We had preplanned and random strikes going into the surrounding countryside on a routine basis. In the afternoons, 1 could hear the strikes on 1 particular place, Barrier Island, coming in about every 5 minutes. Artillery was shot randomly into the surrounding countryside. On 1 of our 1st major combat operations, we bombed, strafed, hit with artillery, a particular village complex for approximately 3 hours, and then moved up. When I got to the village, there was nothing there but civilians. I only went through a very small part of the village. All I saw there were civilians.

It became clear to me that harassment and interdiction of was not designed to interdict the enemy, but rather to terrorize and intimidate the surrounding villagers in an effort to get them to move into detention camps along Route One.

We dropped leaflets in much of the surrounding countryside to thousands of people. On 1 side of the leaflet I remember there was a picture of a B-52 bomber, and the other side said in Vietnamese, "Come to the New Life Hamlet, Come to peace, freedom and justice." Of course, the message was clear to the people in the countryside: leave your homes or we will kill you. I guess I participated in about 13 search and destroy operations. On all these ops we systematically destroyed every home and every bit of rice that we couldn't carry in civilian villages. We could not burn the hooches, we would blow them up with dynamite. As I said, we did this on a routine basis. It was part of the policy again to encourage the civilian population to move into the detention camps controlled by American and Saigon forces.

I can remember 1 particular detention camp near Danang that struck me, 1 of the camps where these people were moved in great numbers, and we were near the river at Danang and having a barbeque, cooking steaks and eating, and right next to us was a barbed wire detention camp. Inside of it were mainly children, and we would throw them bits of steak and throw candy and they would fight for it inside this detention camp.

But it became clear to me after my career in Vietnam, that our aim was to separate the people from the guerrillas, thereby eliminating the guerrilla source of strength.

It became clear to me that the FREE-FIRE ZONES and the search and destroy tactics were we systematically destroyed villages and routinely bombed the surrounding countryside, it became clear to me that we were waging war not against any abstract ideology, but waging war against the Vietnamese people themselves. Again, 1 more point on the POW issue.

I got kind of the same response when I talked about killing of these POW's in my presence. It was, well, they would have gotten worse treatment back at provincial HQ's anyway. What are your questions?

DELLUMS: Thank you very much, Capt Johnson. You enumerated several types of tactical field policies in your testimony this morning. I just have 1 rather broad question to ask. Could the war in SEA have been fought without having to resort to these types of tactical field policies?

JOHNSON: I don't think so. I think that when one is faced with what is essentially a people's struggle to gain social justice and independence, that the only thing we have available to wage war with is our massive technology.

Of course, there is no cross-communication between American and Vietnamese. When massive technological firepower is applied to what is more or less essentially a people's struggle, when you drop bombs--by the way, in the province I was in, at least 40% of the civilian population was formally dislocated into these detention camps.

When you apply these policies to what is essentially a people's struggle, I think the immediate result must be My Lai and wanton disregard for human the, and especially waging a war against a whole people and a whole culture.

DELLUMS: Thank you very much. Congressman Ryan?

RYAN: You said it was understood in that fire zone, anything which moved was to be shot. How was that understood?

JOHNSON: We, I just understood it.

RYAN: Was . . .

JOHNSON: Pilots understood it fast.

RYAN: Did you fire in a FREE-FIRE ZONES as you understood it at the true?

JOHNSON: I think my 1st initiation to it was on the map, whoever was briefing us when we came in, showed us where we were. "These are the secure hamlet areas. the outlying areas here you see on the map are enemy territory, FREE-FIRE ZONESs.

If these people were not enemy, they would not be out there. If you see them, they are the enemy." The air controllers had the understanding. many times-I remember 1 particular place, Barner Island, where people would wave the South Vietnamese flags at the pilots before they came in with the bombings, and we regarded that as a hoax on the part of the Nat'l Liberation Front to prevent us from bombing it.

RYAN: l7nat I am getting at is, was the air power a used indiscriminately?

JOHNSON: Yes, air and artillery power.

RYAN: That about are by individual soldiers in the infantry to civilians?

JOHNSON: We, that was a little different aspect of it.

RYAN: In what way?

JOHNSON: Rifles don't cause anywhere near the destruction that a bomb causes.

It can easily destroy a whole village. If the bombs didn't destroy the village, when we go through the villages on sweeps, we would destroy them by hand, by are, by the dynamite we carried. A foot soldier was used as another means to terrorize the inhabitants of these villages, to force them to move into detention camps.

RYAN: Were foot soldier used to kill civilians with weapons?

JOHNSON: I wouldn't say that the foot soldier was used to kill civilians.

RYAN: Were not soldiers to kill any civilian who moves?

JOHNSON: I think it was understood that you can shoot anything that moves, and it would be justified. when we arrived at some of our objectives, some of the villages, we clearly recognized some older people, some children, and we asked them to come down. Had they been in the distance, running off, making strange movements, I don't think we would have hesitated.

RYAN: Is it your testimony you would not have shot at point-blank range, women and children?

JOHNSON: No, I never saw that done.

RYAN: Was that policy? To shoot at point-blank women and children?

JOHNSON: No. but I think in some cases, like in My Lai, it was the inevitable consequence of certain policies.

RYAN: In other words, it was natural to know from the policies that were being pursued?

JOHNSON: Yes. I never heard an order, "go out and kill civilians." Rather, the orders are, get a big BC, search and destroy; all you are in a free-fire zone, you can shoot anything that moves.

RYAN: Thank you.

DELLUMS: Congressman Koch?

KOCH: I have met the captain on prior occasions, and I would just make this comment, and that is, he has always been very careful never to overstate on any of the occasions I have met with him. I have been impressed with his testimony before and I am this morning. I would like to ask you this question.

You had reference to advice as to how you dealt with POWs to make them talk, and I think the reference was to throwing a POW, at least 1 of them, out of the helicopter for the purpose of impressing others that it was to their advantage and their-at would keep them alive. Did that kind of incident ever occur in your presence?

JOHNSON: No, it did not. I just personally witnessed the brutal beating and subsequent murder of 2 POWs. but not throwing them. we didn't have any helicopters.

KOCH: The brutal beating, did you describe that this morning?

JOHNSON: Yes, the 1 POW who was captured and brought back to the command post was continually beaten and hit with rifles and so on until he was almost dead. There he was killed by a soldier standing on the side of the river.

KOCH: Subsequently to that beating, or during the beating, was any report made a a higher officer?

JOHNSON: I made a written report. 1st, let me say I gave ITA the underlying attitude. We kind of joked about it. I called in to the major, who was the senior adviser, who was controlling this particular operation.

He heard a shooing. He wanted to know what had happened. I said it was the change in the "status" of 1 POW. His response was, "I understand." KOCH: Was it by a change in your attitude on your part that you came to realize that this kind of conduct was wrong, at a later date, because, wasn't it incumbent then to press the matter with the Army and the regular channels that are provided, as limited as they are?

JOHNSON: I made a written report, and I wasn't morally outraged. I made an objection we could have gotten some valuable information from the man. Again, it was pointed out to me he would have under gone worse treatment at the provincial hq's, anyhow. A whole lot of different things changed my attitude to it, my coming to the realization that we were winning war against the Vietnamese people. It was a very slow, gradual process. I don't know what the key to my change of attitude was, exactly.

KOCH: If I might just pursue that, do I understand, then, because of the nature of the indoctrination that you and others had at the time you came to fight in Vietnam, that this kind of treatment was not something that you thought of as immoral at that particular moment, and it was a question of a change in your attitude and the attitude perhaps of others, that brought you and others to the realization that what in fact was taking place, was criminal in nature but at the time it was talking place, because of your indoctrination, you assumed it was principal, is that a fair statement?

JOHNSON: I would say so. At the time of the torture and the murder of the POW, and the murder of the other POW, and when we were killing these civilian hamlets, my moral kame of reference wasn't, it is wrong to kill POW's, it is right not to. My American of reference was, we are in a combat zone, this is real war, and we have got to get information from POW's.

KOCH: Did there ever come a time when you filed a report, oral or written, which set forth the fact that a war crime had been committed in your presence?

JOHNSON: No. I never really understood the term "war came." KOCH: Terminal action, 1 that you thought has violated whatever rules there are in the operation of war?

JOHNSON: No, I never did.

DELLUMS: Thank you very much. Congresswoman Abzug.

ABZUG: Have you in your experience had any contact with arms of tactical warfare ever utilized against civilians?

JOHNSON: CS gas was used on the surrounding hamlets in the free-fire zones, and there was a lot of defoliation going on, but I was not a personal witness to any of it.

DELLUMS: Congressman Conyers.

CONYERS: Chairman, can I pursue an important question raised by Congressman Koch?

I think it is important that the Capt has stated that he had undergone a change of attitude. I would like to ask a question. Is there any impression on your pat about more servicemen having a change of feeling in terms of Vietnam vets that are participating in the war protests and other like yourself moving forth?

With the activities that are going on in military units that began to demonstrate, it would seem to me that there is a conscience surfacing among many of our military personnel that began to address themselves to this question.

JOHNSON: I think that based on my experience, my level of awareness of what is happening was a year ago when I went to Vietnam, and it gradually increased.

I think because of the length of that war and because many people here in the States talk to the Vietnam veterans now and find out what is happening, many more peoples' awareness is raised before the fact, not after the fact, like mine is. I think in Vietnam today there is a general trend--the hostility which has been traditionally directed against the Vietnamese may still be there, but the hostility the GI now has is directed toward a new target, the officers.

I think there have been hundreds of cases of fragging incidents in Vietnam. I think there is a tendency to focus on a new source for the outlet of frustration of the GI in Vietnam.

CONYERS: Thank you. Do any of the other witnesses have any observations on this question?

LIVINGSTON: Yes, I think it is part of the general rise in consciousness of the whole of the United States in regard to the war, and it is certainly reflected in the military. Just as an example, at Ft Bragg a couple of weeks ago I was talking to some people who were undergoing riot control training preparatory to possible deployment in the demonstrations last week, and their estimate was between 30 and 50% of each unit in the future would participate in that sort of thing. I think there is very definitely a change.

LAUGHLIN: I don't think there is any question about it. I was struck by the fact that during the interviews that were conducted through the veterans here last week, almost to the man they testifyed that they had not undergone some kind of dramatic change, it had been gradual and it had been fairly deeply seated. Of course they had lost a lot of friends, and we all have, we all have, very close friends we love, and it is not something that 1 can kind of wrench out of one's mind, but it should be noted that we did and people are doing that, and almost to a man each man testifyed it was a slow process.

CONYERS: Thank you very much, Chairman.

DELLUMS: Cngwmn Mink.

MINK: Thank you. Captain Johnson, in the Calley trial, 6 of your fellow officers found LT Calley guilty of premeditated murder of 22 Vietnamese civilians. We have to assume from all the testimony and evidence that has been put forth in the trial that these civilians had been captured and were in effect POW's of that unit that had captured that village.

You made a statement that in your opinion the My Lai massacre was the inevitable consequence of certain policies. Would you specify what policy you make reference to with regard to the killing of POWs?

JOHNSON: 1st, the underlying rational policy, that is, that the only good gook is a dead gook. Very similar to the only good Indian is a dead Indian and the only good nigger is a dead nigger.

I think LT Calley took it quite seriously. 2dly, the BC, with BODY COUNT your success. After a, General Koester got credit for the BODY COUNT in Vietnam, 128 dead and only 4 weapons captured. General Westmoreland sent a telegram to the commander of the My Lai massacre. So the BODY COUNT had that input.

Next, the search and destroy policy. With me, I couldn't help but somehow view these Vietnamese as a little less than human when we went in and destroyed their homes. They weren't really homes, they were just hooches. I wouldn't have had the same zeal if we were destroying red brick homes or split level homes in suburbia.

Next is the FREE-FIRE ZONES concept, which leads to the understood policy that in that area they are a enemies and they should be removed. Another policy is to force removal of the civilian populations. We have 5 million refugees in Vietnam. whether we have gone in and forcibly moved them out with marches and helicopters or we have arced them to move on through saturation bombers is immaterial. They are all means to obtain the same end, forcibly remove the civilian population. Given those policies, it is my judgment that things like My Lai are inevitable.

DELLUMS: Congressman Seiberling.

SEIBERLING: Captain Johnson, I am quite impressed with the precision of your statement and the clarity with which you thought this thing through. I just have a couple of questions a highlight this. You say you made a written report of the incident of the beating and the murder of the POW. Was any action ever taken after the report was filed?

JOHNSON: Absolutely none.

SEIBERLING: Do you know of . . .

JOHNSON: The colonel didn't call me to talk about it. I received no reply.

SEIBERLING: Do you know if he received the report?

JOHNSON: I am not sure. I assume he did. I put it SEIBERLING: You talked about the purpose of the FREE-FIRE ZONES. You have mentioned the fact that the FREE-FIRE ZONES and the harassment and interdiction fire at villagers were obviously designed to force the villagers to leave and go to resettlement areas. Did you ever hear anyone in a position of rank indicate expressly that was 1 of the purposes?

JOHNSON: No, I did not, because a few months after I left there was a big report in Stars and Stripes, 1 area very close to us, having got 12,000 people, there was a whole operation planned where all of them at once were forcibly moved to detention camps, not by the bombings but by U.S. Marines and the ARVN troops forcibly removing them to these detention camps. That happened in June, 1968.

SEIBERLING: Did you ever hear of the expression "turkey shoots"?

JOHNSON: I have heard the free-fire zone referred to by the pilots and other people as "Indian Country." SEIBERLING: But you are not familiar with the expression "turkey shoots"?

JOHNSON: I am familiar with it, but where I was operating I didn't hear anyone personally use that term. We used the term "Indian Country." SEIBERLING: What did "Indian Country." refer to?

JOHNSON: I guess it means different things to different people. It is like there are savages out there, there are gooks out there. In the same way we slaughtered the Indian's buffalo, we would slaughter the water buffalo in Vietnam.

SEIBERLING: Was there any indoctrination, official or semi-officially, that incorporated the ideas that these people are gooks or that the only good gook is a dead gook or similar philosophies, or was this just something once you got there you picked it up from the other people who bad been there?

JOHNSON: I just picked it up from other people. Before I went to Vietnam, I remember 1 adviser who had been there before and had been through some tough straits telling me you can't trust any of these. That was not official policy.

I don't think you could find it anywhere that you can't trust the gooks in writing.

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