Bay of Pigs Report
by Jared Wiener
At first, Castro was very conservative, but after he realized how much power he had gained, he started abusing it, being very hostile to both the Cuban people, and the United States. The United States, who had been very good to Cuba, but the U.S. started to get angry when, in 1960, Castro seized American oil refineries, sugar mills, and electric utilities. In the early 60s, he also started to welcome communism and formed close ties with the USSR.
In 1959, when Castro became premier, the Central Intelligence Agency, (CIA) started planning an invasion near Guantánamo Bay, a US naval base in Cuba, in the Bay of Pigs, in southern Cuba. The CIA set up a small sub-organization with the sole purpose of planning the invasion. Despite the propaganda, intelligence planning, counterintelligence planning, and paramilitary planning, the mission still failed.
In February 1962, the Inspector General wrote a document called "The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation." This was deemed top secret until 1997. Inside it tells many reasons for the failure. Why didn't the CIA think of these problems ahead of time?
At First, he was a very conservative dictator. He was liked by the Cuban people, and by other countries, including the United States of America. This did not last long, when he soon realized how much power he had. He immediately seized American-owned properties in Cuba. This made him lose the United States as an ally.
However, Khruschev's United Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), stayed as an ally, and influenced Castro to gradually change Cuba in to a communist state. This also scared the Pentagon, because a communist country not far from the coast of Florida was created.
The United States had to come up with an excuse, so the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) issued a statement saying that the plane was on a joint United States Air Force (USAF), and National Aeronautical and Space Administration mission. This mission was observing weather patterns around Lake Van, Turkey on May 1, 1960.
Before the famous U-2 spy plane incident in 1960, there was one in 1958, involving the United States and the United Soviet Socialist Republic. Ambassador Menshikov handed a memo to Secretary of State Alan Dulles saying that the United States violated Soviet Air space. It claimed (in its English form, it was written in Russian) "According to precisely established data, on March 2, 1958, at 4:05 hours Moscow time, an American military jet aircraft, having appeared from the direction of the Sea of Japan, violated the state border of the Soviet Union in the area of the settlement of Velikaya Kema and penetrated into the airspace of the Soviet Union, remaining over its territory for a considerable period of time. Thereafter, the aircraft left in the direction of the Sea of Japan, in the area south of the Olga Bay."1 Secretary of State Alan Dulles replied, "The President read the Soviet aide-memoire which had been delivered to us yesterday protesting an alleged invasion of Soviet Airspace in the Far East on March 2. The President indicated a strong view that such infractions should be discontinued. He thought we should reply to the Soviets by saying we are not aware of the matter referred to but that strong measures were being taken to prevent any reoccurrence.
"The President expressed the view that any such operations carried a danger of starting a nuclear war by miscalculation. He said that his military advisors had pressed upon him the necessity of retaliation of there seemed to be a movement of Soviet planes toward the United States. The President felt that the Soviets might have the same attitude and might misinterpret an overflight as being designed to start a nuclear war against which they would react. "The President instructed General Goodpaster to communicate with the appropriate US officials in this sense."1
On April 21, 1958, a messenger working for the Soviet Embassy to the United States of America delivered a note to the United States Government. This note said that the response of the United States was unsatisfactory, and also said that the Soviets expected that the United States would court-martial, and hopefully punish the guilty of the violation of the Soviet airspace.
This was the airspace violation that happened the first time, before the major U-2 incident. The had many things in common, both over the USSR, both with U-2 planes, but, the first one was before Cuba became a communist state, because the Castro regime was yet to overthrow the Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar administration. This change in government would occur in one year.
The 1960 U-2 spy plane incident there was more at risk, because the Soviets had allied with Cuba, just ninety miles off the coast Florida. If the Soviets believed that the Americans wanted to start a nuclear war, like the Americans feared that the Soviets believed, the Soviets could perform an air strike on Florida, or possibly even on Washington, D.C. This was a possibility because Khruschev referred to the incident to the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, as an "aggressive act." 1
In a telegram sent from Moscow to the United States Department of State, sent at 7:00pm Moscow time and received at 1:34pm Washington, D.C. This stated that the Soviets did not know at that time under what article of the United Nations Charter they would bring the plane incident before the United Nations Security Council, because they were still questioning Francis Gary Powers. Powers was the pilot, who parachuted out of the plane before it was shot down and landed safely, but under captivity of the Soviets.
Khruschev later told the Supreme Soviet in Moscow that Powers was alive and that the USSR Government had recovered parts of the plane, along with developed film that the camera on-board the airplane took. Also, as a result of the interrogation of Francis Powers, Khruschev said in his speech to the Supreme Soviet that Powers' route was from Peshawar airfield in Pakistan, and his landing destination was Bodo airfield in Norway.
"In response to the speech, the Department of State issued a statement on May 7 admitting that while the inquiry ordered by the President established that 'insofar as the authorities in Washington are concerned there was no authorization for any such flight as described by Mr. Khruschev,' such a flight over the Soviet Union to gather information was probably undertaken, and it justified such activities necessary 'given the state of the world today' and that the Soviet Government's rejection of the President's 'open skies' proposal in 1955."1
On May 10, the United States Embassy in Moscow sent a note to the Soviet Government requesting permission to interview Francis Gary Powers, the pilot of the U2 plane. "On the same day, the Soviet Foreign Ministry delivered a note to the Embassy replying to the U.S. note of May 6. The Soviet note protested 'aggressive acts of American aviation' and warned that 'if similar provocations are repeated, it will be obliged to take retaliatory measures."1 President Eisenhower decided, in response to this note from the Soviet Government, to cut off all activities that the Soviet Government may view as provocative.
Eisenhower left for the summit conference by plane on May 14, 1960, and arrived in Paris on May 15, 1960. President Charles de Gaulle received a copy of France from Nikita Khruschev of the United Soviet Socialist Republic, demanding that President Eisenhower denounce all U-2 flights over the Soviet Union as provocative, and also demanded that Eisenhower renounced all U-2 flights over the Soviet Union all together. Eisenhower agreed with Khruschev and announced that there would be no more U-2 flights over the USSR in his administration.
That was not enough for the Soviets. On May 18, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko asked the United Nations Security Council to consider the question of "aggressive acts by the United States Air Force against the Soviet Union, creating a threat to universal peace."1
Francis Gary Powers was tried, and later convicted of espionage by the Military Division of the Supreme Court of the USSR.
Fidel Castro, in order to create tension with the United States of America, seized all American-owned properties. Castro seized American oil refineries, sugar mills, and electric utilities. If the United States Government wasn't mad enough from the United Soviet Socialist Republic/United States U-2 Spy Plane Affair, Castro's actions made the United States Government even angrier.
"Mr. President, I address this message to you at an hour of anxiety fraught with danger to world peace. An armed aggression has begun against Cuba,"4 began Khruschev's letter. He wrote in this letter that he knew that the Cuban exiles that invaded Cuba were trained in the United States. Nikita Khruschev also wrote that he knew that the United States of America owned the planes that bombed Cuba. "Once recently we (The United Soviet Socialist Republic, and the United States of America) exchanged views through our representatives. We spoke about the common desire of both sides to make joint efforts to improve relations between our countries and avert the danger of war.
"Your statement of a few days ago to the effect that the United States would not take part in military operations against Cuba produced the impression that the top echelons of the United States are aware of the consequences of aggression against Cuba to world peace and to the United States itself.
"How are we to understand what is really being done by the United States now that the attack on Cuba has become a fact?" Nikita Khruschev wrote this to President Kennedy after the Bay of Pigs Invasion. In my opinion, Khruschev wrote this to President John F. Kennedy to make him feel guilty, and try to patch up American/Soviet Relations. I believe this is why Nikita Khruschev wrote this letter to President John F. Kennedy, and my theory is also capable of being the right answer because later in the letter, Khruschev writes, "I earnestly appeal to you, Mr. President, to call a halt to the aggression against the Republic of Cuba. The military techniques and the world political situation are now such that any so-called 'small war' can produce a chain reaction in all parts of the world.
"As to the Soviet Union, there should be no misunderstanding of our position: we shall render the Cuban people and their Government all necessary assistance in beating back the armed attack on Cuba.
"We are sincerely interested, in a relaxation of international tension, but if others aggravate it, we shall reply in full measure. And, in general, it is hardly possible to handle matters in such a way as to settle the situation and distinguish the conflagration in one area and kindle a new conflagration in another.
"I hope the United States Government will take into account these considerations of ours, prompted as they are by the sole concern for preventing such steps which could lead the world to a military catastrophe."
Khruschev in the previous paragraphs is trying to threaten the United States, almost as if the United Soviet Socialist Republic was a bully beating up and threatening the United States, using peer pressure, for beating up a friend of the United Soviet Socialist Republic's, Cuba. This appears in several places in Khruschev's letter. This appears the most blatantly in the last paragraph, "I hope that the United States Government will take into account these considerations of ours, prompted as they are by the sole considerations of ours, prompted as they are by the sole concern for preventing such steps which could lead the world to a military catastrophe." Here, the "military catastrophe" represents a schoolyard brawl.
Another example of this metaphor is in the paragraph, "I earnestly appeal to you, Mr. President, to call a halt to the aggression against the Republic of Cuba. The military techniques and the world political situation now are such that any so-called 'small-war' can produce a chain reaction in all parts of the world." Here the symbolism states that if a small fight between the United States of America, and the United Soviet Socialist Republic were to occur, other kids in the schoolyard, or countries in this case, would help out the bully, the United Soviet Socialist Republic, fight against the little weakling, the United States of America.
However, the bully, the United Soviet Socialist Republic, is giving the United States of America a chance to avoid a fight. "It is yet not too late to prevent the irreparable. The Government of the United States still can prevent the flames of war kindled by the interventionists on Cuba from spreading into a conflagration which it will be impossible to cope with." Here, the bully is giving the United States a chance to avoid the fight. The "flames of war kindled by the interventionists" is actually according to the symbolism, the fight that was started because the United States won't intervene between Cuban-Soviet relations.
The paragraph says "the flames of war kindled by the interventionists on Cuba from spreading into a conflagration which it will be impossible to cope with." The fact that they say it will be "impossible to cope with" means that the bully will torment the underdog every single day, until the United States finally surrenders.
"We are sincerely interested in a relaxation of international tension, but if others aggravate it, we shall reply in full measure. And in general, it is hardly possible to handle matters in such a way as to settle the situation and distinguish the conflagration in one area and kindle a new conflagration in another." This is the bully's way of telling the underdog that if anyone helps out the United States of America then the United Soviet Socialist Republic will ignite its rage against the underdog, and have a very brutal fight.
President John F. Kennedy wrote back to Premier Nikita Khruschev. "Mr. Chairman: You are under a serious misapprehension in regard to events in Cuba. For months there has been evident and growing resistance to the Castro dictatorship.
"More than 100,000 refugees have recently fled from Cuba into neighboring countries. Their urgent hope is naturally to assist their fellow Cubans in their struggle for freedom. Many of these refugees fought alongside Dr. Castro against the Batista dictatorship; among them are prominent leaders of his own original movement and government.
"These are unmistakable signs that Cubans found intolerable the denial of democratic liberties and the subversion of the 26 of July Movement by an alien-dominated regime. It cannot be surprising that, as resistance within Cuba grows, refugees have been using whatever means are available to return and support their countrymen in the continuing struggle for freedom. Where people are denied the right of choice, recourse to such struggle is only the means of achieving their liberties.
"I have previously stated and I repeat now that the United States intends no military intervention in Cuba. In the event of any military intervention by an outside force we will immediately honor our obligations under the inter-American system to protect this hemisphere against external aggression.
"While refraining from military intervention in Cuba, the people of the United States do not conceal their admiration for Cuban patriots who wish to see a democratic system in an independent Cuba. The United States Government can take to action to stifle the spirit of liberty.
"I have taken careful note of your statement that the events in Cuba might affect peace in all parts of the world. I trust that this does not mean that the Soviet Government, using the situation in Cuba as a pretext, is planning to inflame other areas of the world. I would like to think that your Government has too great a sense of responsibility to embark upon any enterprise so dangerous to general peace.
"I agree with you as to the desirability of steps to improve the international atmosphere. I continue to hope that you will cooperate in opportunities now available to this end.
"A prompt cease-fire and peaceful settlement of the dangerous situation in Laos, cooperation from the United Nations in the Congo and a speedy conclusion of an acceptable treaty for the banning of nuclear tests would be constructive steps in this direction.
"The regime in Cuba could make a similar contribution by permitting the Cuban people freely to determine their own future by democratic processes and freely to cooperate with their Latin-American neighbors.
"I believe, Mr. Chairman, that you should recognize that free peoples in all parts of the world do not accept the claim of historical inevitability for Communist revolution.
"What your Government believes is its own business; what it does in the world is the world's business. The great revolution in this history of man, past, present, and future, is the revolution of those determined to be free."
This reply also carries the same theme in its symbolism. This is the attempted comeback of the underdog to the bully. This is particularly obvious in the paragraph, "While refraining from military intervention in Cuba, the people of the United States do not conceal their admiration for Cuban patriots who wish to see a democratic system in an independent Cuba. The United States Government can take no action to stifle the spirit of liberty." This paragraph symbolizes the underdog, the United States of America is trying to stand strong and say that Cuba's citizens want to come to the United States of America and change their government to democratic like the United States', but then, the United States tries to not insult the bully by saying at the end of the letter, "What your Government does is its own business." But, then again, to stand strong, the United States replies, "what it does in the world is the world's business", but is does not necessarily say it is the United States' business.
Castro/Khruschev relations are very good, as obvious above, but Khruschev and his United Soviet Socialist Republic were shielding the Republic of Cuba, partially because it had no defense, and strategically, it was a very valuable place, just ninety miles of the coast of Florida, in the United States of America. Although, the letters above were written just afterward the Bay of Pigs Invasion, and later, Khruschev will use Cuba to his advantage, and setup nuclear weapons on the small island. Needless to say, this was a very valuable island to Khruschev.
The Inspector Generals Survey of the Cuban Operation was the internal document inside the Central Intelligence Agency explaining the failure. The document was written by the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency, and was kept in his files in the Agency's building in Washington. It was released under the Freedom of Information Act on February 21st, 1998, to an organization on the World Wide Web called the National Security Archives. This organization is a non-profit organization that through its web page gives the public, such as myself, Government documents, some of which, used to have been top secret.
As it says in the introduction of this document, "This is the Inspector General's report on the Central Intelligence Agency's ill-fated attempt to implement national policy by overthrowing the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba by means of a covert paramilitary operation."2 It also says that the purpose of this document is "to describe weaknesses and failures disclosed by the study, and to make recommendations for their correction and avoidance in the future…It does not describe or analyze in detail the purely military phase of the effort…In preparing the survey the Inspector General and his representatives interviewed about 125 Agency employees of all levels and studied a large quantity of documentary material."2
The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation states that President Dwight Eisenhower authorized the following by approving a paper entitled "A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime":
"a. Formation of a Cuban exile organization to attract Cuban loyalties, to direct opposition activities, and to provide cover for Agency operations.
b. A propaganda offensive in the name of the opposition.
c. Creation inside Cuba of a clandestine intelligence collection and action apparatus to be responsive to the direction of the exile organization
d. Development outside Cuba of a small paramilitary force to be introduced into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance groups."
The concept was for the Cuban exile council to serve as cover for the United States Government by acting as a group of American businessmen. When the United States Government went along to plan and doing actions making the actions themselves publicly known, but since there was cover, "the hand of the U.S. Government would not appear"2 because of the Cuban exile group, which would later form a group called FRD.
This document states that the reason for invasion of Cuba by the United States of America was a way to stop communism from spreading to the Western Hemisphere, near the United States, a world power and a Democracy. The United States Government felt it was a danger to National Security, which eventually it was during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The history of the Bay of Pigs, or for now the Cuban Operation, began in 1959, shortly after Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar was overthrown by Fidel Castro. The Central Intelligence Agency needed a way to accomplish a second revolution in Cuba, this time a Democratic revolution. The Central Intelligence Agency developed a Branch of the Western Hemisphere Division, a division of the Central Intelligence Agency, which handled Intelligence efforts on the Western Hemisphere of the earth. This branch was named Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four, or WH/4 as an abbreviation.
WH/4 was an expandable task force in charge of the Cuban Operation, and involved in the all the aspects as mentioned in the previous list on page 14. Each aspect of the operation had a different are to work from. The recruiting center for the Cuban Exile group was in Miami, with a second on in Cuba. The propaganda aspect was located in several different areas across the continent. For example, there was one powerful "gray" radio station in Massachusetts, there was another radio station posing as a legitimate commercial station on Swan Island. A television show in Spanish was created in Miami, and several written publications were created including a newspaper named Avance, and even an Anti-Castro comic book!
Inside Cuba a clandestine intelligence group was created with the sole purpose of being responsive to the Cuban exile group. Out side Cuba there was a small paramilitary group with the plan to enter Cuba when deemed necessary to organize, train, and lead resistance groups.
The actual Bay of Pigs Invasion begins in the year 1959, and ends with the Cuban victory on April 19, 1961. The Invasion became official on March 17, 1960, when President Eisenhower authored a paper titled, "A Program of Covert Action Agency Against the Castro Regime". This authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to undertake the following:
"a. Formation of a Cuban exile organization to attract Cuban loyalties, to direct opposition activities, and to provide cover for Agency operations.
b. A propaganda offensive in the name of the opposition.
c. Creation inside Cuba of a clandestine intelligence collection and action apparatus to be responsive to the direction of the exile organization.
d. Development outside Cuba of a small paramilitary force to be introduced into Cuba to organize, train, and lead resistance groups."2
Eisenhower also approved the budget for the operation, which totaled
$4, 400,000. This included "Political action, $950,000; propaganda, $1,700,000; paramilitary, $1,500,000; intelligence collection, $250,000."2
The plan was to train Cuban exiles, which would serve as a cover for action by the Central Intelligence Agency, which became known by the public. All Central Intelligence Agency personnel that had any contact with the Cuban public would have a separate identity as an American businessman. This would hide all United States Government involvement.
In August 1959, the Chief of the Paramilitary Group attended a meeting to discuss the creation of a paramilitary group, to be used in Latin American crisis situations. He setup a small, proprietary airline for future use. At this time, Cuba was only one of may possible targets.
The Bay of Pigs operation starts in 1959, however, "Formal U.S. Government adoption of the project occurred on 17 March 1960, when, after preliminary preparations by the agency, President Eisenhower approved an Agency paper titled 'A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime' and thereby authorized the Agency to undertake this program."2 Several sub-programs were set up. The propaganda team was set up to release propaganda offensive of the Castro administration. The US government also recruited Cuban exiles, to set up an organization to "attract Cuban Loyalties, to direct opposition, and to provide cover for Agency operations 2 The government also set up a clandestine intelligence organization to work alongside the Cuban exile organization. Outside Cuba, the government set up a "small paramilitary force to be introduced into Cuba to organize, train, and lead resistance groups.
"In 1959, the Chief of the Agency's Paramilitary Group attended a meeting [Blacked out] to discuss the creation of a paramilitary capability to be used in Latin America Crisis situations."2 Cuba was considered a crisis situation in Latin America. Cuba, however, was only one of many possible targets. The chief of the Paramilitary Group began a group of staff studies for the WH (Western Hemisphere Division.) The WH setup the paramilitary staff. The chief also setup a small airline for future use. In January 1960, the WH setup WH/4, an expandable sub-division to run the operation. The initial WH/4 consisted of forty people. Eighteen were at the WH/4 Headquarters, twenty at Havana Station, and two at the Santiago Base.
WH/4 negotiated for a training center in Panama. The officers searched Miami, Florida, for office space, warehouses, safe sites, recruiting centers, a communications center, and bases for "the movement of persons, materiel, and propaganda into or out of Cuba."2
The CIA WH/4 division started to setup radio outlets in Massachusetts, and two others that were blacked out in the "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation". The division also worked out that a powerful "gray" station on Swan Island, could be setup in two months. Another propaganda operation besides the radio station was setup after the CIA confiscated a Cuban Newspaper, and arranged for a special propaganda anti-Castro edition to be published.
"In the last months of 1959 the Special Group, composed of representatives of several departments and agencies and charged by NSC 5412 with responsibility for policy approval of major covert operations, considered several agency proposals for exile broadcasts to Cuba. During January and February of 1960 the Director of Central Intelligence informed the Special Group of Agency planning with regard to Cuba, and on 14 March an entire meeting was devoted to discussion of the Agency's Program."2
"The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is reported to have said that forces totaling 50,000 men were ready if needed and that the first of them could be ready within four hours after receipt of orders." 2
One problem may have been that the Central Intelligence Agency did not pay enough attention to the operation, thus not giving it the time it deserved, thus, making it perfectly clear why the operation failed, right? Wrong. Section B, Paragraph 15 of the Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation clearly states, "The project to unseat Castro had become a major Agency activity with the highest policy sanction, engaging the full-time activity of the personnel of a rapidly expanding operation in higher Agency echelons and entailing frequent liaison with other agencies and departments of the Government."2
"Late September 1960 saw almost simultaneous occurrence of the first maritime operation and the first air drop over Cuba. The former was successful. The latter, the first of a series of failures, resulted in the capture and execution of a paramilitary agent on whom the project had set a great store."2
There were more successful maritime operations; most of them took place in late 1960, before severe winter weather began to make them almost impossible. Another problem was that the project only had one boat regularly available during this time, and creating a resistance in a clandestine fashion with only one boat takes a very long time. This sense of impossibility was increased when word got to the division that Castro's army was strengthened with thirty to forty thousand tons of Bloc arms, and the fact that Cuban Government internal security was being heightened. The sense of impossibility, however, wore off when the Nicaraguan Government offered the Central Intelligence Agency Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four an airstrip and docking facilities. This brought the United States 250 miles closer to Cuba from Guatemala.
"Propaganda activity had gotten off to an early start and had developed rapidly. After an initial shakedown period Radio Swan had gone on the air first with anti-Trujillo, then with ant-Castro broadcasts. Radio programs were also originating from Miami and [Blacked out]. The newspaper Avance in Exile was being published by the end of the summer, and a second paper and a weekly magazine were planned…
"By the end of August the FRD had a lawyer team set for a Latin American propaganda tour and was ready with its first broadcast on Radio Swan, which was reported to be getting world-wide reception with many listeners in Cuba. An anti-Castro comic book was being reprinted, and a Spanish-language television program was being prepared in Miami.
"At the end of August WH/4 Branch was reporting that a machine run search had failed to find any bilingual Agency employee suitable as a Radio Swan announcer. (This search went on for some time. On 28 December the branch reported finding a candidate, but an 18 January 1961 that he had backed out.)" 2 On November 29th 1960 President Eisenhower gave a general go-ahead signal to the Western Hemisphere Division of the Central Intelligence Agency and reaffirmed it on January 3rd, 1961, but turned it down shortly afterward. This caused the cancellation of a proposed propaganda drop.
There were some financial problems with Radio Swan. To publicize it, which served a double purpose to enhance its cover as a legitimate commercial radio station, it needed to advertise.
Bohemia Libre, weekly propaganda magazine, was budgeted at $300,000 but it actually cost about $35,000 an issue. It did not do well, because it had bad luck selling advertising, and even missed an issue because it could not sell enough advertising to produce the magazine, for that week. Additional funding had been requested several times. However, despite the hardships it went through, its circulation was 126,000, second to Reader's Digest in the Spanish-Language field.
Propaganda played a major role in the Bay of Pigs Operation. The exile periodical Avance, whose plant in Havana was seized by Castro, was being prepared. The Government purchased a boat for anti-Castro marine broadcasts, and the Swan Island radio station, was on the air with test signals by May 17th.
The budget for the operation was estimated at $4, 400, 000. $950,000 was assigned for political action, the propaganda division received $1,700,000; paramilitary received $1,500,000; and finally the last $250,000 went toward intelligence collection.
The Agency did not stick to their plan budget-wise. On July 1st, 1960, The Western Hemisphere Division of the Central Intelligence Agency estimated costs for the next four weeks at $1,700,000 and for the fiscal year they estimated $25,000,000. On August 19th the Western Hemisphere Division requested an additional $10,000,000 and all $10,000,000 was obtained!
On November 4th, 1960, WH/4 decided to change the focus of the operation by expanding the paramilitary unit and running the operation on more conventional military lines. This caused recruiting efforts to be increased at the Guatemala base where 475 trainees were stationed. The breakdown was 101 air trainees, 370 paramilitary trainees, and six specialists that included doctors, dentists, and chaplains. After a long chain of events, this lead to WH/4 needing more funding. Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four reported it only had $2,250,000 left in the fiscal year. Another estimate was given and the Bureau of the Budget granted WH/4 another $28,200,000.
That was the large scale, but there were, however, financial problems on a smaller scale. To publicize Radio Swan, and to enhance its cover, the radio station took out ads in local newspapers. In the next few weeks, Radio Swan received a total of $330 in gifts.
On 24 March 1960 the project was approved by the director of Central Intelligence in the initial amount of $900,000 for the rest of Fiscal Year 1960. However, only two weeks later, on 7 April, WH/4 Branch reported that 85% of the $900,000 had been obligated. By 30 June an additional $1,000,000 was obligated. "2
This money was needed, for Western Hemisphere Division Brach Four grew considerably from January 1960, when it had just forty employees, to April 16, 1961, when it became one of the largest branches in the Clandestine Services division, with 588 employees. This statistic does not include the air operations personnel, because they worked for the Development Projects Division (DPD), which was a lot of people.
Earlier in the document, the Inspector General wrote about a group of agents posing as American businessmen. Now, it goes in to more detail. These project political action officers; created a group known as Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD) was agreed upon on May 11, 1960.
Propaganda played a major role in the Bay of Pigs Operation. The exile periodical Avance, whose plant in Havana was seized by Castro, was being prepared. The Government purchased a boat for anti-Castro marine broadcasts, and the Swan Island radio station, was on the air with test signals by May 17th.
Propaganda was not the only aspect developing at this time. $25,000 worth of sterile arms was sent to the Panama training base, which had been open since May 11th. A Miami Base was opened May 25th in the Coral Gables business district under the cover of a New York career development and placement firm, and was backed up by a Department of Defense contract. On June 15th, a communications site with military cover, was setup at the former Richmond Naval Air Station, which was being leased by the University of Miami. Safe houses were also purchased in the Miami area.
By June, the American press was beginning to "nibble" at the operation, especially Radio Swan, the Swan Island radio station, implying that it was not completely legitimate.
In July 1960, the air training program got underway when the Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four began screening Cuban recruits to be pilots, and negotiating with the Defense Department for twelve AD-5s and the Navy for seventy-five instructors and maintenance personnel. By mid June, twenty-nine Cuban Exiles had arrived at the Panama training facility to begin training in small-unit infiltration.
In August 1960, the President was briefed with the following briefing paper: "The initial phase of paramilitary operations envisages the development, support and guidance of dissident groups in three areas of Cuba: Piper del Rio, Escambray and Sierra Maestra. These groups will be organized for concerted guerilla action against the regime.
"The second phase will be initiated by combined sea-air assault by FRD forces on the Isle of Pines coordinated with general guerilla activity on the main island of Cuba. This will establish a close-in staging base for future operations.
"The last phase will be air assault on the Havana area with the guerilla forces in Cuba moving on the ground from these areas into the Havana area also."2
The finance aspect was running off schedule, much farther away from the original estimates. The Western Hemisphere Division estimated operating expenses for four weeks, beginning July 1st at $1,700,00, and approximately $25,000,000 for the fiscal year. On August 19th the Division added an additional $10,000,000, and was received. Half of the total $35 Million was for paramilitary expenses and about two million dollars was for propaganda.
Anti-Castro Regime Propaganda broadcasts and newspapers had taken off early and developed quickly. Besides from Radio Swan, there were also anti-Castro radio shows originating from Miami and from another undisclosed location. By the end of the summer, Avance in Exile, the propaganda newspaper, was being published, and two more were being planned. An anti-Castro television program in Spanish was being prepared in Miami, and even an ant-Castro comic book was being printed.
A computer-ran search for a bilingual Western Hemisphere Division employee capable of being a radio-swan announcer had failed to find one. However, on December 28th, it found one, but he backed out January 18th 1961. The computer did not find another match.
"1.The Central Intelligence Agency, after starting to build up the resistance and guerilla forces inside Cuba, drastically concerted the project into what rapidly became an overt military operation. The Agency failed to recognize that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility as well as Agency capability.
"2.The Agency became so wrapped up in the military operation that it failed to appraise the [blurred] of [blurred] realistically. Furthermore, it failed to keep the national policy-makers adequately and realistically informed of the conditions considered essential for success, and it did not [burred] sufficiently for prompt policy decisions in a fast moving situation.
"3.As the project grew, the Agency reduced the exiled leaders to the status of puppets, thereby losing the advantages of their active participation.
"4.The Agency failed to build up and supply a resistance organization under rather favorable conditions. Air and boat operations showed up poorly.
"5. The Agency failed to collect adequate information on the strengths of the Castro regime and the extent of the opposition to it; and it failed to evaluate the available information correctly.
"6.The project was badly organized. Command lines and [blurred] controls were ineffective and useless. Senior Staffs if the Agency were not utilized; air support stayed independent of the project; the role of the large forward [blurred] was not clear.
"7.The project was not staffed with top-quality people, and a number of people were not used to the best advantage.
"8. The Agency entered the project without adequate [blurred] in the way of [blurred], bases, training facilities, [blurred][blurred], Spanish-speakers, and similar essential ingredients of a successful operation. [Blurred] these been already in being, such time and effort would have been saved."2
Although the planning was going along smoothly, it was taking to long for the Cuban exiles to wait, and several went AWOL. "In late March the [blacked out] ostensible owner of the Swan Island radio station, thanked all the sponsored of political programs and advised them that no more tapes would be required; purpose of this action was to clear the way for a unity program during the action phase of the operation."2 Although the mission was being prepared and almost ready, the Guatemala Camp was accepting trainees as late as the week of April 4th.
Flights over Cuba were suspended on March 28th. The Government gave two reasons for the suspension. "(a) That the aircraft were needed to move the strike force from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, for embarkation on the invasion ships; (b) that the Agency wished to avoid any incident, such as a plane being downed over Cuba, which might upset the course of events during the critical pre-invasion period."2
Three Cuban airfields were raided by eight B-26s on April 15th, and resulted in destroying about half of Castro's air force, which was estimated by post-strike photography.
Attacks were not the only aspect of the invasion that was increasing. Propaganda efforts were increased. Before D-Day, Radio Swan as well as other propaganda outlets were broadcasting eighteen hours a day on medium wave, and sixteen hours a day on short wave. "Immediately after D-Day, these totals were increased to 55 hours and 26 hours, receptively. Fourteen frequencies were used. By the time of the invasion a total of 12,000,000 pounds of leaflets had been dropped on Cuba." 2
Late on April 16th, the eve of D-Day, the air strikes planned to destroy the rest of Castro's air force were called off.
"The invasion fleet which had assembled off the south coast of Cuba on the night of 16 April included two LCIs owned by the Agency, a U.S. Navy LSD carrying three LCUs and four LCVPs, all of them pre-loaded with supplies, and even charted commercial freighters. All these craft participated in the assault phase, except for three freighters which were loaded with follow-up supplies for ground and air-forces. These vessels were armed with 50-caliber machine guns. In addition, each LCI mounted two 75-mm. Recoilless rifles.
"In addition to the personal weapons of the Cuban exile soldiers, the armament provided for combat included sufficient numbers of Browning automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and flame-throwers. There were also five M-41 tanks, 12 heavy trucks, an aviation fuel tank truck, a tractor crane, a bulldozer, two large water trailers, and numerous small trucks and tractors." 2
A total of 1,511 men fought in the invasion, all of them were on the invasion ships, except for one airborne infantry company comprised of 177 men. The entire brigade included five infantry companies, one heavy weapons company, on intelligence-reconnaissance company, and one tank platoon.
"These troops had been moved by air on three successive nights from the Guatemala training camp to the staging area in Nicaragua where they embarked in the ships which had been pre-loaded at New Orleans. The ships had moved on separate courses from Nicaragua, under unobtrusive Navy escort, to the rendezvous 40 miles offshore in order to avoid the appearance of a convoy. From there they had moved in a column under cover of darkness to a point 5,000 yards to the landing area, where they met the Navy LSD. These complicated movements were apparently accomplished in a secure manner and without alerting the enemy." 2
Three follow-up ships were scheduled to arrive in Cuba, one from Nicaragua was supposed to come
The article's writers, Christopher Dickey, Evan Thomas, and Gregory L. Vistica decided to not write anything about the real Bay of Pigs Invasion, just about the $20 Million operation that President Bush started after the end of the Persian Gulf War.
The Central Intelligence Agency sent a man whose code name was "Bob". "Bob" spoke fluent Arabic, and new how to wear a turban that looked right, so he blended right into Iraqi society. He came to Iraq January 1995, armed with an AK-47, a computer that he operated from his temporary home in Salah ad Din, Iraq, and knowing that Ahmed Chalabi, an MIT-trained banker that was convicted of embezzlement of tens of millions of dollars in a Jordanian court, was the operation head.
So far, everything sounds ok, right? So far it is. This is about to take a change for the worse, and become more and more like the Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961. While he was there, "Bob" allied with Kurdish exiles because the Central Intelligence Agency had betrayed them in the past, and made arrangements for these exiles fight alongside the United States Government against Saddam Hussein. The Kurds were willing to fight Hussein because they were trying to build a homeland in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, and if they could defeat Iraq, they could receive some land. Does any of this sound familiar yet? It could be because this is exactly what happened at the beginning of the preparations for the Bay of Pigs Invasion, except it was with Cuban exiles instead of Kurdish exiles trying to build a homeland in the Middle East!
This all ended in 1996, when the Iraqis found out about the operation, they sent out a group of tanks that killed the resistance fighters. The tanks killed the fighters, and The United States Government gave word to stop the operation.
That was not the end of tense moments between Cuba and the United Soviet Socialist Republic and the United States of America. For exactly two weeks beginning on October 15, the Cuban Missile Crisis existed. On October 15, a U-2 spy plane piloted by Richard Heyser revealed SS-4 nuclear missiles in Cuba all aimed at various points in the United States. The missile silos were disguised as trees, or at least the communists tried to disguise them as trees.
On October 16, the next day, President John Fitzgerald Kennedy was informed of this sighting during breakfast. He called a meeting of EX-COMM, his twelve most important advisors. According to EX-COMM, Khruschev would retaliate no matter what action they took. Still, Kennedy called a blockade to begin at 10 am Eastern Daylight Time on October 24th 1962.
President John F. Kennedy was able to talk Khruschev into disabling the missiles on October 26th , but on October 27th, Khruschev demanded to renegotiate terms. On October 28th, 1962, Khruschev had agreed to remove all missiles from the Republic of Cuba.
In the next several years, the CIA still had a tense time with the USSR, and the Republic of Cuba. In the internal memo" Views of a Cuban Official on the future of Cuban-United States Relations, it says that the United States would be able to intervene without any consequences if the Vietnam War escalated and all the other powers concentrated on Vietnam, not Cuba.
In 1964, the Cuban exiles planned a March on Washington. The would begin in front of the Pan-American Union Building then march to the Lincoln Memorial where they would conduct a rally. This is described in Planned March on Washington by Cuban Exiles on 21 July 1964 at Start of OAS Sessions on the Cuban Problem.
As of March 1968, The USSR was still giving Cuba economic aid. This went on despite Castro's attacks on Soviet policies. If Soviet economic aid was cut-off, the Cuban economy was in such bad condition, it would cause an economic crisis in Cuba. This is described in Continued Soviet Economic Aid to Cuba and Public Soviet Attacks on Castro's Interference in Other Communist Parties.
The United States Policy was to isolate Cuba from the rest of the free world on December 12th, 1963. The United States' plan was to replace the Castro regime and replace it with an administration that would be fully compatible with the United States of America. "In the last analysis, however, there are only two courses which would eliminate the Castro regime at an early date: an invasion or a complete blockade. Both of the se actions would result in a major crisis between the US and the USSR (in Cuba and/or Berlin) and would produce substantial strains in the fabric of US relations with other countries-allied as well as neutral. To a greater extent than in any of the courses discussed above, OAS support would be important, if not critical, in reducing the risks and in increasing the practical and political effect of an invasion or a blockade."3 This is described in Document 24, Cuba-A Status Report.
Despite the embarrassment and the Cuban Missile Crisis that came later, I personally think that the United States Government should stop trying to destroy and spend millions of dollars trying to destroy Communism, and instead, learn to live with it.
I personally think Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick said it best in The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation when he wrote, "Furthermore, it is essential to keep in mind that the possibility of an invasion was doomed in advance, that an initially successful landing by 1,500 men would eventually have been crushed by Castro's combined military resources strengthened by Soviet Bloc-supplied military materiel."