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Gulf Of Tonkin
Notebook

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OFFICIAL US NAVY NOTES
ON GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENTS, 8-64

-- O800H, 7-28: Maddox Commander Herbert L Ogier departs from Keelung, Taiwan.

-- Destination: South China Sea.

-- On board: Captain John Herrick, Commander Destroyer Division 192 and Commander Task Group 72-1, and electronic collection personnel and equipment temporarily assigned from various shore stations, and a petty officer to accomplish conventional photography, and another man trained in radarscope photography transferred to Maddox from USS Tichonderoga.

-- Morning, 7-31: Maddox rendesvous' with oiler Ashtabula (AO-51) for underway refueling due east of the DMZ at 17 degrees 1.5'N 108' 29.5E.

-- Approximately 0820H, Maddox sighted 2 unidentified craft, which appeared to Capt Herrick to be similar to Nasty class PT boats, passing 5 miles ahead on a southerly course.

-- Within the next half hour, 2 more vessels passed astern, also heading south. 1 appeared to observers to be a Soviet P-6 class boat but was American-built PTF-2. No communications were exchanged.

-- All 4 South Vietnamese-manned PTFs returning to Danang.

-- 0845H: Maddox activated radars and other electronic equipment and steamed for Point Alpha.

-- 1320H: the Desoto Patrol ship reached her destination and began an orbit of the area.

-- Maddox personnel sight 60-80 fishing junks, an observation post, and a radio facility on Gio island.

-- Electronic activity identified as emanating from this station: Communist early warning emissions.

-- Maddox headed for Point Bravo.

-- Next morning (8-1): US intelligence sources noted the 1st reaction by North Vietnamese to presence of July-August Desoto Patrol.

-- Maddox remained in vicinity of Point Bravo, 8 miles off mainland.

-- No incidents reported.

-- North Vietnamese fishing craft sighted.

-- During the late afternoon, Maddox passed 5 miles to the northeast of Hon Matt.

-- 1800H: Point Charlie reached. Maddox reported existence of number of communications antennae along beach.

-- Intelligence later revealed that the Maddox tracked all day.

-- At 2115H, Maddox reached position 5 miles so'east of Ho Vat, a small islet close to Hon Me.

-- At no time during the August patrol did any American ship come close to North Vietnamese soil.

-- Early morning hours Sunday, 8-2: North Vietnamese naval hqs ordered coastal forces to prepare for battle.

-- Soon afterward, Northern Fleet hqs at Van Hoa (Port Wallut) dispatched reinforcments for the 3 Swatows already in the Hon Me-Hon Nieu area, Division 3 of PT Squadron 135.

-- The 3 P-4s of this unit were due to arrive at Hon Me around 0400H.

-- 0324H, 8-2: Capt Herrick informed by American intelligence of the imminent danger.

-- 0354H: Herrick sent "flash" precedence message stating "contemplate serious reaction my movements [vicinity] Pt Charlie.

-- Shortly afterward, Maddox ended the orbit at Point Charlie and steamed due east for the open sea at 10 knots.

-- Capt Herrick remained there until daylight when it would be safer to return to coastal waters.

-- 0645H: Herrick reported that unless otherwise directed he would proceed back toward the coast and Point Delta. Added that "if info received concerning hostile intent by DRV is accurate consider continuance of patrol presents unacceptable risk."

-- Admiral Johnson "noted" Herrick's concern but directed the Desoto Patrol commander to resume the operation.

-- Herrick reminded he was authorized to "deviate from itinerary at any time you consider unacceptable risk to exist."

-- 1045H, 8-2: Maddox reached vicinity of Point Delta and turned south on the 1st leg of a planned 8-hour orbit off Thanh Hoa.

-- Number of junks sailed in area. but Maddox adjusted her track to avoid passing through any concentrations.

-- Herrick reported the "no further evidence of hostile intent".

-- At same time CINCPAC and Commander Seventh Fleet received a new intelligence North Vietnamese were preparing to repulse further attacks on Hon Me and might attack Maddox.

-- Approx 1235H, 8-2: Maddox lookouts and radar picked up 3 naval craft, identified a P-4 torpedo boats, 10 miles north of Hon Me and heading south at 20 knots.

-- Maddox reversed course and headed northeastward toward Point Delta.

-- Soon afterward, Maddox personnel observed 2 Swatows, north of island heading south at 10-15 knots.

-- Both groups entered a cove on Hon Me.

-- Herrick reported North Vietnamese forces were preparing to attack.

-- NV group gathered around Hon Me consisted of Swatows T-142 and T-146 and Division 3 of PT Squadron 135, comprising P-4s T-333, T-336, and T-339.

-- 1400H: the force was ordered to carry out a torpedo attack on the enemy.

-- Departing the Hon Me area, Maddox steamed toward Point Delta.

-- 1500H: Maddox was 12 miles east of that reference point and headed in a no'easterly direction.

-- Weather: sky overcast but visibility extended 10 miles. 10-knot wind did not disturb the relatively calm sea.

-- 1500H: Maddox surface radar picked up a contact 30 miles to the southwest near Hon Me.

-- Radar operators tracked the contact and evaluated as a patrol boat because of its 30-knot speed, on a course of 50 degrees, almost parallel to Maddox.

-- During the next 45 minutes, Maddox increased speed from 10-25 knots, headed east briefly, and then made to the so'east as more enemy boats were identified.

-- Contacts increased speed and closed.

-- 1530H Commander Ogier sounded Gen'l Quarters.

-- 1540H Herrick sent an uncoded "flash" precedence message to Commander Seventh Fleet and carrier task group stating Maddox was "being approached by high speed craft with apparent intention of torpedo attack. Intend to open fire if necessary self defense."

-- Task group commander requested USS Tichonderoga provide air support.

-- Steaming 280 miles so'east Maddox Tichonderoga already had 4 F-8E Crusaders airborne. Aircraft armed with Sidewinder missiles, Zuni rockets, 20-mm cannon, immediately were vectored to Maddox.

-- Turner Joy (DD-951 ), serving as a forward radar picket ship for the carrier group, also received orders to steam toward Maddox at best possible speed.

-- Before reinforcements arrived, Herrick rptd 3 enemy torpedo boats closing Maddox, 11 1/2 nautical miles distant.

-- 1600H: Maddox 25 miles from the North Vietnamese coast and steaming to the so'east at 27 knots.

-- Enemy vessels, identified positively as 3 P-4s in column, closed to 9,800 yds off the starboard quarter.

-- 1605H: Maddox fired 3 5-inch/38-caliber warning shots to deter further approach.

-- North Vietnamese craft continued closing fast.

-- NVA craft made no attempt with signal flags, lights, pyrotechnics, radio, or other means to clarify threatening maneuver.

-- 1608H: Maddox opened fire on the enemy, then 9,000 yards from the ship, with 5-inch and 3-inch guns.

-- Unobserved by Maddox, 1st enemy boat in formation, (T-336), launched 1 of 2 torpedoes at a range of between 9,000 and 5,000 yards.

-- Herrick reports: "because her torpedo was launched or because of heavy fire from Maddox, the lead boat temporarily turned away to south. 2d and 3d vessels, T-339 and T-333, continued to attack."

-- Within 3,000 yards of Maddox, T-339 launched 2 torpedoes. 5-inch guns from Maddox hit craft. Damaged boat retired from the battle with difficulty.

-- Maddox changes course to 110 degrees to avoid 2 torpedoes, which within 200 yards to starboard.

-- Same time: T-333 and North Vietnamese squadron commander Capt Le Du Khoai on board passed astern of the ship without launching torpedoes.

-- Same time: T-336 returns to the scene falling in behind T-333.

-- Closing to 2,000 yards, T-336 launched 1 torpedo and fires 14.5-millimeter guns at Maddox.

-- A round hits Mark 56 fire director pedestal on Maddox and lodged in ammo handling compartment below.

-- Maddox gunfire hits T-336 as it passed astern, killing enemy boat commander, Lt Tu.

-- Commander Ogier stated the "attacking boats were aggressive and showed no tendency to abort their torpedo run even though they were confronted with a heavy barrage of fire."

-- 1630H: surface action was over. Enemy boats make for shore.

-- Herrick pursued them for a short while until clear North Vietnamese craft out-distanced Maddox and there was a danger of hitting unexploded torpedoes in the area.

-- Same time: Tichonderoga aircraft, led by Commander James B Stockdale, arrived overhead.

-- Maddox directed aircraft to enemy. Maddox retired to the so'east at best speed.

-- The F-8s discovered T-339 only 5 miles from Maddox while the other boats had covered several additional miles.

-- 2 Crusaders from VF 51 unsuccessfully attacked the northerly pair with Zuni rockets and cannon fire.

-- Anti-aircraft fire from the boats hit 1 of the aircraft, forcing pilot to make emergency landing at Danang.

-- Same time: 2 F-8s of VF 53 concentrated on T-339, 1st expending Zuni rockets and then strafing with machineguns.

-- Hits were observed on vessel. Vessel which stopped dead in the water and began to burn near the stern.

-- Running low on fuel, the 3 remaining Crusaders returned to Tichonderoga.

-- Intelligence sources indicated that T-339 sank in the vicinity of 19 degree 47'N 106' 31'E.

-- T-336 was heavily damaged, requiring a tow from T-333 to reach shore.

-- T-336 received damage to her auxilliary engine, but with the exception of a low lubrication oil-pressure reading, was ready for further action. Both boats beached just south of the Lach Chao Estuary. 2 boat group remained there for the next 3 days.

-- Maddox out of immediate danger.

-- Admiral Johnson took steps to limit the consequences of the action.

-- 2d flight of F-8 Crusaders, that relieved the 1st group over Maddox, was ordered not to pursue the enemy boats.

-- Herrick was directed to "retire from area until situation clears and further advised.

-- Herrick also was instructed to "not pursue attacking craft" but to "fire as necessary in self defense."

-- No further action took place.

-- Early morning hours 8-3: Maddox approaching the mouth of the gulf.

-- A little more than 2 hours after the close of the combat action in the Gulf of Tonkin, Admiral Moorer ordered continuation of the Desoto Patrol.

-- Pacific Fleet commander stated that "in view Maddox incident consider it in our best interest that we assert right of freedom of the seas and resume Gulf of Tonkin patrol earliest.

-- Maddox now joined by Turner Joy destroyer carrying 3 rapid-fre, 5-inch/54-cal 4 twin-mounted, 3-inch/50-caliber guns, and advanced fire control systems.

-- CINCPAC altered the previous operational schedule. Maddox and Turner Joy ordered to proceed to Point Charlie, close by Hon Me, and then move northward toward Point Delta on Thanh Hoa. On 8-4, the destroyers were to retrace their track to Point Charlie.

-- During the next 3 days, both patrol ships scheduled to steam through points L, M, N, O, and P before ending the mission.

-- Both ships had orders to retire to the east for safety at close of day.

-- CINCPACFLT stated that the closest point of approach to North Vietnam remained 8 nautical miles to the mainland and 4 nautical miles from the off-shore islands.

-- Admiral Sharp concurred with CINCCPACFLT's resumption of the patrol and with the changes to the schedule. Sharp directed his naval component commander to delay implementation until the JCS gave approval.

-- Same time: Herrick expressed concerns about reentry into the Gulf of Tonkin, noting: "It is apparent that DRV has cut down the gauntlet and now considers itself at war with US. It is felt that they will attack US forces on sight with no regard for cost. US ships in the Gulf of Tonkin can no longer assume that

they will be considered neutrals exercising the right of free transit. They will be treated as belligerents from 1st detection and must consider themselves as such."

-- Herrick also observed that tactical considerations weighed against Maddox undertaking a renewed patrol:

"DRV PTs have advantage especially at night of being able to hide in junk concentrations all across the Gulf of Tonkin. This would allow attack from short range with little or no warning. Present USS-gunnery suit not too well fitted for anti-PT even in daylight. Short hull DD such a Maddox too shortlegged [limited feel capacity] for long patrol where high speeds are required as in PT evasion.- Consider resumption of patrol can only be safely undertaken by DD, CL/CA [cruiser] team and with continuous air cover.

-- Same time: Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] concluded that "info collected revealed that since March the North Vietnamese had become "increasingly sensitive to incursions from the South and to the threat of extension of the war and bombing." DIA further observed that the "torpedo attempt on Maddox indicates North Vietnamese intent and readiness to take aggressive action if they consider their territory immediately threatened."

-- US Leaders in Washg'tn did not share this interpretation.

-- Morning, 8-2: The Pres met with SecState Rusk, Sec'y of Defense McNamara, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen'l Wheeler, and other senior officials of the administration.

-- Group concluded attack might have resulted from the unilateral actions of an aggressive North Vietnamese boat commander or a local shore command.

-- Pres Johnson observed later that "we were determined not to be provocative, nor were we going to run away. We would give Hanoi the benefit of the doubt -- this time -- and assume the unprovoked attack had been a mistake."

-- As the patrol was resumed, North Vietnam informed that US ships would continue to steam where they pleased in international waters. Further, the North Vietnamese were warned to be "under no misapprehension as to the grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against US forces."

-- 1229 Eastern Daylight Time, 8-2: Pres orders JCS to complete interrupted Desoto Patrol. Admiral Moorer's route and time changes were accepted.

-- CINCPAC was advised that Desoto ships could approach no closer than 12 nautical miles to the North Vietnamese mainland.

-- Continuous daylight air cover provided for. Aircraft were stationed east of the 2 destroyers to avoid the possibility of over-flying Communist territory.

-- Admiral Sharp also directed to ensure that the patrol avoided approaching the North Vietnamese coast during the period of the next 34A maritime mission.

-- 0822H, 8-3: Commander Seventh Fleet, requested that COMUSMACV provide him with info on the timing of the next 34A mission to preclude interference with the Desoto Patrol.

-- Gen'l Westmoreland responded that the Seventh Fleet destroyers should remain clear of the waters generally between the 17th and 18th parallels and stay east of 108 20'E during 8-3 and 8-4.

-- Same time: Concern in the Washg'tn intelligence community that North Vietnamese considered the 34A and Desoto Patrol ops as 1.

-- CNO advised CINCPACFLT that intelligence revealed "heightened sensitivity and resultant attack by the DRV [on Maddox] possibly was aftermath of a [reported] attack on Hon Me island; that following this attack, [intelligence] indicated DRV intentions and preparations to repulse further such attacks."

-- Intelligence units in the Pacific informed that on 8-1 the New China New Agency reported North Vietnamese had protested to the International Control Commission [ICC] that at about 2340H, 7-30, US and South Vietnamese admin sent 2 naval vessels to shell Hon Ngu island [and] Hon Me island." Conclusion drawn that tracking and subsequent attack on Maddox could have been provoked by enemy incursions into the Gulf of Tonkin a day or 2 before arrival of Maddox in the area.

-- 8-3: CIA bulletin affirmed "Hanoi's naval units have displayed increasing sensitivity to US and South Vietnamese naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin during past few months."

-- Maddox and Turner Joy placed under the operational control of Capt Herrick as Commander Task Group 72.

-- Herrick instructed to destroy any enemy as that attacked Maddox or Turner Joy.

-- Admiral Moorer on Tichonderoga told that in the event of "another unprovoked attack on Desoto Patrol, it is mandatory maximum effort be made achieve complete destruction attacking units."

-- US ships and aircraft authorized to maintain alert on enemy vessels which were within the 12-mile coastal zone, if the latter craft attacked from those waters or retired there after the action. US ships not allowed to undertake hot pursuit into the 12-mile zone.

-- Morning and early afternoon, 8-3: Desote Patrol steered northwesterly course toward Point Charlie.

-- Passage uneventful until 1420H when 1 of the ships detected apparent radar emissions from a surface vessel indicating that the pair of ships was under surveillance from at least 1637H on.

-- An hour later Patrol reached vicinity off Point Charlie where they turned north toward Point Delta.

-- Swatow T-142 shadowed destroyers on the sortie north, periodically reporting to shore stations.

-- Upon reaching the Point Delta area at 1727H, Maddox and Turner Joy turned east and made for the relative safety of a nighttime orbit in the open sea.

-- Same time South Vietnamese maritime force had been at sea for 1 hour and 17 minutes. The 4-boat group, PTF-1, PTF-5, PTF-2, and PTF-6, was scheduled to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the south bank of the Ron River. The force departed Danang at 1610H on the evening of 8-3.

-- Each SVN boats carried an 18-man South Vietnamese crew and a portable a 7-millimeter recoilless rine, in addition to other weapons.

-- Trip north uneventful until 1845H, when PTF-2 suffered a mechanical failure 70 miles east of the DMZ, forcing return to Danang. Remaining vessels proceeded to a point east of Vinh Son, where they separated and made for their respective targets.

-- Midnight, 8-3: PTF-1 and PTF-5 opened fire on the radar facility near Vinh Son for 25 minutes. South Vietnamese fired 770 rounds of 57-millimeter,

40-millimeter fire into the target area.

-- SVN boats then withdrew and headed for Danang, reaching that port about 0715H, 8-4.

-- Operating alone, PTF-6 took up station off the mouth of the Ron River.

-- 2352H: PTF-6 began illuminating and shelling security post in area with 7-millimeter, 40-millimeter, and 20-millimeter weapons igniting several fires.

-- Enemy responded with small arms fire, which failed to hit the craft.

-- 0020H, 8-4: PTF-6 pursued by enemy vessel, which approached at 25 knots.

-- PTF-6 sped south, arriving in Danang at 0625H that morning.

-- Midnight, same day: approximately 100 miles from coast, Desoto Patrol ships made radar contact with their vessel which closely paralleled their course for over an hour.

-- Capt Herrick strongly suspected the shadower was a Communist bloc patrol craft. Suspected shadower, probably the Swatow T-142, broke contact at 0100H.

-- During night of 3-4 August, Admiral Johnson, Commander Seventh Fleet, suggested following day's mission be ended. With their radius of action restricted to the 60-mile track between Point Delta and Point Charlie, he noted that the ships would be easy to locate.

-- Adml Moorer, cmdr of the Pacific Fleet, did not concur. "... does not in my view adequately demonstrate US resolve to assert our legitimate rights in these international waters." "... ships should patrol the Charlie to delta track for the next 2 days, proceed to another point to the north on the 3d day, and return to the Charlie-delta track on the 4th day, before departing gulf." "... believe these sorties would demonstrate US determination to continue the patrols, possibly draw the enemy away from the 34A activities, and preclude interference between the 2 ops."

-- JCS agreed with the revised schedule.

-- Same time: Adml Sharp raised objection to the JCS directives that prohibited the destroyers from approaching closer than 12 miles to the North Vietnamese coastline, even in hot pursuit.

-- Noting his dissatisfaction with the rules of engagement, the Pacific cmdr observed:

"A US ship has been attacked on the high seas off N/Vietnam. The Maddox quite properly repulsed the attackers and 1 of the attacking boats was destroyed. Now, our friends and enemies alike will await what additional moves the US will take. The JCS directives appear to be a retreat at a time when aggressive measures are necessary."

-- In response, JCS reaffirmed the decision that the Desoto Patrol ships barred "from entry into the 11-mile zone, even in hot pursuit." In event of attack on the patrol, aircraft could retaliate against the attackers in waters up to 3 miles of the enemy coastline. >Desote Patrol ships returned to the patrol track on the morning of Tuesday, 8-4.

-- Capt Herrick again expressed his concern for the safety of US force.

-- Task group cmdr concluded DRV considers patrol directly involved with 34-A OPs. "DRV considers US ships present as enemies because of these ops and have already indicated their readiness to treat us in that category."

-- Herrick deputy report: "Capt Herrick believed that the enemy was especially sensitive about the area around Hon Me because of his concentration of coastal patrol forces there.... the Capt felt that his ships would be most vulnerable to the enemy at that point.... the N/Vietnamese could hide behind the island and then launch a sudden attack that would be difficult to detect or repulse because of the short distance to the Desoto Patrol track."

-- 0700H, morning of 8-4: almost 7 hours after the PTF force departed their target area off Vinh Son, Maddox and Turner Joy turned west toward the N/Vietnamese coast, arriving in the vicinity of Point Delta around 1400H.

-- Ships then proceeded so'west toward Point Charlie with Tichonderoga aircraft circling overhead or nearby.

-- 1435H: Herrick reported having been shadowed for the past 4 hours from a distance of 15 miles by a vessel he believed to be a motor gunboat.

-- 1700H: Desoto Patrol force reached a position northeast of Point Charlie, changed course to the east, and headed out to sea. At no time did the patrol sail closer than 16 miles to the coast.

-- N/Vietnamese aware of the passage of the Amer ships.

-- Late afternoon, of 8-4: Swatows T-142 and T-146 received orders from the naval hqs in Haiphong to prepare for mili ops that night.

-- T-333, 1 of the P-4s involved in the action on 8-2, also was scheduled to participate in operation.

-- Due to an inability to repair her lubricating oil casualty, this unit was not able to deploy.

-- 2040H: Capt Herrick sent "flash" precedence message stating that he had received info indicating attack by PGM/P-4 imminent" and that the patrol force was "proceeding so'east at best speed." >Desoto force more than 60 nautical miles So'east of Hon Me at 19' 10.7'N 107' E on a heading of 90'at a speed of 20 knots. >Maddox, using surface radar for long-range search, was 1,000 yds ahead of Turner Joy.

-- Subsequent to the engagement on the night of 8-4 Cmdr Ogier reported contacts detected on his destroyer's radar were bona fide.

-- Weather and wake contacts were quickly identified as such.

-- Meteorological conditions particularly good for radar ops.

-- No N/Vietnamese junks or fishing craft sailed that for out to sea after dark, and none was detected that night.

-- Desoto Patrol radar scopes free of clutter, naval radarmen able to clearly distinguish the enemy fast craft.

-- Weather conditions: Gulf/Tonkin that night included a 10 to 20-knot wind from the So'east and intermittent thunderstorms. Cloud cover at about 2,000 feet. Night was moonless and dark. Sea moderate with 2 to 6-foot waves.

-- 2041H, on 8-4: Maddox picked up surface contact 42 miles northeast in area where both ships had intended to cruise during the night; same position used by the Desoto Patrol previous night.

-- 2150H: 1st Maddox then Turner Joy established clear radar contact with 3 surface vessels. Herrick determined vessels were patrol craft because their speeds in excess of 30 knots.

-- Unidentified craft attempted to close with the Desoto Patrol.

-- Same time: Herrick ordered both US destroyers to change course to the so'east (130' and then 140') at maximum speed.

-- Fearing a trap, Herrick attempted to open the threatening contacts. However, the latter vessels turned as well to intersect the course of US ships.

-- 2107H, radar on Maddox determined the 3 surface craft had joined in close formation about 32 miles from Patrol ships.

-- Both US destroyers now proceeding at 30-knot speed. Herrick changed heading more to the So'east (160').

-- 2145H: radar contacts had drifted out of range and disappeared aft.

-- 2215H: both Maddox and Turner Joy picked up 3 or 4 contacts in close formation only 13 miles behind and approaching at 30 knots.

-- Fire control radars of both ships locked on these contacts, The threatening surface craft closed to 23,200 yds.

-- Same time: Maddox and Turner Joy radars identified another contact only 9,800 yds due east and approaching at 35 to 40 knots. When latter craft closed to 7,000 yds, at 2239H, Turner Joy opened fire. Maddox immediately followed suit. Ships then were at 18' 17'N 107' 32'E.

-- Same time: single contact to the east turned to the left and opened range.

-- Lt JG Frederick Frick, Maddox watch officer, in combat info center (CIC), evaluated this maneuver, plotted and recorded on his dead reckoning tracer, as a torpedo launch.

-- Same time: Maddox sonar reported torpedo noises.

-- Cmdr Ogier ordered full right rudder to comb the track of the suspected torpedo and warned Turner Joy.

-- Turner Joy immediately came right on course 210' just as crewmen spotted a torpedo wake.

-- Lt JG John Barry, USNR, officer in charge of Fire Control Director 51, located high in the ship's superstructure, spied "a distinct wake on port side about 5 hundred feet from the ship moving from forward on a parallel course to this ship.-" "... the wake itself appeared light in color and more just below the surface than anything cutting the water on the surface and that it performed a definite vee in the water.-"

-- Barry, an experienced ASW officer, had seen many actual torpedo wakes prior to the August incidents.

-- This sighting of a torpedo wake 100 to 500 feet to port was corroborated by 1 of Barry's subordinates, Seaman Larry Litton, by Seaman Rodger Bergland positioned in Fire Control Director 52, and by the port side lookout, Seaman Edwin Sentel, the latter of whom reported the info to the bridge.

-- When hostile craft returned at 10 knots on an intercept course, 2 5" mounts on Turner Joy again took it under fire. Fire control radar indicated that hits were scored.

-- 2210H: 1 F-8 Crusader and 2 A-4D Skyhawks arrived overhead to provide a combat air patrol, retiring to Tichonderoga at dusk.

-- 2125H: receiving Capt Herrick's request for air support, Rear Adml Robert Moore, Cmdr Task Force 77, immediately launched 3-plane alert force.

-- 15 minutes later, 4 A-1H Skyraiders were sent alone. Additional planes later launched from Constellation, making a total of 16 aircraft providing protection head. Effectiveness of air cover limited due to darkness of night, cloudy sky, and unsatifactory illumination devices.

-- Aircraft strafed waters where the enemy boats were believed to be, but most of the pilots, including future Vice Adml and Medal of Honor recipient Cmdr James Stockdale, did not see any hostile craft.

-- Pilots of 2 Tichonderoga A-1s, Cmdr George Edmondson, commanding officer of VA 98, and his wingman, Lt Jere Barton, both experienced at night search, reported significant info: Flying between 700 and 1,50 feet above water, aviators sighted gun flashes as well a bursts of light at their altitude that they attributed to an enemy vessel's anti-aircraft fire.

-- On 1 pass over the destroyers, Cmdr Edmondson identified a "snakey," high-speed wake a mile and a half ahead of Maddox, the lead ship.

-- Lt Barton on another pass spotted a dark object, in the wake midway between the 2 destroyers, that soon moved away from the ships and out of sight.

-- 2242H: all surface contacts were gone from the radars of Maddox and Turner Joy, now steaming independently.

-- For the next 10 minutes, both ships maneuvered to avoid possible torpedoes reported by sonar.

-- 2301H: Turner Joy picked up several contacts between 2,000 to 6,000 yds to west.

-- 2310H: ship briefly opened fire on the fleeting targets.

-- 2318H: firinf terminated.

-- 1 contact (V2) was plotted dead in the water and subsequently presumed damaged or sunk. Verification not possible.

-- 2321H: Turner Joy headed south again; tracked another surface craft (V3) 3,600 yds away and closing at 48 knots.

-- When hostile contact reached 2,500 yds, Turner Joy opened up with a heavy volume of fire; crewmen observed numerous explosions.

-- 2328H: Radarmen witnessed many hits on the target.

-- Cmdr Robert Barnhart, Turner Joy's commanding officer, and others saw a thick column of black smoke rise from the target area. This boat was presumed sunk.

-- Soon afterward: another high-speed contact (V4) approached from the North following Turner Joy.

-- The ship changed course to starboard several time and the contact overshot the destroyer's wake.

-- Star shells fired by Maddox. Flares dropped by aircraft. Turner Joy crewmen identified this target as an enemy PT boat.

-- Boatswain's Mate 3rd Class Donald Sharkey, Seaman Kenneth Garrison, and Gunner's mate Delner Jones all observed the craft from their station at the 3"/50 caliber Gun Mount 32.

-- Sharkey stated: "(the) outline of this contact was clearly seen by me and was definitely a PT boat."

-- Garrison corroborated sighting and added:"I saw it long enough to make sure what it was."

-- Day after battle, 8-5: Jones sketched the craft, which he had seen for the 1st time the previous night, for Radarman 1st Class John Spanka.

-- Garrison agreed with the accuracy of this visual representation.

-- Spanka compared drawing with an intell photograph of a P-4 PT boat: He found the "2 were very similar in nature" and particularly noteworthy was the elongated bow. Spanka added: "I had no trouble identifying his sketch as the P-4."

-- 2347H: Turner Joy dropped depth charge astern in an attempt to shake the

enemy pursuer.

-- Throughout latter part of the action, several enemy craft appeared to guide on the wakes of the 2 destroyers.

-- Cmdr Ogier believed the N/Vietnamese used this tactic because they lacked on board radar.

-- Same time: seaman amidships and sailors manning Gun Mount 31 in Turner Joy observed machine gun fire felt the water from aa forward, about 40 or to yds to port. Seaman reports flashes "may have been splashes of Amer shell fragments."

-- 2354H: Cmdr Barnhart turned his ship hard left and attempted to ram the craft, but without success.

-- The boat, now 1,500 yds on the starboard side of the US destroyer, was taken under are exactly at midnight.

-- 0003H, on 8-5: after radarmen observed 4 bursts on target, contact disappeared from screen.

-- During last attack, all of Turner Joy's bridge personnel, including Commander Barnhart, sighted a searchlight to the north in the gen'l vicinity of the trailing enemy boats.

-- Senior Chief quartermaster Walter Shishim related he observed the light "by eye and its beam... by binoculars" and that it "remained at constant brightness and the beam was elongated an shape pointing up."

-- Signalman 3rd Class Gary Carroll added: "the light was moving around and at times skyward. It made a couple of swoops at us before going out."

-- Shipmate Signalman 2nd Class Richard Bacino, concluded: "as a Signalman, I feel I can tell a searchlight from any other light that could possibly be mistaken for such."

-- Several of the men verified through the CIC the current position of Maddox, which ruled out that ship a the source of the light.

-- When Amer aircraft were dispatched tn investigate what was perhaps a N/Vietnamese boat-to-boat signalling attempt, the light was extinguished.

-- Meanwhile, Maddox, almost 10 miles to the west of Turner Joy, dropped a depth charge and fired in the gen'l vicinity of a contact reported astern.

-- No results were observed.

-- 0010H: Turner Joy took similar actions to ward off a contact (V5) trailing her for the next 40 minutes, the US destroyers dropped depth charges or fired their guns at contacts.

-- Same time: Turner Joy returned to her position 4,000 yds astern of Maddox.

-- Desoto Patrol ships then steamed for the mouth of the gulf and a rendezvous with destroyer Samuel N Noore.

-- No further sightings of the enemy.

-- Entire engagement lasted about 4 hours.

-- Throughout melee, Maddox and Turner Joy fired 249 5" shells, including 24 star shells, and 123 3" rounds. The 2 destroyers also dropped 4 or 5 depth charges, 1 of which failed to detonate, against boats following in their wakes.

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