Copyright (c) Since 1988 The American War Library | Home
G.I. Photo Registry | Registry Applications | Military/Veteran Websites | Veterans Collectables

Robert S. McNamara
Vietnam War Documents, Pt 1
Permission granted to link this site to your Webpage
http://members.aol.com/warlibrary/vwrsm.htm

Contents:

1. Telegram from the SecDef (McNamara) to the Commander in Chief Pacific (Felt) and the Chief MAAG Vietnam (McGarr) Washington, 11-28-61, TOP SECRET; Priority

2. Editorial Note

3. Memo From the Spec Asst to the JCS Chairman (Maj General TW Parker) to the Chairman (Lemnitzer), Washington, 12-18-61 SECRET

1. Telegram from the SecDef (McNamara) Time of transmission is not indicated on the source text. William Bundy's draft of this telegram, which differs only slightly from the final version as sent, is in Dept of State, Bundy files, 1961 Chron.

Def 906345. Personal for Felt and McGarr from McNamara. Situation in Vietnam obviously causing great concern here, I have consulted with JCS on creating continues personal contact to review progress and see what more we can do within framework present policy. For this purpose I would like to set up a 1st meeting at HQ, PACOM with CINCPAC, CHMAAG SVN and the Chiefs of his air and naval sections just after NATO meeting in Paris. I would have with me General Lemnitzer, possibly Taylor, Deputy Asst Sec'y Bundy/ ISA, BG Brown, and will arrive Hawaii 1530Z 12-16. Political uncertainty of Diem's position and doubts as to his willingness to take steps to make his govt more effective must not prevent us from going ahead full blast (without publicity, until political discussions are completed) on all possible actions short of large scale introduction of US combat forces. riming of putting these actions visibly into effect in Vietnam will be affected by political development, but we cannot let this slow down our making all necessary preparations and movements. This is philosophy behind series of decisions reached by me yesterday with JCS and being communicated to you separately. [This msg not found] Fundamentally, we must adjust ourselves to a perenially unclear political framework and to a policy that for overall nat'l reasons sets limits on military action. However, that policy already gives us considerable scope, and I will do my utmost to get authority for any new ideas you may suggest which are not now covered. What we must do is wring the last ounce out of present possibilities and I feel that we have sometimes been slow, both here at DOD and in the field, in devising and carrying out feasible actions. Cost considerations particularly should be secondary in your search for new approaches. Re Diem's position, Pres yesterday [see 270 [285?] file] emphasized importance all was personnel avoiding criticism his regime outside official channels. Recent adverse publicity making job much more difficult both domestically and in achieving a better partnership. Please stress this within your commands. 12-16 meeting should be intense 1-day session. I have in mind later meetings at about monthly intervals.

2. Editorial Note

On 12-16, a conference called by the SecDef to discuss Vietnam wag held at the hqs of the Commander in Chief Pacific, at Camp HM Smith, Honolulu, Hawaii. The principal participants in the meeting were SecDef Robert S McNamara; Deputy Asst SecDef for Internat'l Security Affairs William P Bundy; Chairman of the JCS Lyman Lemnitzer; Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral HD Felt; Ambass Frederick E Nolting; and Chief of the MAAG, Vietnam General Lionel McGarr. The agenda for the conference included the following items:
  • (1) Review of VC ops since 10-1-61, and forecast of their probable moves during the next 90 days and the next 180 days;
  • (2) Description of SVN ops against the VC since 10-1 and statement of the plan of ops for the next 90 days and the next 180 days; whether the position of the VC had on balance become stronger or weaker since 10-l; what the forecast was for the next 90 and the next 180 days;
  • (3) The major SVN weaknesses and what must be corrected if the VC were to be defeated;
  • (4) the status of plans to achieve US objectives in RVN, including CINCPAC's concept of the campaign plan for debating the VC and the prospects for the development of a GCN overall plan;
  • (5) Command relationships in the event US Forces (USFV) were established;
  • (6) The number of US and GVN troops required to ensure the achievement of the established objectives;
  • (7) implementation of changes within the RVNAF agreed to by Diem; and
  • (8) A series of specific military measures, including provision to the RVNAF of additional helicopters, the improvement of air-ground support capability, and surveillance and control of costal waters and inland waterways. A restricted group of participants met at 8am to discuss failures for conducting the conference and to approve the agenda. During this discussion it was decided to remove item 5 from the agenda. The meeting was then opened to a larger group of officers from the staffs present. The conference adjourned at 6:15pm. A 54-page summary record of the conference and the decisions reached was attached to a memo of 12-18 from Felt to McNamara. A 10-page memo for the record, prepared by Admiral Heinz, dated 12-20 and designated I-19504/61, also recorded the highlights and the actions required as a result of the decisions by the SecDef during the conference.

    3. Memo From the Spec Asst to the JCS Chairman (Maj General TW Parker)

    Attached to the source text are 10 pages of handwritten notes on the discussion at the Honolulu meeting. The drafter of the notes may have been Parker, but this is not indicated on the source text

    The following are selected items of interest discussed at the Honolulu meeting. They are arranged in chronological order and generally follow the agenda item by item.

    1. SecDef announced intention to have such a meeting each month for the next 3 months, possibly in Hawaii but probably farther West.

    2. SecDef outlined Mission of his visit as: a. What can we do to improve the situation.

  • b. What do our people in the field need.
  • c. We have great authority from the Pres.
  • d. Money is no object.
  • e. The 1 restriction is what combat troops will not be introduced.

    3. It was the general consensus agreed to by SecDef that there is not likely to be any gimmick which will win the war for us. While air and naval action contribute it's mainly the ground force problem.

    4. After considerable discussion all hands seemed to have come around to General Lemnitzer's view that we needed teams of 5 or 6 advisors down to and including battalion level.

    5. Doubt was cast on the wisdom of mounting the campaign to clear out Zone D. The plan was considered highly sophisticated for a 1st campaign, also it seemed to rest too heavily on the success of defoliant ops. MAAG is to restudy the plan and determine an alternate.

    6. After discussion of the pros and cons of Diem, SecDef pointed out that we are stuck with him and must make the best of it; we cannot expect to change him much; what we must do is present him with specifics and get his agreement on them rather than on broad general plans.

    7. We have to train at the same time and on an expedited schedule enough regular forces to make sweeps of areas, and enough para-military forces to then hold them.

    8. When we speak of reorganization of the Vietnamese forces we are speaking basically of 2 aspects:
  • a. Taking the Air Force and Navy into the JCS setup to further the team spirit all down the line.
  • b. Give authority to field commanders. Diem says he has done this, the field commanders say he has not.

    9. After considerable discussion on use of Jungle Jim, Lemnitzer cleared up all doubts by saying that they could use for many missions they wished in RVN by putting 1 Vietnamese aboard.

    10. The Vietnamese navy capability border, coastal and inland waterway and particularly the latter is better than we thought back here.

    11. The training program for the Civil Guard and Self-Defense Corps extends to 1963. SecDef thinks this is a crucial problem that we can't wait until 1963 and that we must find some other solution.

    12. SecDef gave approval on the spot for certain program to improve communications.

    13. SecDef approved going ahead with 3 construction projects.

    14. Meanwhile Diem has agreed to making 5,000 rangers available for border patrol the implementation slow. Lemnitzer pointed out that implementation should start on the Laos-Vietnam border leaving Cambodia border to the end.

    15. SecDef refused to discuss Laos indicating that Govt decisions had been taken there and there was nothing further we could do for the moment. In Vietnam however there are many things we can and must do quickly.

    Click here to continue this Series

    This page sponsored this month by