Glossary

Searle's Chinese Box: The Chinese Room Argument and Artificial Intelligence by Larry Hauser
TITLE PAGE | PREFACE | ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS | ABSTRACT| TABLE_OF_CONTENTS | GLOSSARY | INTRODUCTION | CHAPTER_1 | CHAPTER_2 | CHAPTER_3 | CHAPTER_4 | CHAPTER_5 | CHAPTER_6 | BIBLIOGRAPHY
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LIST OF ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS, AND NOMENCLATURE

A1: Programs are formal (syntactic)
A1S: Strong modal version of A1: Programs are necessarily formal
A1*: Envisaged strengthening of A1: Programs are purely formal, having only syntactic properties.
A2: Minds have semantics.
A2S: Strong modal version of A2: Minds necessarily have semantics.
A3: Form (syntax) is not (sufficient for) semantics.
A3S: Strong modal version of A3: Necessarily syntax is not (sufficient for) semantics.
A4: Brains cause minds.
AI: Artificial intelligence.
AIP: AI proper: Computers can (roughly, someday will) think.
BSA: The "brutally simple" argument: A1 & A2 & A3, therefore, C1.
BSAS: Strong modal version of BSA: A1S, & A2S & A3S, therefore, C1S.
BS1A: Supplemented BSA 1: A1 & A2 & A3 & S1, therefore, C1.
BS2A: Supplemented BSA 2: A1 & A2 & S2 & P1, therefore, C1.
BS12A: Doubly supplemented BSA: A1 & A2 & S1 & S2, therefore EL.
C1: Programs are not (sufficient for) minds.
C1S: Strong modal version of C1: Necessarily Programs are not (sufficient for) minds.
C1W: Weak modal version of C1: Possibly Programs are not (sufficient for) minds.
C2: Sufficiency for mind requires causal powers (at least) equivalent to those of brains.
C3: Any artifact that produced mental phenomena would have to duplicate the specific causal powers of brains, and it could not do this just by running a program.
C4: The way human brains actually produce mental phenomena cannot be solely by virtue of running a computer program.
COG: Cognitivism: To explain mental phenomena is to specify the programs from whose execution they derive.
CP: Searle's "Connection Principle": unconscious mental phenomena are in principle accessible to consciousness.
CPU: Central processing unit.
CRA: The Chinese room argument: A1 & A2 & A3, therefore, C1; C1 & A4, therefore, C2 & C3 & C4.
CRE: The Chinese room thought experiment.
CREA: Would-be Chinese room experimental argument: A2 & IR, therefore, C1.
CREAS: Strong modal CREA: A2S & IRS, therefore, C1S.
CREAW: Weak modal CREA: A2 & IRW, therefore, C1W.
CSAM: Imaginary souped up Chinese version of SAM implemented by Searle in the Chinese room.
DOS: Short for MS-DOS, an acronym for "Microsoft Disk Operating System", once the standard operating system for IBM and IBM-clone PCs.
EE: Explanatory exclusion principle: "No event can be given more than one complete and independent explanation" (Kim 1989, p. 79).
EL: Eliminativism: Nothing has mental or semantic properties: no minds or meanings exist.
FUN: Turing machine Functionalism or Computationalism: Programs are (sufficient for) minds
FUN': Specific programs are (sufficient for) minds for specific types of system.
In: "In" (with a capital "I"), or "intrinsicality," connotes a relation between things (including states and events as well as objects) stronger than physical containment. X's being In Y requires everything necessary for X being what it essentially is (or for individuating X) being In Y. Properties are also held to be In their subjects if everything necessary for having the property is intrinsic to (or supervenient on the local physical properties of) the subject: in this connection intrinsicality can be viewed as a mechanistic constraint on essence, a necessary condition for essentiality of attributes.
IR: Intermediate would-be experimental result: Programming does not suffice for semantics or, equivalently, some things implement Programs without having semantics.
IRS: Strong modal version of IR: Necessarily Programming doesn't suffice for semantics.
IRW: Weak modal version of IR: Possibly Programming doesn't suffice for semantics.
MR: Multiple realizability: Identical types of mental attributes can be realized or caused by different programs (procedural MR) or in different physical types of systems (hardware MR).
NLU: Natural language understanding.
P1: Presupposition 1: Some things instantiate programs.
PC: Personal computer.
Program: "Program" (with a capital "P") refers to just the Turing test passing programs (insofar as behaviorism is in question) or just the Turing test passing programs which do it in the right way or by implementing the right program (insofar as functionalism is in question).
R: Would-be experimental result of CRE (directly construed): Searle in the room implements an NLU Program for Chinese (CSAM) without understanding any Chinese.
R': Would-be experimental result of CRE indirectly construed: Searle in the room implements an NLU Program for Chinese (CSAM) without having semantics for the Chinese symbols he processes.
RIS: The room-in-Searle: SIR internalized (i.e., CSAM memorized) by Searle.
S: Supplementary hypothesis (for SCRA): No (presently existing) computer has causal powers (at least) equivalent to a brain's.
S1: Supplementary hypothesis 1 (for BSA): All things instantiate Programs.
S2: Supplementary hypothesis 2 (for BSA): Form (syntax) precludes semantics.
SAIP: Strong AI proper: Computers think already.
SAM: Script Applier Mechanism: Schank and Abelson's story understanding program.
SCRA: Supplemental Chinese room argument: C2,S/ˆSAIP.
SIR: Searle-in-the-room: the system consisting of Searle, program, slips of paper, etc.
SR: Scientific Realism: Whatever the best scientific theory ultimately postulates for explanatory purposes really exists and constitutes or causes the phenomena it explains.
Strong AI: Searle's name for AIP or FUN.
Weak AI: Searle's name for his view that computers merely simulate the mental abilities they seem to manifest, with the additional proviso that such simulation may nevertheless be a useful tool for studying the mind.
XR: Extreme would-be experimental result (equivalent to S2): Programming precludes semantics.