflict
Notes
Glossary
Bibliography
About
the Author
Name
Index
4.
Excerpt from Chapter 1
While ostensibly crude, the Muslim militant's method has never been defeated.
Through multiple deception and continual mutation, it has so far bested
Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya, Israel in Southern Lebanon and Gaza, and the
United States in Beirut and Mogadishu. To
finally defeat that method, every deployed (or about-to-be-deployed) GI must
become thoroughly familiar with its latest configuration.
That will take a good, hard look at all that has happened over the last
year.
In Iraq, U.S. forces have won every firefight and killed thousands of
Islamic fighters. (See Map 1.1.) Unfortunately,
wars are not won by occupying nonstrategic ground or killing opposition
soldiers. They are won by
destroying the enemy's "strategic assets." Eastern insurgents don't have many strategic assets.
Whatever they need, they can generally take from a well-supplied
adversary. To make matters worse,
they have the edge in a 4th-generation-warfare (4GW) environment-one in which
combat/tactics, religion/psychology, politics/media, and
economics/infrastructure all come into play. In a densely populated area, they are virtually immune to
electronic surveillance and precision bombardment. Every time their pursuer overreacts, he damages local
infrastructure and loses popular support. As
such, Eastern insurgents develop a full portfolio of battlefield feints.
What has, or has not, occurred in Iraq deserves a closer look from this
perspective. Marco Polo did, after all, warn of the diabolical mysteries
of Upper Persia. Could U.S. forces
have "won" every firefight in Iraq and still be losing the war?
They were equally lethal and never driven from the field in Vietnam
Within the context of Eastern intrigue, Iraq's future
looks far less certain than one might think.
The U.S. military has had trouble countering its new foe's propensity for
chaos and deception. To do so now,
it must identify, analyze, and compare every one of his strategic initiatives
between September 2004 to September 2005. For
many, there was a hidden objective, subtle diversion, and secret maneuver.
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